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Abstract In four empirical chapters, matching analysis is employed to estimate the effects of specific contractual and regulatory arrangements on particular deal outcomes in the UK takeover market. The first chapter highlights the positive effect of earnout financing on the acquiring firms’ returns in private target acquisitions. Furthermore, this chapter offers a detailed example of how the non-parametric Propensity Score Matching, despite its growing popularity in financial research, can lead to inaccurate inferences when relevant private-target-specific factors are omitted from the analysis. The second chapter provides the first empirical examination of the effect of the earnout’s terms on the premium offered to the target firm’s shareholders, and how information asymmetry concerns influence this premium. Additionally, the findings indicate that increases in the premia are negatively interpreted by the market in non-earnout financed deals. However, this negative effect is neutralised in comparable earnout financed deals. The third chapter provides the first empirical contribution that highlights the deal- and firm-related factors that contribute to the growing reliance on the Scheme of Arrangement, as a substitute for the Contractual Offer, in conducting UK public target deals. Despite the concerns raised in the legal literature about the limited bargaining power of the target shareholders under the Scheme, the robust conclusions indicate that such shareholders manage to receive premia that are at least as high as the premia received by shareholders in comparable Offer deals. The fourth chapter employs a hand-collected dataset that covers the incidences of termination fee use in the UK takeover market. The main result is that, in the period preceding the ban that The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers had imposed on termination fees, the inclusion of these fees had a beneficial, or at worst neutral, effect on target shareholders’ wealth. Consequently, it is recommended that the Panel ends its ban.               
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Introduction The United Kingdom’s (UK) takeover market is the most active European market for corporate control (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). The study of the various contractual and regulatory arrangements in this market, their related innovations, and their impacts on the shareholders’ wealth represent a fruitful area of research that is of great interest to both regulators and market participants. On the regulatory front, the UK constitutes a successful model whereby self-regulation is presented as an efficient alternative to both direct litigation and formal government-led interference in addressing takeover-related challenges (Armour and Skeel, 2007). Along these lines, a detailed analysis of the particular takeover-related arrangements imposed by The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, which is the self-regulatory body in charge of addressing takeover-related matters in the City of London, is highly valued by European regulators that aim to emulate the UK model (Armour et al., 2009). Furthermore, given the presence of various forms of contractual innovations that are used to address information asymmetry problems in the UK market, merger advisors and stock market investors would value additional guidance on the determinants of the decision to introduce particular contractual tools in takeovers. These market participants would also value a detailed analysis of the wealth effects that arise from the introduction of these specific contractual innovations in mergers deals. This thesis provides a detailed investigation of three critical aspects of the UK takeover market. These aspects are: (a) the use of earnouts in the financing process of private target acquisitions, (b) the emergence of the Scheme of Arrangement as the main takeover method in public target acquisitions, and (c) the inclusion of target termination fees in public target deals along with the ban that The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers imposed on the use of these fees. In the following lines, the relevance of each of these aspects is discussed and the research questions and main findings are summarised. Earnout financing is a mechanism by which the acquisition deal has a two-payment structure: (a) an initial upfront payment settled at the time of the deal’s announcement, and (b) a deferred payment linked to the target firm’s satisfaction of pre-determined performance requirements before a pre-specified date following the acquisition’s announcement (Kohers and Ang, 2000). By deferring a significant portion of the deal payment and linking its settlement to the target’s performance, the acquirer reduces the likelihood of overpaying the target (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Datar et al., 2001). Along these lines, earnouts are more likely to be employed when acquiring private targets, which are hard to value due to a lack of frequently audited financial statements and an absence of market valuation for their shares (Capron and Shen, 2007). Furthermore, the presence of a deferred payment incentivises the 
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target firm’s experienced owners and skilled managers to keep running their firm as a subsidiary of the acquirer (Datar et al., 2001; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009).  The examination of the earnout’s wealth effect on a sample that is limited to private target deals is relevant given the challenging lack of publicly available private-target-specific information to be introduced in the form of covariates in the analysis. The previous UK-based study of Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) confirms the positive wealth effects enjoyed by the acquirers in the presence of earnout financing due to the earnout’s usefulness in addressing information asymmetry concerns. However, these results are based on the parametric regression analysis on a sample that covers public, private and subsidiary targets. Furthermore, the wealth effect of earnout financing in the Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) study is insignificant or at best significant at the 10% level in the analysis of private target deals. In Chapter Three, I aim to examine whether the use of the non-parametric Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method that has a growing popularity in financial research on a sample of private target deals, after introducing private-target-specific data to the analysis, would yield different economic conclusions about the wealth effects of earnout financing. In estimating the effect of a business strategy or a financial instrument on a particular outcome, PSM limits the empirical analysis to the evaluation of comparable observations which have close propensity scores estimated using a Logistic model that predicts the use of the particular strategy or instrument. This non-parametric method is supposed to allow more accurate estimations of treatment effects compared to the alternative parametric methods applied to samples containing observations that are not necessarily comparable (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Ho et al., 2007). Moreover, several important issues are still to be addressed in order to offer a clearer guidance to market participants on how an earnout contract is structured and how this structure influences the wealth effect of both the acquiring and the target firms. By how much should the offered premium increase to incentivise the target firm’s shareholders to accept the deferral of a larger part of the deal’s payment, for an even longer period, than the already agreed upon ones? Should the acquiring firm offer a high initial payment to the target firm’s shareholders in order to motivate them to accept the deal? Does the market interpret the increase in the premia in earnout financed deals as a signal of overpayment, thus leading to lower acquirer abnormal returns? These questions are carefully addressed in Chapter Four. After presenting a detailed summary of the main assumptions behind the PSM, Chapter Three shows that a merger consultant who relies on this method in the presence of a deficient dataset is likely to underestimate the wealth effects of earnout financing in private target deals. Consequently, this consultant will not recommend the use of earnout financing under conditions in which such a use can add significant wealth to the acquiring firm’s shareholders. As the 
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Logistic model estimating the propensity scores necessarily includes only observed covariates, PSM is a method that exclusively addresses the treatment effect estimation bias that is due to 
‘selection on observables’(p. 243) (Heckman and Robb, 1985). Chapter Three demonstrates how, when ‘selection on unobservables’ is the main source of bias, PSM can lead to inaccurate inferences. To emphasise this point, I re-apply PSM after introducing to the analysis a hand-collected variable that reflects the target firm’s pre-acquisition performance in order to make the matched deals relatively more comparable. After balancing the propensity scores and most of the key covariates on the matched sample, my results indicate that earnout financing leads to a significant 2.4% increase in the acquiring firm’s Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR). These results are due to the change in the structure of the matched samples: a significantly high portion of the non-earnout financed deals that end up in the matched sample when a private-target-specific covariate is included in the matching do not end up in the matched sample when this covariate is excluded. Given that the researcher does not have a priori certain knowledge of whether ‘selection on observables’ or ‘selection on unobservables’ is the main source of bias to be addressed, Chapter Three advocates combining the use of PSM with the sensitivity analysis developed by Rosenbaum (2002). This analysis quantifies the effect that a missing covariate should have in the Logistic model which estimates the propensity scores in order to alter the PSM’s conclusions. Indeed, the results of this sensitivity analysis indicate that, when the private target’s pre-acquisition performance measure is not included in the matching exercise, the conclusions of PSM indicating an insignificant wealth effect of earnout financing are highly sensitive to the effect of a missing covariate. However, the conclusions resulting from the matching exercise that controls for the target’s pre-acquisition performance are far less sensitive to the effect of a missing covariate. Surprisingly, despite the growing popularity of PSM in financial research, very few financial studies combine its use with a sensitivity analysis (Core, 2010). Following the emphasis on the guidance provided by the sensitivity analysis developed by  Rosenbaum (2002), this analysis is applied alongside PSM in Chapters Four, Five, and Six. By applying a parametric analysis on a matched sample established via PSM, Chapter Four shows that the magnitude of the compensations required by the target’s shareholders for accepting earnout financing is not homogenous across all earnout financed deals but is rather strongly dependent on the terms of each earnout contract. More specifically, an additional 10% increase in the relative earnout size is associated with, on average, a 6.45% higher premium.1 Moreover, my results indicate that a 1-month increase in the length of the earnout period is, on average, associated with a 0.6% higher premium. This chapter also shows that, when designing                                                           1 The relative earnout size is the maximum size of the deferred payment relative to the total deal value. 
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an earnout contract, moral hazard and adverse selection considerations lead to a specific rule of thumb based on which the merging firms divide the deal payment between initial and deferred payments. Specifically, despite the offering of a higher premium in an earnout financed deal relative to a comparable non-earnout financed one, moral hazard and adverse selection considerations lead the acquiring firm to insist on setting the initial payment in an earnout financed deal at a level that is lower than, or equal to, the full deal payment in a comparable non-earnout financed deal. This rule: (a) incentivises the target firm’s managers to co-operate with the acquirer and achieve the main objectives of the merger during the earnout period, and (b) limits the target managers’ incentives to exaggerate the extent of valuation disagreements in order to induce the use of the earnout as, otherwise, the initial payment they receive would remain considerably lower than, or at most equal to, the full single-payment in a non-earnout financed deal. If earnout financing allows the acquirer to ensure the deal’s completion while hedging against the risk of overpaying the target, the negative relationship between the premium and the acquirer’s short-run abnormal returns should be limited to non-earnout financed deals. My results are consistent with this view: an increase in the premia in non-earnout financed deals, which are comparable to earnout financed ones as identified via the PSM method, is interpreted as a signal of overpayment. This interpretation should lead to lower short-run abnormal returns for the acquirers’ shareholders (Alexandridis et al., 2013; Mueller and Sirower, 2003). However, the negative relationship between the premium and the acquirer’s abnormal returns is fully neutralised in earnout financed deals, as evidenced by the insignificant effect of the premium on the acquirer’s abnormal returns. The Scheme of Arrangement is a court-administered takeover method by which the public target’s shareholders are split, based on pre-determined criteria, into separate groups in which voting takes place to accept or reject a takeover bid (The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 2011). The procedures, regulations, ownership and tax ramifications characterising this method differ from those which characterise the traditional Contractual Offer. In particular, via the Contractual Offer, without the intervention of the court, the acquirer directly asks the target’s shareholders to tender their shares at the announced offered price. The guaranteed ownership of 100% of the target’s shares and the absence of the stamp duty taxes when the Scheme is used, combined with the recent procedural clarifications provided by both The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers and the courts, are contributing to the growing popularity of this takeover method (Boardman, 2012). However, Payne (2011) analyses the Scheme-related regulations and the attitude of the court to highlight the limited ability of the dissenting target shareholders to influence the takeover outcomes under this method.  
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Chapter Five, in addition to summarising the various regulatory and financial characteristics of the Scheme, examines the deal- and firm-related factors that make the use of this takeover method more likely. Additionally, this chapter provides the first empirical examination of the Scheme’s wealth effect on both the acquiring and the target firm’s shareholders in order to assess the validity of the concerns raised by Payne (2011).  The evidence that is presented in this chapter suggests that the likelihood of using the Scheme as a takeover method is positively influenced by the fraction of the deal’s stock financing. Given that detailed business- and synergy-related information are revealed by the acquiring firm to convince the target’s board of directors to accept stock financing, the immediate guarantee of an explicit completion of the deal through the sale of 100% of the target shares sets the Scheme as the favourable takeover method. Furthermore, the likelihood of the Scheme being used is influenced by the size of the target firm. More specifically, as the acquirers using the Scheme, rather than the Offer, do not pay the stamp duty that amounts to 0.5% of the deal value, the size of deal presents an important factor that is positively affecting the use of the Scheme takeover method. Likewise, the previously mentioned taxation, ownership, and guaranteed deal completion features of the Scheme make it more likely to be used: (a) in acquisitions initiated by private equity acquirers, and (b) when the target’s board of directors signs a binding termination fee agreement. Regarding the premia offered in Scheme and Offer deals, my initial multivariate analysis shows that, on average, the target shareholders in Scheme deals receive almost 7% higher premia than their counterparts in Offer deals. When matching analysis is employed, the effect of the takeover method on the offered premia becomes statistically and economically insignificant. Based on the Rosenbaum (2002)-bounds sensitivity analysis, the conclusions based on the latter analysis are found to be relatively insensitive to the effect of a missing covariate. These findings clearly indicate that the target shareholders, despite their theoretically weak relative bargaining power on the books, manage to receive premia that are at least as high as the premia received by their counterparts in comparable Offer deals.  With respect to the acquiring firm’s returns, my analysis indicates that the abnormal returns gained by acquirers in Scheme and Offer deals are not significantly different from each other. However, I document significant differences in the acquirers’ abnormal returns between the optimal and the sub-optimal use of the Scheme relative to the Offer. Specifically, before the year 2008 (the time at which the Panel issued formal clarifications of the Scheme’s procedures and timetable) the sub-optimal use of the Scheme was associated with at least 2.5% decline in the abnormal returns gained by acquirers. Hence, when the Scheme is not properly codified, its use in circumstances in which such a use is not recommended leads its economic costs (i.e. 
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delay in firms’ integration) and advisory fees to exceed its tax benefits, thus leading to lower abnormal returns. By including a Target Termination Fee Provision in the acquisition deal, the target firm’s board commits to pay the acquirer a sum that is capped at 1% of the announced deal value if the target firm’s shareholders eventually decide not to consummate the proposed deal (The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 2011). A growing body of empirical contributions based on takeover data from the United States (US) and Canada emphasises the beneficial, or at worst neutral, effects of Target Termination Fee Provisions on the premia received by the target shareholders (André et al., 2007; Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Boone and Mulherin, 2007; Damian and Rich, 2013; Officer, 2003). Nevertheless, The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers banned the inclusion of these provisions after claiming that their presence limits the options of the target boards during the takeover negotiations and, consequently, reduces the gains of the target shareholders (The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 2010). Chapter Six is the first study that examines: (a) the determinants of the inclusion of Target Termination Fee Provisions in UK public target acquisitions, and (b) the effect of such provisions on the premia received by the target shareholders. On the one hand, the dataset that is employed allows the analysis of the relationship between two alternative forms of commitments: those that are directly made by the target shareholders to accept the takeover bids and the Target Termination Fee Provisions granted by the boards. On the other hand, the examination of the effect of the Target Termination Fee Provisions on the premia provides the first investigation of whether the granting of these provisions reduces the gains of the target shareholders and, consequently, whether the Panel’s ban has empirical merits or not.  As the Target Termination Fee Provision binds the entire company rather than a particular group of shareholders, the evidence that I present suggests that the target’s board accepts the inclusion of this provision in order to motivate the bidder to proceed with the deal when the shareholders are reluctant to make fully binding commitments. However, a loyal target board would be hesitant to grant a termination fee provision unless the target’s shareholders agree in principle to complete the deal. Along these lines, I show that Target Termination Fee Provisions are more likely to be granted when the target shareholders offer weakly binding commitments that expire under particular conditions. This finding is relevant to the overall termination fees-related literature. While previous contributions mainly document either complementary (Jeon and Ligon, 2011) or trade-off (Boone and Mulherin, 2007) relations between the presence of a Target Termination Fee Provision and the target shareholders’ commitments, no previous studies examine how the degree to which these shareholders’ commitments are binding influences the decision to include a Target Termination Fee Provision.  
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With respect to the effect of Target Termination Fee Provisions on the premia, my findings suggest that the inclusion of these provisions in the acquisition deals is not to the detriment of the target shareholders. Particularly, the shareholders in deals which include these provisions receive premia that are, at least, as high as the premia paid in comparable deals which do not include these provisions. Furthermore, these provisions facilitate the consummation of acquisition deals with private acquirers that are willing to pay relatively high premia. Consequently, I recommend that the Panel end its ban. The remainder of this thesis consists of a general literature review related to the use of earnouts in addition to the four empirical chapters discussed above. Accompanying tables and appendices follow each chapter. Moreover, each chapter has its own conclusion section. Finally, some concluding remarks discussing the economic, regulatory and methodological ramifications of the findings are provided before presenting a detailed list of references.                    
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review on Earnouts 
2.1. Introduction  Reflecting the importance of takeovers in shaping the modern corporation, an influential body of literature studies how the methods of payment in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) allocate risks and rewards between the merging parties (Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Fuller et al., 2002; Hansen, 1987; Kohers and Ang, 2000; Travlos, 1987).2 Among the many important aspects associated with this literature, the incentives of the owners of the target firm to reveal private information to the acquirer and to work in line with the objectives of the new entity resulting from the merger are considerations that receive increasing attention. Particularly, a growing array of studies examines the determinants of the merging parties’ decision to rely on contingent payments, i.e. earnouts, in the deal financing process (Datar et al., 2001; Kohers and Ang, 2000; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009). Many of these contributions also examine the extent to which including an earnout in the deal provides additional gains to the shareholders of the merging firms compared to the case in which the earnout is not included (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Cadman et al., 2014; Kohers and Ang, 2000). When a deal includes an earnout, the selling firm receives only a portion of the deal payment at the time of the deal’s announcement. Under such an arrangement, the receipt of the remaining portion of the deal payment is conditional on the satisfaction of pre-specified performance requirements within a pre-determined period, i.e. the earnout period (Caselli et al., 2006).3 Extant literature shows that relying on this contractual arrangement helps achieve many objectives to the benefit of both the acquiring and the target firms.  First, by deferring a significant portion of the payment, the acquiring firm limits her exposure to the risk of target overvaluation during the deal’s announcement period (Kohers and Ang, 2000). Such a consideration is especially relevant when the acquiring firm has relatively limited financial resources and is consequently vulnerable to the effects of overpayment in the deal (Datar et al., 2001). In addition to this, the target overvaluation risk is likely to be prevalent                                                           2 Hansen (1987) develops a theoretical model which predicts the choice of the method of payment used, i.e. cash or stocks, while addressing the information asymmetry concerns of both the acquirer and the target. Faccio and Masulis (2005) develop empirical models which predict the choice of the payment method. In turn, Travlos (1987) and Fuller et al. (2002) empirically examine the effect of the choice of the payment method on the announcement period gains of the acquiring firms. Kohers and Ang (2000) present the first empirical contribution examining the determinants of the choice to defer a part of the deal payment to a future date. 3 These requirements are usually related to the target firm’s earnings, sales, and other company related measures (Datar et al., 2001). However, the settlements of the deferred payment in a minority of earnout contracts can be linked to the satisfaction of a non-performance-related requirement such as the regulatory approval of a particular drug (Cadman et al., 2013). Moreover, in the particular acquisition announcements that I cover in Chapters Three and Four, the settlement of the remaining payment is deferred for just a few months until the end of the auditing process of the target company. 
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in M&A deals in which the acquirer has limited knowledge of the target’s business activities (Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009). Second, the use of earnouts in the deal financing process facilitates the retention of the target’s specialised human capital in the acquiring company, at least during the earnout period (Datar et al., 2001; Kohers and Ang, 2000). More precisely, in order to receive the remaining portion of the deal payment, the selling firm’s owners usually keep running their business as an independent subsidiary of the acquiring firm during the integration period and employ their expertise in line with the acquisition’s objective (Datar et al., 2001). This managerial retention aspect of earnout financing is highly relevant given the informational advantage that these owners can have with respect to the target firm’s customers, suppliers and overall business environment (Coff, 2002).  Third, by bridging the valuation gap between the acquiring and target firms, the use of earnouts is an example of how specific contingent contractual arrangements help the market participants overcome the Akerlof (1970) scenario. Specifically, when the merging parties disagree about the accurate valuation of the target’s business, the earnout allows these parties to complete the transaction by making the settlement of a significant part of the deal that is subject to disagreement linked to future performance. By providing a context in which the merging parties can complete the deal while ‘agreeing to disagree’ (p. 445) (Kohers and Ang, 2000) without ending the acquisition negotiations, the earnout allows the acquiring firm to benefit from a business opportunity judged to be profitable by its directors. Furthermore, by addressing this valuation risk, the earnout is presented as a contractual tool dealing with the adverse selection problem: only the target owners that are confident with respect to the future prospects of their companies will accept the deferral of significant portions of their deal payments (Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009). Along similar lines, accepting the presence of earnout financing provides a valuable opportunity for the owners of unlisted companies that lack access to capital markets to sell their firms, especially when these owners face difficulties in signalling their value to investors (Becchetti and Trovato, 2002).     In this brief chapter, I review the previous literature related to: (a) the determinants of the merging parties’ decision to use the earnout, (b) the determinants of the variation in the terms of the earnout contract, (c) the acquiring and the target firms’ wealth effects arising from using earnouts in the deal financing process, and (b) the settlement of the earnout payment at the end of the earnout period as well as the fate of the target firm’s retained managers.  
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2.2. Determinants of the Earnout’s Presence This section provides an overview of the acquirer-, target-, and deal-related factors influencing the use of earnouts. It also highlights the earnout’s association with the use of the acquiring firm’s stocks as a payment method in the deal, especially as this form of financing represents an alternative form of contingent payment.4 
 
2.2.1. The earnout’s presence Stressing the relevance of valuation difficulties which characterise the acquisition of unlisted firms, earnout financing is more likely to be used in the acquisitions of private firms and in deals in which the target is a subsidiary that is being divested by its parent company (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Datar et al., 2001; Kohers and Ang, 2000). In both cases, the valuation difficulties are driven by the absence of a target-specific market value (Kohers and Ang, 2000). Furthermore, the lack of frequently updated financial statements in the case of private targets, and the lack of such statements evaluating the divested subsidiary’s performance  outside the scope of the parent’s business activities, also increase the magnitude of valuation difficulties and hence the favourability of earnout financing (Datar et al., 2001; Kohers and Ang, 2000). Similarly, earnouts are more likely to be used in the acquisition of new ventures with limited financial history rather than the acquisition of established mature companies (Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009).  Small acquirers have limited resources and are therefore more vulnerable to the consequences of target overvaluation (Kohers and Ang, 2000). Hence, earnout financing tends to be used in acquisitions announced by small acquirers and firms acquiring relatively large targets (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Kohers and Ang, 2000).5,6 These estimation-based results are complemented by the responses provided by the acquiring companies’ managers in the survey reported by Datar et al. (2001). Particularly, these managers present the overcoming of valuation differences as the main objective for relying on earnout financing in 51.85% of the cases (14 out of 27 cases covered).                                                            4 The papers reviewed in this chapter are based on different samples. The Kohers and Ang (2000) sample contains  7,072 acquisitions of US private and subsidiary targets between January 1st 1984 and June 30th 1996, the Datar et al. (2001) sample contains  8,298 acquisitions of US and non-US public, private and subsidiary targets announced by US public acquirers between January 1st 1990 and December 31st 1997, the Ragozzino and Reuer (2009) sample contains 1,174 private target acquisitions covered in the Secutiries and Data Corporation database between January 1st, 1993 and December 31st 2000, the sample covered by Cain et al. (2011) contains 725 acquisitions of US and non-US public, private and subsidiary targets announced by US public acquirers between January 1st 1994 and December 31st 2003, and the sample covered by Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) contains 4788 acquisitions of private, subsidiary and public targets by UK public acquirers between 1986 and 2008. Finally, the sample covered by Cadman et al. (2013) contains 10,816 acquisitions of private and non-private targets by US public firms between July 1st 2006 and June 30th 2011. 5 Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) also show that the earnout is more likely to be used in the acquisitions announced by young acquirers that usually lack the acquisition experience and know-how needed to accurately value and integrate their targets.  6 Ragozzino and Reuer (2009) also highlight the trade-off between earnout financing and minority equity ownership as alternative strategies for hedging against the valuation risk.   
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As recognised by Kohers and Ang (2000), the earnout’s functions of addressing valuation difficulties and retaining the target’s valuable human capital are not mutually exclusive. In particular, a critical part of the target’s value can be driven by the future performance of its human capital.7 This applies to high R&D and high growth companies which, in addition to being characterised by significant amounts of unrecorded and intangible assets, require the skills of specialised human capital in managing their day-to-day activities (Datar et al., 2001). Likewise, the evidence suggesting that earnouts are likely to be used in cross-industry acquisitions whereby the acquirer have limited knowledge of the target’s valuation and working environment, and consequently has to rely on the efforts of the target’s management team in the post-acquisition period, supports this notion (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Kohers and Ang, 2000; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009).  Nonetheless, as emphasised by Eckbo et al. (2009), poorly designed earnouts could distort the incentives of the merging partners. On the one hand, the target firm can focus on short-term performance to satisfy the earnout’s requirement at the expense of the long-term objectives of the acquiring firm. On the other hand, the acquiring firm can manipulate the target’s post-acquisition reported earnings in order to lower the likelihood of satisfying the earnout’s performance requirement, and consequently avoid the delivery of the deferred payment. Accordingly, the evidence presented by Kohers and Ang (2000) suggests that the use of earnouts in cross-border acquisitions takes place only when the acquiring firm belongs to a country with the same Common Law legal tradition as that of the targets in their sample. This finding emphasises the necessity of a homogenous legal framework in which potential disagreements can be solved as a critical determinant of the decision to rely on earnouts.  
2.2.2. The size of the earnout’s payment The relative size of the earnout payment, represented by the maximum size of the stated deferred payment scaled by the total deal value which is the sum of both the initial upfront and the maximum deferred payments, also received specific attention in the literature. In particular, the previously mentioned factors that represent valuation uncertainty and the importance of human capital are documented to have an effect on this variable that is qualitatively similar to their effect on the likelihood of the earnout’s use (Cain et al., 2011; Kohers and Ang, 2000; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009).    Cadman et al. (2013) show that the relation between the maximum stated earnout payment and the fair valuation of the earnout provides further insights on how earnout                                                           7 The results of the Datar et al. (2001) survey indicate that in 26.92% of the cases (7 out of 27 cases covered) the retention of the target’s human capital is the primary motive behind earnout financing while in 22.22% of the cases (6 out of 27) both the overcoming of valuation difficulties and the retention of the target’s human capital are primary motives.  
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contracts are designed to address information asymmetry problems. Mainly, the fair value of the earnout represents the present value of the earnout payment based on the acquiring firm’s assessment.8 The authors’ findings indicate that, when the earnout is used to incentivise the target managers to work in line with the acquirer’s objective, the earnout’s fair valuation lies in the midrange between 0 and the maximum earnout payment.9 The interpretation of this result is that when the fair value of the earnout is very low or very high relative to the maximum value of the earnout, the target managers are not incentivised to work in line with the acquisition’s objectives as they are confident that they will not receive any relevant deferred payments in the former case and assured that they will receive relatively high deferred payments in the latter. In turn, when the earnout is used to overcome valuation difficulties, the earnout’s fair value is set at a relatively low level compared to the maximum earnout payment. Such a result is expected given that the target firm’s valuation of its own assets is likely to be close to the maximum earnout value while the acquiring firm’s valuation is reflected in the earnout’s stated fair value.10 Furthermore, when the earnout is used as a compensation bonus to the retained target managers rather than a contractual tool to deal with valuation differences, the authors find that the earnout’s fair value is relatively close to the maximum deferred payment.  
2.2.3. The length of the earnout period The length of the earnout period has also received attention in the literature. Cain et al. (2011) show that that this length is negatively influenced by the target industry’s average returns and market-to-book value while it is positively related to the target industry’s average R&D-to-sales expenditures.  The findings related to the effect of the target industry’s returns are in line with the results of the literature emphasising the negative relation between the degree of uncertainty that characterise a transaction and the contract’s length (Brickley et al., 2006; Flannery, 1986).11 Furthermore, following Datar et al. (2001), I note that the high market-to-book values reflect the presence of a significant portion of unrecorded assets. This complicates the measurement of the target’s performance and, as a result, limits the period in which this performance can be monitored. In turn, the finding related to the positive impact of the target industry’s R&D-to-sales expenditures on the length of the earnout period is in line with the emphasis of Cain et al. 
                                                          8 The disclosure of the fair earnout value is mandated by a Statement of Financial Accounting Standards in 2007. 9 The author’s findings hold for the case of private and cross-industry targets in which the services offered by the target’s managers are likely to be valuable for the acquirer.  10 Accordingly, the authors show that the higher the degree of information asymmetry between the merging firms, as represented by the target’s research expenses-to-sales ratio, the lower the size of the earnout’s fair value relative to the earnout’s maximum value. 11 Flannery (1986), for example, argues that in the presence of large information asymmetries, firms issue short term debt contracts to avoid the information costs of long term debt contracts. 
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(2011) on the notion that stronger reliance on specialised human capital should lead to longer contracts in order to benefit from the services of the target’s managers.   
2.2.4. Relationship with stock financing The use of earnouts and the settlement of the deal payment using the acquiring firm’s securities are both characterised by a contingent aspect. Mainly, in both cases, the target firm’s owners realise higher gains when the company resulting from the merger performs better compared to the gains realised when this company has a poor performance. In the case of the earnout, the strong performance of this company increases the likelihood of satisfying the earnout’s performance requirement and, consequently, receiving the deferred payment. In the case of stock financing, the strong performance of the merged company is reflected by a high valuation of this company’s stocks and, accordingly, strong gains for the holders of these stocks. However, particular factors influence the favourability of one method over the other. First, as recognised by Hansen (1987), the contingent pricing function of stock financing becomes less relevant with the increase in the acquiring firm’s size relative to that of the target firm and hence with the reduction of the latter firm’s impact on market performance of the company resulting from the merger. Such concerns are less relevant in the case of earnout financing considering that the target firm operates as an independent subsidiary that aims to satisfy an accounting-based performance requirement (Datar et al., 2001). Furthermore, the information asymmetry with respect to the valuation of the acquiring firm’s securities creates a double lemons problem: while the acquirer might have concerns regarding the target’s true valuation, the target firm’s owners may well have concerns with respect to the use of overvalued securities by the acquirer in the acquisition’s financing process (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Travlos, 1987). As the deals that include earnouts are mostly settled with cash payments, the previously mentioned double lemons problem is less likely to be present in earnout financed deals (Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009). Second, the empirical literature shows that equity financing is less likely to be used when a shareholder who controls a weak majority in the acquiring firm runs the risk of losing her dominant position with the introduction of a new block of equity owners (Faccio and Masulis, 2005).12 Since the deals that include earnouts are not usually financed with stocks, such ownership concerns become less relevant.  In another context, Reuer et al. (2004) examine the determinants of the use of stock financing or earnouts, put together as a single method described as ‘contingent pay-outs’ (p. 19),                                                           12 The authors stress that these concerns do not hold when the percentage of shares owned by the controlling shareholder is too low (below 16%) or too high (above 60%). 
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compared to single cash payments in cross-border transactions made by US firms between 1995 and 1998. The authors’ main finding is that, in cross-border transactions, contingent pay-outs are more expected to be used in the acquisitions of the hard-to-value high-tech and service companies. Furthermore, in line with emphasis of Kohers and Ang (2000) on the homegenity of the legal system, Reuer et al. (2004) find that ‘contingent pay-outs’ are more likely to be used than single upfront cash payments in acquisitions of targets in Common Law countries.   
2.3. Wealth Effects of Earnout Financing In this section, I review the empirical findings related to the: (a) premia that are offered to the target firms’ owners in the deals that include earnouts compared to the deals that do not include earnouts, (b) short-run abnormal returns earned by the acquiring firm’s shareholders when the earnout is used, and (c) long-run abnormal returns of these shareholders. 
2.3.1. The target’s premium The field of peer-reviewed empirical analysis of earnout financing’s effect on the premia is limited to the contribution of Kohers and Ang (2000). The authors’ findings, based on a sample of private target deals, support the notion that the target owners in earnout financed deals receive higher premia, compared to deals financed with single upfront payments. Such increases in premia, in addition to reflecting potentially high synergies due to addressing the information asymmetry concerns between the merging partners, are also presented as a form of compensation for the target firms’ owners for accepting to share the post-acquisition business risk with the acquirers (Kohers and Ang, 2000). In particular, the offer-to-book ratio in earnout financed deals, with the offer value covering the sum of both the initial upfront payment and the earnout payment, exceeds its equivalent in deals with single upfront payments that are cash-financed and stock-financed at both the mean and median levels.13 More precisely, the respective values of the mean (median) offer-to-book value documented in the private target sample of Kohers and Ang (2000) are 10.16 (5.6), 5.24 (2.2) and 6.42 (2.3) for earnout financed deals and non-earnout financed deals with payments settled in cash and stocks respectively. Another interesting observation based on these results is that in earnout financed deals, even if the earnout payment is excluded from the offer price in estimating the premium, the premium received by the target owners remains higher than the premium in deals financed by single upfront payments. These results and their ramifications are presented and discussed in detail in Chapter Four.  
                                                          13 The premium estimates of Kohers and Ang (2000) are made on a sample of private target deals that include: 104 earnout financed deals, 283 deals with a single upfront cash payment, and 379 deals with a single upfront payment settled using the acquiring firm’s securities.  
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In addition to the premia received by private target owners, the abnormal returns of the public firms selling subsidiaries in earnout financed deals represent an alternative measure of the gains received by the target firm owners in earnout financed deals as a compensation for deferring their payments. Accordingly, the sold subsidiary’s owners are documented as receiving significant abnormal returns in the two-day (0, 1) period around the acquisition announcement: the documented two-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) by Kohers and Ang (2000) is 2.70% and significant at the 1% level.  
2.3.2. The acquirer’s short-run abnormal returns Given that the earnout is a mechanism that allows the acquiring firm to limit her exposure to the risk of overpaying the target while, at the same time, benefiting from the retention of the target’s human capital, it is expected that the use of earnout financing will be associated with additional wealth gains to the acquiring firm. Along these lines, strong empirical evidence highlights the overall positive wealth effect of earnout financing on the acquiring firm under particular conditions. In private target acquisitions, the published evidence documents that earnout financing adds further acquirer abnormal returns (Kohers and Ang, 2000). Specifically, the wealth effects associated with earnout financed deals exceed those associated with deals of a similar size which are financed with single upfront payments.14,15 Such a difference becomes more apparent when the abnormal returns of earnout financed deals are compared to the abnormal returns of non-earnout financed deals in the subgroups of transactions likely to include earnout payments i.e. hi-tech, service, cross-industry and cross-border deals. Such a positive wealth effect is especially relevant when the acquirer is a small company vulnerable to the consequences of target overvaluation.16,17  However, in cross-border acquisitions, unlike the case of domestic ones, earnouts are found to yield lower acquiring firm abnormal returns compared to the alternative strategy of running joint ventures.18 The advantage of the latter strategy over earnouts becomes more 
                                                          14 For instance, the announcement day abnormal returns estimated via a market model by Kohers and Ang (2000) are 1.348%. They significantly exceed the abnormal returns of non-earnout financed deals settled with cash (0.867%) and stocks (0.868%). 15 The matched control deals are those that have deal values within two standard deviations of the average deal value of the earnout financed deals. 16 In each of these four subgroups, Kohers and Ang (2000) document that the two-day (0, 1) CAR of earnout financed deals exceed those of both cash- and stock-financed deals that do not include earnouts.  17 In the case of the acquisition of divested subsidiaries, despite the CAR of earnout financed deals exceeding the CAR of both cash- and stock-financed deals, Kohers and Ang (2000) find these differences in CAR not significant. 18 By establishing joint ventures, two or more companies jointly operate particular assets without merging. 
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evident when the targets operate in business environments characterised by investment uncertainty and country investment risks (Mantecon, 2009).19  The Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) results also highlight the positive earnout wealth effect at both the univariate and multivariate levels. In particular, they document the presence of 0.41% higher 5-day CAR in earnout financed deals in their univariate analysis and 1.21% higher CAR in their multivariate analysis. The authors also indicate that the wealth effect of earnout financing becomes more apparent when the earnout’s use is optimal. To put it more accurately, based on the authors’ Correct Currency methodology, when the probability retrieved from the Logistic model exceeds the sample proportion of earnouts (26.1%) and the earnout financing ends up being a part of the deal financing process, the earnout is set to be optimally used. When the probability retrieved from the Logistic model does not exceed the proportion of the earnout in the sample and the earnout is included in the financing process, the use of the earnout is judged to be sub-optimal. The authors also expand the use of the Correct Currency methodology to the industry level: they introduce a Correct Currency Industry variable that takes the value of 1 when the earnout is used in an industry in which the probability of its use exceeds 50% based on the Logistic model, and 0 otherwise.20 Accordingly, both measures of optimal earnout use indicate a positive wealth effect of this deal structuring method based on both the univariate and multivariate levels.21   However, both the matching analysis conducted by Kohers and Ang (2000) and the estimation of optimal earnout use by Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) do not account for the effect of the private target-specific pre-acquisition performance. More specifically, the matching exercises in the former contribution and the estimations of the Logistic models in the latter are exclusively based on acquiring firm- and deal-specific covariates. In Chapter Three, I emphasise the relevance of the inclusion of the target’s pre-acquisition performance in the analysis of the wealth effects arising from earnout financing in private target acquisitions. Moreover, I demonstrate how the lack of access to such a dataset influences the choice of the econometric method employed in estimating these wealth effects.                                                              19 The author’s results are based on the analysis of the variation in the three-day (-1, 1) CAR using various proxies of valuation uncertainty (e.g. limited buyer acquisition experience, high target R&D-to-sales ratio, cross-industry acquisitions…) and country investment risk (e.g. the level of contract enforcement, degree of economic openness…).  20 The industries where the earnout is optimally used are: Media and Entertainment, Consumer Products, High Technology, Healthcare and Telecommunications. 21 At the univariate level, the overall (sector-level) optimal earnout use is associated with 0.41% (0.54%) higher 5-day (-2, 2) CAR with significance at the 5% level. At the multivariate level, this effect is 1.1% (0.5%) with significance at the 5% (1%) level.  
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2.3.3. The long-run abnormal returns Extant literature shows that the positive short-run effects arising from the use of earnouts on the acquiring firm’s shareholders are not reversed in the long-run. In particular, the findings of both Kohers and Ang (2000) and Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2000) indicate an insignificant long-run wealth effect of earnout financing.22 Nevertheless, further evidence presented by Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) shows that, when optimally used, earnouts are associated with higher first year and second year buy-and-hold abnormal returns compared to the case in which their use is suboptimal (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012).23 In turn, during the period following the acquisition’s announcement, Cadman et al. (2013) find that the releases of earnout fair value adjustments are associated with higher acquirer buy-and-hold abnormal returns around their announcement periods. This result indicates that the market welcomes the revisions in the target’s valuation based on updated information, and consequently the reduction in uncertainty through the framework provided by earnout contracts.  
2.4. The Post-Earnout Period The survey-based evidence reported in the previous literature also sheds some light on: (a) the settlement of the earnout payment at the end of the earnout period, and (b) the fate of the target firm’s managers in the period following this settlement.     With respect to the settlement of the earnout payment, Kohers and Ang (2000) report that the target owners receive all or part of the earnout payment in 91.13% of the deals (72 out of 79 cases covered). The full payment is received in 50% of these cases. Along similar lines, the authors document that, on average, 62% of the stated earnout payment is eventually paid. This empirical evidence suggesting a variation in the portion of the earnout payment confirms the presence of divergent views with respect to the target’s future performance when the earnout contract is signed. This evidence also highlights the relevance of the framework provided by earnout contracts in facilitating the completion of the deals despite the presence of disagreements. With regard to the fate of the target owners/managers, these survey-based results indicate that the earnout, in addition to incentivising them to stay with the acquirer during the earnout period, initiates a long-term employer-employee relationship between them and the acquirer. While Datar et al. (2001) show that target firms’ owners stay with the acquirer in                                                           22 The post-acquisition abnormal return in this method is the intercept in the regression of the portfolio returns of earnout financed deals on the three Fama and French (1993) factors. 23 In the first year following the acquisition, the calendar time portfolio returns under the optimal (suboptimal) use of earnouts are 0.51% (0.02%). In the second year following the acquisition, these returns are 0.20% (-0.25%). The same authors also report long-run results based on buy-and-hold abnormal returns supporting the notion of the additional wealth created by earnout financing. However, in particular specifications, the optimal use of earnout financing has insignificant long term wealth effect in the acquisitions of unlisted targets. 
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72.13% of cases (44 out of 61 cases covered), the evidence presented by Kohers and Ang (2000) shows that in 69.23% of the cases (37 out of 56 cases covered), the target firm’s managers stay with the acquiring company after the end of the earnout period. The evidence that 97.29% (36 out of 37 cases covered) of these managers receive part or all of the deferred payment suggests that the satisfaction of the earnout’s performance requirement represents an opportunity for these managers to signal their capabilities to the acquirer. This finding supports the notion that the target firm’s owners view the acquisition as the beginning of a ‘courtship’ (p. 367) as they form a long-run organisational rapport with the acquirer (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004).24 Nevertheless, the monitoring of the target firm’s performance during the earnout period allows the acquiring firm’s management to determine whether the target firm fits the requirements needed to become part of the acquirer’s long-term business strategy. Along these lines, Kohers and Ang (2000) document that in 9% of the cases (10 out of 110 cases covered) the acquiring firm divests the target at the end of the earnout period.  
2.5. Conclusion This brief chapter presented an overview of previous literature related to the use of the earnout and its impact on various deal outcomes. The earnout is shown to be used when information asymmetry concerns are likely to be relevant in valuing the target company and ensuring its integration within the acquiring firm. The earnout is also found to provide additional wealth gains for the owners of both the acquiring and the target firms. Chapters Three and Four build on these findings. Furthermore, the review that I presented suggests that the earnout has a strategic function that is not limited to short-run valuation concerns. In particular, a carefully designed earnout contract whose conditions are properly met can initiate a long-term organisational rapport between the acquiring and the target firm’s managers. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          24 The authors show that the 12 knowledge-intensive target firms they study are more profitable relative to their industry peers. Yet, such firms still prefer to be acquired when: (a) they face strategic hurdles (e.g. need for funding), (b) their managers need further personal benefits and/or face personal challenges in running the business, and (c) they find an opportunity for high-quality organisational rapport based on trust, personal and cultural fit with a potential acquirer. Such conclusions indicate that the target firm’s owners take into account timing and employment factors, in addition to the premium. 
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Chapter Three 
The Limitations of the PSM Method: 
Earnout Financing in Private Target Acquisitions    
Abstract I present new evidence from the earnout financing literature on the precision of the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method. Without the guidance of a sensitivity analysis and the inclusion of private-target-specific variables, PSM leads to erroneous inferences about the earnout’s impact on the acquiring firm’s gains in private target deals. Such inferences could lead the acquiring firm to disregard the use of earnout financing under circumstances in which such a use could add significant positive gains to this firm’s shareholders.                                 
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3.1. Introduction A survey of recent studies indicates that PSM has become a popular approach in estimating treatment effects in financial research.25 In analysing the outcome of adopting a new policy or employing a particular financial instrument, the non-parametric PSM consists of estimating the treatment effect on a sample of observations that have close levels of propensity scores. The propensity scores represent the probabilities of the treatment’s presence and are estimated via a qualitative response model. Accordingly, on the matched sample, the untreated observations are considered as representatives of the counterfactual cases in which the treatment is not assigned. By limiting the analysis to comparable observations within an accurately constructed domain, i.e. the matched sample, the non-parametric PSM is presented as a method that provides a more accurate evaluation of treatment effects compared to the alternative parametric methods applied to samples containing observations that are not necessarily comparable (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). In this chapter, in line with the statement by Smith and Todd (2005) that PSM is no ‘magic bullet’ (p. 307), I present a contribution to the literature related to contractual arrangements in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) as an example of PSM’s limitations. Given that this method exclusively addresses the bias due to ‘selection on observables’ (Heckman and Robb, 1985), its use when ‘selection on unobservables’ is the main source of bias leads to inaccurate inferences. This limitation of PSM, as illustrated in the analysis of the earnout financing’s impact on the abnormal returns gained by acquirers in private target acquisitions, is the focus of this chapter. Specifically, I investigate the wealth effect, i.e. outcome, of the use of earnout financing, i.e. treatment, on the abnormal returns gained by acquirers of privately held target firms. The analysis focuses on the UK market because, while the use of earnouts is limited to 8.7% of US private target deals (Officer et al., 2009), this contractual arrangement represents the second most popular deal financing method in UK private target deals after single payment cash financing with respective percentages of 38% and 40% (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012). The examination of the earnout’s wealth effect on a sample that is limited to private target deals is relevant given the challenging lack of publicly available private-target-specific information to be introduced in the form of covariates in the matching analysis. The previous UK-based study of Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) confirms the positive wealth effects                                                           25 The PSM method has been used recently to estimate the causal effects of banking- and corporate policy-specific outcomes (Bartram et al., 2011; Behr and Heid, 2011; Carbo-Valverde et al., 2012; Casu et al., 2013; Saunders and Steffen, 2011). For instance, Bartram et al. (2011) use PSM to examine the effect of the firm’s reliance on derivatives on a set of risk measures (e.g. cash flow volatility and variation in stock returns). Others have also used the PSM method to examine: the effect of the choice of common advisors on many aspects of the mergers (Agrawal et al., 2013), the effect of hiring a big 4 or a top 4 mid-tier auditor instead of smaller auditors on the accounting premiums paid by private companies (Peel and Makepeace, 2012), the effect of bank securitisation on a set of measures related to the bank’s performance (Casu et al., 2013), and the difference in loan costs between private firms and comparable public ones (Saunders and Steffen, 2011). 
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enjoyed by the acquirers in the presence of earnout financing due to the earnout’s usefulness in addressing information asymmetry concerns. However, these results are based on parametric regression analysis on a sample that covers public, private and subsidiary targets. Furthermore, the wealth effect of earnout financing in the Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) study is insignificant, or at best significant at the 10% level, in the analysis of private target deals. In this chapter, I aim to examine whether the use of the non-parametric PSM on a sample of private target deals yields different economic conclusions about the wealth effects of earnout financing.  Along these lines, the PSM-based conclusions that I present after balancing a large set of deal-, firm-, and sector-related covariates discussed in the previous literature indicate that earnout financing has no significant wealth effects on the acquiring firms. In this case, the derived conclusion would be that the acquiring firms in a significantly large portion of private target deals invest substantial resources in designing earnout contracts and monitoring their targets’ performance with no particular wealth benefits. This conclusion, however, is highly sensitive to the effect of a missing covariate. As indicated by the Rosenbaum (2002) bounds sensitivity analysis (RB analysis), a missing covariate needs to have a minor effect in the Logistic model to make the earnout’s wealth effect highly significant. Such an effect is equivalent to making the odds of earnout financing in one deal only 2% higher than its match. I re-apply PSM on my sample after introducing to the analysis a hand-collected variable that reflects the target firm’s pre-acquisition performance in order to make the matched deals relatively more comparable. After balancing the propensity scores and most of the key covariates on the matched sample, my results indicate that earnout financing leads to a significant 2.4% increase in the acquiring firm’s Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR). My results are due to the change in the structure of the matched samples: a significantly high portion of the non-earnout financed deals that end up in the matched samples when a private-target-specific covariate is included in the matching do not end up in the matched samples when this covariate is excluded. These results are relatively insensitive to the effect of a missing covariate. In particular, for two matched deals, such a covariate need to make the odds of earnout financing in one deal 50% higher than its match in order to alter the conclusion of a positive and significant wealth effect of earnout financing. The evidence that I present suggests that a merger advisor who relies on PSM could have mistakenly recommended disregarding the use of earnout financing under circumstances in which such a use could have created additional wealth for the acquiring firms. Due to the lack of formal guidance on the choice of covariates to be used in the matching (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004; Smith and Todd, 2005), my findings highlight the usefulness of guidance provided by the quantification of the missing covariate’s effect in estimating the propensity scores.  
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These results, however, should be treated with caution. In particular, I do not suggest that insensitive PSM results are necessarily more reliable than sensitive ones, irrespective of whether the key covariates and the propensity scores are balanced on the matched sample or not. Rather, in estimating the propensity scores, I emphasise the relevance of choosing Logistic model specifications that balance these variables on the matched samples. Then, in the presence of conflicting PSM-based results and various specifications that balance the key covariates, the RB analysis provides a useful framework that allows the researcher to derive the appropriate inferences with respect to the sign and magnitude of the treatment effect.  I proceed as follows: Section 3.2 presents the dataset and the key covariates used in the analysis, Section 3.3 discusses the general problem of selection bias with its application to the case of earnout financing, Section 3.4 presents the PSM method, Section 3.5 presents the PSM-based results in addition to the appropriate sensitivity analyses, and Section 3.6 concludes.  
3.2. Dataset and Variables 
3.2.1. Dataset My sample includes acquisitions involving private target firms that are announced between January 1996 and December 2010 (inclusive) and recorded by the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Thomson ONE database.26 For a deal to remain in the sample it must satisfy the following criteria: (a) the acquirer is a UK public firm listed in the London Stock Exchange and has a market value of at least £1m four weeks prior to the announcement of the deal; (b) the target firm is privately held and is based in either the domestic or the foreign market; (c) the deal value should be at least £1m, excluding fees; and (d) the acquirer should aim to control at least 50% of the target firm’s assets after the transaction. Furthermore, to avoid the inseparable effects of multiple deals on acquirers’ gains, deals that are announced by same acquirer within 5 days, i.e. the event window analysed, are excluded from the sample. The lack of publicly disclosed and updated accounting-related information is a stylised feature of privately listed firms (Ekkayokkaya et al., 2009; Officer et al., 2009). Even in the presence of such information, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) highlight their low quality and argue that private firms give insiders, i.e. potential acquirers or lenders, more detailed and accurate information relative to the ones they disclose. As a result, I examine the acquisition announcements from Nexis UK and the InvestEgate Financial Press in order to obtain target-related measures that the acquiring firms are prepared to report to their shareholders, after detailed due diligence with the private target’s owners. In the acquisition announcements that I 
                                                          26 The choice of the starting date is based on the observation of Faccio et al. (2006) that the SDC coverage of deals outside the United States becomes more accurate after 1996. 
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screened I found that the acquirers often report the target firm’s pre-acquisition Audited Profits Before Taxes (PBT). I identify 445 completed deals for which the PBT is available.27  
3.2.2. Sample statistics Table 3.1 records the annual distribution of the sample according to the payment method that is used to finance the deal. The same table records the annual distributions of the sampled deals in which the acquirer aims to control 100% of the target (FULL) in addition to cross-border acquisitions (CBA). In this sample, the earnout is the most frequently used financing method (70.5% of the transactions) followed by acquisitions financed in single payments in cash (CASH) (18.65%). This result differs from the statistics of Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) where the authors report that 38.7% of their sampled UK deals include earnouts and 40.51% include cash payments. Given that the sample is limited to deals covering the target-specific pre-acquisition performance, a potential explanation for this result is that, as earnout financing requires the measurement of the target’s performance after the deal’s announcement, the acquirers are more often prepared to report target-specific information in earnout financed deals compared to non-earnout financed ones. I operate within this constraint.28 
Table 3.1: Distribution of the sample by deal characteristics and methods of payment YEAR ALL CASH STOCK MIXED EA NEA FULL CBA DVRD 1996 29 9 0 4 16 13 28 4 10 1997 38 8 4 2 24 14 37 14 16 1998 38 9 0 7 21 17 38 11 16 1999 36 8 2 3 24 12 36 7 23 2000 35 10 0 2 23 12 35 12 20 2001 28 2 0 0 26 2 28 4 15 2002 13 1 1 0 11 2 13 2 9 2003 11 1 0 1 9 2 10 2 7 2004 18 1 0 2 15 3 18 2 11 2005 36 3 0 1 32 4 35 5 20 2006 32 2 0 3 27 5 31 6 20 2007 40 2 1 2 35 5 40 6 28 2008 22 8 0 0 14 8 22 8 11 2009 24 5 1 7 11 13 24 8 12 2010 45 14 2 6 23 22 40 17 24 
N 445 83 11 40 311 134 435 108 242 % - 18.65 2.47 8.99 69.89 30.11 97.75 24.27 54.38 
Note:	This	table	represents	the	annual	distribution	of	private	target	M&A	announced	by	UK	public	acquirers	between	
January	 1st,	 1996	 and	 December	 31st,	 2010.	 The	 distribution	 of	 these	 samples	 is	 presented	 according	 to	 the	 deal	
financing	 method	 (earnout	 financing	 (EA)	 or	 non-earnout	 financing	 (NEA)	 with	 single	 payments	 settled	 in	 cash	
(CASH),	 stock	(STOCK)	or	mixes	of	both	(MIXED)),	whether	 the	acquisition	 is	 classified	by	SDC	as	a	full	 acquisition	
(FULL)	 where	 the	 acquirer	 controls	 100%	 of	 the	 target	 once	 the	 acquisition	 becomes	 effective,	 whether	 the	
acquisition	 is	 classified	 by	 SDC	 as	 a	 cross-border	 transaction	 (CBA)	 where	 the	 target	 is	 not	 registered	 as	 a	 UK	
company	and	whether	the	acquisition	is	 classified	as	a	diversifying	 one	(DVRD)	where	 the	acquirer	and	 the	 target	
have	different	2-digit	SIC	codes.	                                                            27 Other measures like book values and operating profits are not as frequently reported as PBT. Such information is present in less than 100 deals among the ones that I screened. Such a constraint makes the application of a matching analysis less feasible. The proportion of the sample that I employ in this chapter relative to the initial SDC sample of 2797 deals is 16%, which is equal to the proportion reported by the private-target-related study of Officer et al., (2009). 28 In alternative estimations, I do not find that the announcement of target-specific information influences the acquiring firm’s abnormal returns in earnout and non-earnout financed deals.  
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Table 3.2 reports the annual distribution of the sampled deals according to the target firm’s sector. Private targets from the Consumer Products and Services (CPS) sector are more often involved in acquisitions (24.5%) in the sample. They are followed by private targets in the High-Technology (HT) sector with a share of 22.7%. Consistent with earlier studies, these statistics show that earnout financing is more likely to be present in deals involving private targets from the hi-tech and other service-related sectors in which the value of the firm is dependent on the knowledge, skill, creativity, and efforts of a few personnel (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Kohers and Ang, 2000). On the contrary, the target sectors with the lowest acquisition activity in the sample are the Energy and Power (EPW) with a share of 0.68% and the Real Estate (RST) one with a share of 0.90%. Potentially, the design of flexible earnout contracts is not feasible in these regulation-intensive sectors.29 
Table 3.2: The distribution of the sample by target sector YEAR IND HCR CST MAT MED RTL CPS HT EPW TLC FIN RST 1996 10 0 4 4 1 0 1 6 0 2 0 1 1997 12 1 3 2 3 1 7 6 0 1 1 1 1998 8 0 0 4 2 3 12 8 0 0 1 0 1999 5 0 3 6 2 2 5 11 0 0 2 0 2000 3 1 1 3 4 1 10 11 0 1 0 0 2001 1 0 2 0 3 0 10 9 0 1 2 0 2002 2 1 0 0 2 0 3 2 0 1 2 0 2003 3 1 0 0 4 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 2004 1 0 1 0 6 0 4 3 0 1 1 1 2005 7 6 1 0 3 1 8 6 0 1 3 0 2006 6 1 0 0 2 1 11 10 0 0 1 0 2007 6 1 1 2 4 0 11 9 1 1 4 0 2008 2 1 1 1 1 1 8 4 0 0 3 0 2009 2 0 0 1 2 2 8 5 0 1 2 1 2010 6 3 0 2 5 2 10 9 2 5 1 0 
N 74 16 17 25 44 14 109 101 3 15 23 4 % 16.63 3.60 3.82 5.62 9.89 3.15 24.5 22.70 0.68 3.37 5.17 0.90 
Note:	This	table	represents	the	annual	distribution	of	private	target	M&A	announced	by	UK	public	acquirers	between	
January	1st,	1996	and	December	31st.	The	12	reported	sectors,	that	exclude	Government	Agencies	and	Utilities,	are:	
Industrials	 (IND),	 Healthcare	 (HCR),	 Consumer	 Staples	 (CST),	 Materials	 (MAT),	 Media	 and	 Entertainment	 (MED),	
Retail	 (RTL),	 Consumer	 Products	 and	 Services	 (CPS),	 High	 Technology	 (HT),	 Energy	 and	 Power	 (EPW),	
Telecommunications	(TLC),	Financials	(FIN)	and	Real	Estate	(RST). 
 
3.2.3. Key covariates As suggested by Smith and Todd (2005), I rely on the previous literature to employ a large set of factors that influence the merging firms’ decision to rely on earnout financing. I add to the analysis the	portion	of	the	deal	payment	financed	with	stock	(STOCK_PERC)	in	order	to	reflect	
the	possible	trade-off	between	stock	and	earnout	financing,	given	that	they	both	have	contingent	
payment	 properties	 (Chang,	 1998;	 Datar	 et	 al.,	 2001;	 Officer	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 To	 emphasise	 the	
importance	of	balancing	the	portions	of	domestic	and	cross-border	deals	in	the	matched	sample,	I	also	include	in	my	estimations	a	dichotomous	variable	(CBA)	that	is	assigned	the	value	of	1	if	
the	target	is	not	a	UK	company	and	0	otherwise.	The	introduction	of	this	variable	is	relevant	due	                                                          29 Following the external examiner’s remark, I repeated the estimations in this thesis after excluding both financial acquirers and financial targets. When it comes to the robustness and the magnitudes of the various treatment effects, the overall results remain qualitatively similar to the ones reported. 
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to	 the	 emphasis	 of	 Mantecon	 (2009)	 that	 alternative	 strategies	 like	 the	 operation	 of	 joint	
ventures	are	more	profitable	than	earnout	financed	acquisitions	in	cross-border	acquisitions. 
Furthermore,	cultural	and	societal	values	can	be	a	strong	factor	that	influences	the	post-
acquisition	integration	process,	especially	in	cross-border	deals.	Hence,	I	employ	a	Culture	Index	
(CULT_IND)	 that	 allows	me	 to	 control	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 influence	of	 cultural	heterogeneity	
between	the	merging	 firms	on	the	challenges/difficulties	 faced	during	 the	 integration	process.	
This	 index	 is	 based	 on	 the	 graphical	 presentation	 presented	 by	 Radebaugh,	 Gray,	 and	 Black	(2006)	 which,	 in	 turn,	 is	 based	 on	 the	 traditional	 classification	 of	 country	 groups	 based	 on	
cultural	and	societal	values	by	Gray	(1988).	CULT_IND	increases	when	the	target	firm’s	country	
group	puts	 less	 emphasis	 on	 flexibility	and	more	 emphasis	 on	uniformity	 in	dealing	with	 the	
accounting	 and	organisational	 issues	 that	might	arise	 in	a	 takeover.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	use	of	
contractual	 tools	 that	 require	 precise	 measurement	 of	 the	 target’s	performance,	 like	 earnout	
financing,	becomes	less	feasible.	This	variable	is	properly	defined	in	Appendix	1.	To emphasise the favorability of earnout financing in particular industries characterised by the relevance of retaining the skilled human capital, I introduce the dichotomous variable IND. This variable is assigned the value of 1 if the target firm operates in the sectors in which Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) highlight the relevance of intellectual property and the reliance on science and technology, and 0 otherwise. These sectors are Media and Entertainment (MED), Consumer Products and Services (CPS), High Technology (HT), Healthcare (HTC) and Telecommunications (TLC). I	also	control	for	the	presence	of	frequent	acquirers	(FREQ),	which	allows	me	to	account	
for	 the	 acquirers’	 experience	 in	 engaging	 in	 M&As	 as	 well	 as	 their	 experience	 in	 assessing	
synergies	 and	 evaluating	 the	 success	 of	 their	 deals.	 I	 also	 balance	 the	 continuous	 variables	
representing	the	acquirer’s	market	value	(MV)	and	age	(AGE)	as	in	Barbopoulos	and	Sudarsnam	
(2012)	 to	proxy	 for	 the	 acquiring	 firm’s	 resources	 and	market	 experience,	 respectively.	Along	
these	 lines,	 large	 established	 acquirers	 with	 significant	 takeover	 experience	 can	 have	 the	
resources	and	expertise	that	make	them	less	vulnerable	to	the	negative	ramifications	of	target	
overvaluation	and	might	be	less	likely	to	use	earnout	financing	compared	to	smaller	acquirers	
with	limited	market	experience.	Alternatively,	these	acquirers	can	have	 the	resources	required	
to	design	earnout	contracts	and	monitor	 their	 target’s	performance.	Such	aspects	might	make	
them	more	 likely	 to	 exploit	 the	 usefulness	of	 earnouts	 in	 addressing	 information	 asymmetry	
concerns.		 
Finally,	having	balanced	the	acquirer’s	sizes,	and	to	ensure	that	the	targets	in	the	matched	
sample	 have	 close	 sizes	 relative	 to	 their	 acquirers,	 I	 balance	 the	 dichotomous	 variable	
DUMMYRS	which	is	assigned	the	value	of	1	if	the	relative	size	of	the	deal	value	to	the	acquirer’s	
market	value	exceeds	17%,	which	is	the	third	quartile	in	the	initial	SDC	sample,	and	0	otherwise.	
35 
 
Given	that	the	deal	value	is	an	outcome	variable	that	should	not	be	included	as	a	covariate	in	the	
matching	(Smith	and	Todd,	2005),	 the	use	of	DUMMYRS	 allows	me	to	balance	 the	portions	of	
relatively	large	targets	in	the	matched	sample	between	earnout	and	non-earnout	financed	deals	
without	necessarily	balancing	the	continuous	measure	of	the	deal	value. 
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics  MV(£m) DV(£m) AGE (days) STOCK_PERC (%) RS CULT_IND   Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. ALL 298 70 12 5 4,755 3,275 12 0 0.4 0.1 1.3 1.0 CASH 388 95 12 3 6,321 5,267 0 0 0.2 0.1 1.8 1.0 STOCK 242 83 37 5 1,719 1,144 100 100 0.4 0.1 1.6 1.0 MIXED 380 48 9 4 5,694 4,445 32 28 0.3 0.1 1.6 1.0 EA 265 57 12 6 4,322 2,566 10 0 0.3 0.1 1.2 1.0 NEA 374 79 13 6 5,756 4,065 17 0 0.9 0.1 1.7 1.0 DOM 481 131 10 5 4,100 2,270 12 0 0.5 0.1 1.0 1.0 CBA 239 62 19 9 6,769 5,581 12 0 0.3 0.1 2.4 1.0 FCSD 345 68 13 5 4,160 2,549 13 0 0.3 0.1 1.3 1.0 DVRD 241 72 12 5 5,463 3,880 12 0 0.6 0.1 1.3 1.0 
Note:	 This	 table	 represents	 the	mean	 and	median	 values	 of	 a	 set	of	 continuous	covariates.	 The	covariates	 are	 the	
acquirer’s	market	value	(MV),	the	deal	value	(DV),	the	acquirer’s	age	(AGE),	the	percentage	of	the	deal	value	financed	
with	 stocks	 (STOCK_PERC),	 the	 relative	 size	 of	 the	 deal	 value	 compared	 to	 the	 acquirer’s	 market	 value	 (RS),	 the	
Culture	 Index	 (CULT_IND)	 defined	 in	 Appendix	 1.	 These	 measures	 are	 reported	 for	 all	 the	 transactions	 (ALL),	
transactions	 fully	 financed	 with	 cash	 (CASH),	 transactions	 fully	 financed	 with	 stocks	 (STOCK),	 transactions	 fully	
financed	with	a	mix	 of	 cash	and	 stock	with	no	 inclusion	of	earnouts	 (MIXED),	 transactions	financed	with	earnouts	
(EA)	and	 the	 general	 group	 of	 non-earnout	 financed	 deals	 (NEA).	 The	 table	also	 presents	 the	means	 (medians)	 of	
these	 variables	 based	on	 the	 geographic	 scope	 of	 the	 transaction	 (domestic	 transactions	 (DOM)	 and	 cross-borders	
transactions	 (CBA))	 and	 sector	 relatedness	 (focused	 transactions	 (FCSD)	 and	 diversifying	 transactions	 (DVRD)).	
Please	refer	to	Appendix	1	for	an	accurate	description	of	the	variables.  Table 3.3 records sample statistics of acquirer- and deal-specific features. Acquirers in earnout deals are smaller than their counterparts in non-earnout ones with mean market values of £265m and £374m. Moreover, acquiring firms in earnout deals are younger with a mean (median) age of 11.48 (7.03) years, compared to 15.76 (11.13) years in non-earnout deals. Consistent with earlier studies such as Kohers and Ang (2000) and Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012), these figures suggest that mature and large acquirers are less likely to use deferred payments as they might already have the necessary expertise to successfully manage the target into the new firm’s business environment, even in the presence of coordination difficulties. Moreover, larger acquirers may have the financial resources not only to absorb the losses of possible misevaluations but also to hire skilled human capital, and consequently reduce the dependence on the targets’ managers in the post-acquisition period. Compared to the mean (median) deal value of £435m (£35m) for the public target deals in the sample of Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012), my results indicate that private target deals are considerably smaller than public target ones with a mean of £12m. The reported Logistic model in Table 3.4 presents results that are in line with the previous earnout-related research. The results confirm the trade-off between earnout financing and the portion of the deal value that is financed with stocks (STOCKPERC) (Datar et al., 2001). Earnouts are also likely to be included in the deal financing process when the target firm is 
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relatively large with respect to the acquirer (DUMMYRS) (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Kohers and Ang, 2000). In such a case, the financial constraints of the acquiring firm lead to the deferring of a significant portion of the deal’s payment (Kohers and Ang, 2000). In line with Mantecon (2009), my results highlight the limited popularity of earnout financing in cross-border deals. They also clearly show the relevance of cultural and organisational challenges in making the use of earnout financing less likely, as evidenced by the negative impact of CULT_IND. These results further indicate that large and frequent, though not old established, acquirers highly value the use of earnout financing. Finally, as predicted, the odds of earnout financing increase significantly when the target firm is located in a human-capital-intensive industry, as evidenced by the significant impact of IND.30 
Table 3.4: Predicting the use of earnout financing Variable Intercept ln(MV) ln(AGE) STOCKPERC CBA CULT_IND DUMMYRS IND FREQ McFadden R Squared Coefficient (S.E) 1.157 (0.937) 0.187** (0.091) -0.166* (0.099) -0.016*** (0.004) -0.631** (0.315) -0.254** (0.121) 0.991*** (0.274) 0.681*** (0.230) 0.495* (0.299) 0.13 
Note:	This	 table	presents	 the	 results	of	a	Logistic	model	that	predicts	 the	use	of	earnout	financing.	The	dependent	
variable	 (EA)	 is	 a	 dummy	 variable	 that	 is	 assigned	 the	value	 of	 1	 if	 earnout	 financing	 is	 used	 in	 the	 deal,	 and	 0	
otherwise.	As	independent	covariates,	I	include	the	variables	discussed	in	Section	3.2.	Please	refer	to	Appendix	1	for	
an	 accurate	 description	 of	 the	 variables.	 ***,**	 and	 *	 represent	 significance	 at	 the	 1%,	 5%	 and	 the	 10%	 levels	respectively.  
3.2.4. Cumulative abnormal returns I estimate the abnormal returns of each acquiring firm by using the market-adjusted model as in earlier studies (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Fuller et al., 2002):   ܣܴ௜,௧ = ܴ௜,௧ −ܴ௠,௧  (A.1)  
ܣܴ௜,௧is the abnormal return of acquirer ݅ on day ݐ. ܴ௜,௧is the percentage change of the return index, inclusive of dividends, of acquirer ݅ on day ݐ. ܴ௠ ,௧is the percentage change in the FTSE-All Share return index on day ݐ. Brown and Warner (1980) confirm that the use of a market-adjusted model in estimating the abnormal returns in an event study is robust, as the adjustment for the firm’s systematic risk does not improve the precision of the short-term abnormal returns relative to the above model. The CAR in the 5-day window (t-2, t+2) surrounding the day 0 of the announcement of the bid are calculated using the following equation:  
                                                          30 In alternative estimations, I introduce variables that refer to the presence of cross-industry deals in addition to the acquiring firm’s market-to-book value. I find that the effects of these variables on the likelihood of using earnouts are insignificant. 
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ܥܣܴ = ෍ ܣܴ௜ ,௧௧ୀାଶ
௧ୀିଶ
 (A.2) 
 This variable is used as the dependent variable in the estimation presented in this chapter.31 
3.3. Selection Bias in the Analysis of the Earnout’s Wealth Effect In assessing the wealth effect of earnout financing, two potential outcomes (ܥܣܴா஺,ܥܣܴோ஺) need to be analysed. ܥܣܴா஺ is the acquiring firm’s announcement period CAR when an earnout is involved in the deal’s financing process. ܥܣܴோ஺ is the acquiring firm’s announcement period CAR when an earnout is not involved in the deal’s financing process. The treatment variable, ܧܣ, is assigned the value of 1 if the deal includes an earnout, and 0 otherwise. Let ܸ be the combined payoff of merging firms that decide to include an earnout in the financing process of the deal. We may then write:   ܸ = ߜܼ + ܷ௏ (B.1)  ܧܣ = 1 (ܸ > 0) (B.2)  with ܼ being the observed factors influencing the choice of including an earnout and ܷ௏ representing the effect of the unobserved factors. What (B.2) indicates is that, once the payoff exceeds a pre-determined threshold normalised at 0, both parties agree to rely on earnout financing. CAR can be written in terms of the effects of the presence and absence of treatment, i.e. μா஺  when the earnout is used and μோ஺ when it is not used, in addition to a set of control functions, which are represented by ݒா஺  when the earnout is used and ݒோ஺  when it is not used. Each control function, in turn, can be divided into two components: (a) the function ℎ() of the observed variables ܺ expressed as ℎா஺(ܺ) and ℎோ஺(ܺ)in the presence and the absence of earnout financing, respectively, and (b) the unobserved variables, ܷா஺ for the earnout financed deals and ܷோ஺  for non-earnout financed ones. Consequently, the difference in outcomes is expressed as follows:   ܥܣܴா஺ − ܥܣܴோ஺ = (μா஺ − μோ஺) + (ݒா஺ − ݒோ஺) (B.3)  withݒா஺ = ℎா஺(ܺ) +ܷா஺  , ݒோ஺ = ℎோ஺(ܺ) + ܷோ஺  and ܧ(ܷா஺) = ܧ(ܷோ஺) = 0. 
                                                          31 The conclusions reported in this thesis are not altered when each public firm’s beta is controlled for in the analysis, as in Brown and Warner (1980). 
38 
 
Hence, (μா஺ − μோ஺) is the individual level of the impact of the presence of earnout on the acquiring firm’s CAR. As indicated by Smith and Todd (2005), the most common evaluation parameter of interest is the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) defined as:   ܣܶܶ =  ܧ(ܥܣܴா஺ − ܥܣܴோ஺|ܧܣ = 1) (B.4) This parameter represents the average impact of earnout financing on the acquirers’ CAR relative to the counterfactual case in which the earnout is not used, i.e. single upfront payments.32 In estimating ATT, a missing data problem emerges: while we have access to the CAR of acquirers when the earnout is used, we do not have access to data representing the counterfactual case in which the earnout treatment is not assigned.33 The following equation points out the evaluation problem (Heckman, 2010)   ܥܣܴ = ܧܣ × ܥܣܴா஺ + (1 −ܧܣ) × ܥܣܴோ஺ (B.5)  Following the Quandt (1972, 1958) switching regression framework, I refer to ܧܣ and (1 −ܧܣ) as switchers: when ܧܣ = 1, only the CAR of the earnout financed deals is observed and when ܧܣ = 0, only the CAR of the non-earnout financed deals is observed.34 A bias emerges in the estimation of ATT as the observed outcomeCARோ஺ when ܧܣ = 0 does not necessarily represent the counterfactual outcome to the case where ܧܣ = 1. This bias is expressed in the following representation:   ܤ݅ܽݏ(ܣܶܶ) = ܧ(ܥܣܴோ஺|ܧܣ = 1) −ܧ(ܥܣܴோ஺|ܧܣ = 0) (B.6)  In clinical experiments, the randomised assignment of the treatment makes it independent of the potential outcomes and therefore ensures that ܧ(ܥܣܴோ஺|ܧܣ = 1) = ܧ(ܥܣܴோ஺|ܧܣ = 0). Such a privilege is not available for researchers in observational studies which leads to the necessity of controlling for the effects of the various observed and unobserved factors causing this bias (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The following section outlines PSM and the assumptions on which it relies to address this bias.                                                           32 Other evaluation-related parameters that can be estimated are: the Average Treatment Effect (ܣܶܧ) which represents the effect of assigning the treatment to a randomly drawn unit of the population, the Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated (ܣܷܶ) which is an effect parallel to ܣܶܶ, the Average Treatment Effect of the Intent to Treat (ܣܶܫܶ) which represents the effect of the policymaker’s decision to assign the treatment without necessarily proceeding with such assignment and the Local Average Treatment effect (ܮܣܶܧ) which represents the average causal effect of the units that comply with the treatments (Guo and Fraser, 2010). 33 The same applies to the case when the earnout is not assigned and the counterfactual case in which it is assigned. 34Holland (1986) refers to this missing data problem as the ‘fundamental problem of causal inference’ (p. 947). 
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3.4. Propensity Score Matching 
3.4.1. Addressing selection bias Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) complement Rubin (1977) and introduce two assumptions in the forms of conditions that I express in the context of my analysis as follows:  Condition 1:(ܥܣܴா஺,ܥܣܴோ஺) ⫫ ܧܣ|ܹ with ܹ = (ܺ,ܼ) 
 
⫫ represents independence given the conditioning set of variables, ܹ. The economic interpretation of this assumption is that, conditioning on the observed variables ܺ and ܼ, CAR is independent of the process by which the earnout is chosen in the financing process of the deal. The term ‘selection on observables’ introduced by Heckman and Robb (1985) is consistent with this property. This assumption is known as the ‘Conditional Independence Assumption’ (CIA): once the observed variables (ܼand ܺ) are controlled for, the assignment of an earnout to any given deal is equivalent to a random assignment.  Condition 2:0 < Pr(ܧܣ = 1|ܹ) < 1  This assumption is known as the ‘Common Support Assumption’ (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Specifically, while we assume the random assignment of the treatment after accounting for the observed factors, we still need to assume the presence of unobservable factors that influence the choice of the earnout. In particular, ruling out the perfect predictability of the treatment’s presence is necessary in order to find appropriate matches for earnout financed deals.  Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985, 1983) show that conditioning on known propensity scores ܲ(ܹ), with each propensity score representing the probability of a deal being financed with an earnout in the context of my analysis, is sufficient to remove the bias due to these observed covariates. Hence, CIA can be expressed as:   (ܥܣܴா஺,ܥܣܴோ஺) ⫫ ܧܣ|ܲ(ܹ) (C.1)  Under this condition, PSM is supposed to eliminate the bias in B.6 as:  
ܧ൫ܥܣܴோ஺หܧܣ = 1,ܲ(ܹ)൯ = ܧ൫ܥܣܴோ஺หܧܣ = 0,ܲ(ܹ)൯ = ܧ൫ܥܣܴோ஺หܲ(ܹ)൯ (C.2)  Angrist and Pischke (2008) argue that there is very limited theoretical distinction between regression and matching analyses. Particularly, as regression analysis also assumes 
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that the model is correctly specified by controlling for the effect of exogenous variables, in the presence of a rich dataset and precisely measured variables, the inferences from both PSM and regression analysis should not differ.  However, PSM rose to prominence due to its ability to address the famous LaLonde (1986) critique. Basically, LaLonde (1986) compared the trainee earnings effects of an employment program in which assignment to the training is random to the earnings effects estimated using traditional parametric regression methods with non-randomised control samples. A main result of this analysis was that the application of mainstream econometric methods with non-randomised control samples yields treatment effect estimates that substantially deviate from the treatment effects estimated using the randomised control sample. Given that most of the analyses by economists are based on the application of regression analysis using non-randomised control samples, LaLonde’s (1986) results lead to the questioning of the validity of the widely published estimates in the literature and put further emphasis on the use of randomised experiments when logistically feasible (Guo and Fraser, 2010). In a response to Lalonde’s challenge, Dehejia and Wahba (2002, 1999) managed to achieve a breakthrough. The authors mainly showed that the treatment effects estimated on subsamples which include trained workers and members of a non-randomised control group, which have close levels of propensity scores predicting the assignment to the training program, are remarkably close to the treatment effect levels estimated by LaLonde with randomised control groups. Therefore, while the estimators based on propensity scores have no specific efficiency gains asymptotically, it is worth noting that all the samples used by researchers are finite. Hence, by limiting the treatment effect analysis to comparable observations, PSM should often lead to gains in precision (Angrist and Hahn, 2004).   
3.4.2. The balancing of the propensity scores and the covariates With regards to the balancing of propensity scores between the treated and the control groups on the matched sample, a formal approach is offered by the Kolmogrov-Smirnov test. This test allows the researcher to determine if the empirical probability distributions of the propensity scores in both the treated and the non-treated groups, before and after the matching, are not statistically different. The non-parametric aspect of this test gives it an important advantage in assessing the quality of the matching exercise. In addition to examining the significance of the difference in estimated propensity scores, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest using of the t-test to examine the difference between the mean values of each of the main covariates between the sample of treated and untreated units before and after the matching. Hence, a successful matching procedure is 
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supposed to be reflected in insignificant, or weakly significant, differences in the averages of these covariates between the treated and untreated units that end up in the matched sample. Following DiPrete and Gangl (2004) and Guo and Fraser (2010), a further suitable measure for assessing the quality of the matching for every covariate is the Absolute Standardized Mean Difference which, for a continuous covariate ݔ takes the value: 
݀ = ተተ ݔா஺തതതതത − ݔோ஺തതതതതത
ටܵா஺
ଶ + ܵோ஺ଶ2 ተተ with ݔா஺തതതതതand  ݔோ஺തതതതതത  representing the average values of ݔ in the treated and untreated group respectively. ܵா஺ଶ  and ܵோ஺ଶ  represent the variances of this covariate in both samples respectively.35 Based on the results of previous research, a reduction in the level of this bias clearly indicates successful matching (Hujer et al., 2004; Sianesi, 2004).  
3.4.3. Estimating ATT With the matching procedure yielding a sample in which the propensity scores do not significantly differ between the treated and the untreated observations, ܣܶܶ can be estimated with the following equation (Guo and Fraser, 2010):  
ܣܶܶ = ∑ {ܥܣ ௜ܴ(ܧܣ௜)−ܥܣ ௜ܴ(ܰܧܣ௜)}௜:ா஺ୀଵ
ଵܰ
= ∑ ൜൬ܧܣ௜ − (1− ܧܣ௜)ܭெ(݅)ܯ ൰ܥܣܴ௜ൠே௜ୀଵ
ଵܰ
 (C.3)  with ܰ representing the total number of deals in the matched sample, ଵܰ representing the number of earnout financed deals in the matched sample, ܥܣܴ௜(ܧܣ௜) representing the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for deal ݅ when it is financed with an earnout, and ܥܣܴ௜(ܰܧܣ௜) representing the outcome for the deal ݅ when it is not financed with an earnout. Hence, ܥܣ ௜ܴ(ܰܧܣ௜) represents the counterfactual outcome when not receiving the treatment for a unit that receives the treatment. This counterfactual outcome is represented by the CAR on non-earnout financed deals in the matched sample while allowing each one of these deals to be used more than once as a control unit. ܯrepresents the number of control units matched to each treated one. ܭெ(݅) represents the number of times a control unit is used as a match when matching is done with replacement. Hence, to represent the counterfactual outcomes based on this specification, the                                                           
35For a dichotomous variable ݕ, this measure can be estimated by ݀ = ተተ ௉೤ಶಲି௉೤ಿಶಲ
ඨು೤ಶಲቀ1షು೤ಶಲቁశು೤ಿಶಲ(1ష ು೤ಿಶಲ)
2
ተተ with ௬ܲா஺ and 
௬ܲோ஺, respectively, representing the portion of the prevalence of the dichotomous variable in the treated and untreated samples. 
42 
 
non-earnout financed deals on the matched samples are appropriately weighted to represent the number of matches chosen per earnout financed deal and the number of times each non-earnout financed deal is chosen as a match.    The estimation of standard errors is of critical importance in testing the hypothesis of the absence of a treatment effect. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) emphasise the importance of the estimated variance’s inclusion of the variance due to the estimation of propensity scores, the exclusion of observations from the regions of common support, and the potential order by which units are treated. Wooldridge (2010) emphasises the lack of scholarly work that focuses on such issues. Along these lines, Core (2010)mentions that ‘standard errors do not appear well developed’ (p. 283). However, both Caliendo and Kopeining (2008) and Wooldridge (2010) discuss the use of the bootstrap in the estimation of standard errors. Abadie and Imbens (2008) show that estimators resulting from bootstrap procedures are not valid even under the simple conditions of a single continuous covariate and an unbiased 
ܰଵ/ଶ normally distributed estimator. The results of the Abadie and Imbens (2008) simulation show that the variance estimator they developed (Abadie and Imbens, 2006) tends to perform well even with small samples. Consequently, in testing the null hypothesis of zero ATT, the Abadie andImbens (2006) standard errors are employed in the t-tests and reported with the results. 
 
3.4.4. Choice of the covariates Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984) argue that only the variables that are statistically significant at a pre-determined level should be included in the estimation of propensity scores. Hirano and Imbens (2001), in turn, propose the estimation of individual Logistic regressions by including only one independent variable at a time. Then, only the variables that are individually significant, or that satisfy a pre-determined significance level or threshold, are included in the multivariate estimation of propensity scores. Likewise, Rosenbaum (2002) indicates that a t-value higher than |1.5| can be used as a criterion to determine whether a variable is included in the estimation of propensities and thus in the matching process. In turn, Dehejia and Wahba (1999) emphasise the importance of including higher order polynomials and interactions of the candidate variables in the matching, if necessary, and ultimately choosing the variables that are eventually balanced on the matched sample.  Despite the relevance of the statistical guidance provided by earlier studies, Smith and Todd (2005) argue that there is no definitive procedure, or available test, to provide the best propensity score model. In fact, one of the authors’ main criticisms of the Dehejia and Whaba (1999, 2002) contribution is that the change in the set of variables used to estimate the 
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propensity scores influences the size of the matched samples and also the degree of bias relative to LaLonde’s (1986) randomised estimates. In turn, Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004) show that the best-fitting Logistic models are not necessarily the ones that lead to the lowest bias in the estimation of treatment effects. Along these lines, Smith and Todd (2005) suggest that the inclusion of unnecessary variables might exacerbate the common support problem by making the matched observations less comparable than the case in which matching is not used in the first place. Hence, through the matching procedures that I use in this chapter, in addition to balancing the propensity scores, I aim to balance the variables that significantly predict the use of earnout financing in the Logistic models. 
3.5. Results In this section, I present two non-mutually exclusive specifications of the Logistic models that are used to estimate the propensity scores. In the first specification, I do not include a private-target-specific covariate in the analysis, as in most of the previous research in earnout financing (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Datar et al., 2001; Kohers and Ang, 2000). In the second specification, I introduce a variable that links the target’s pre-acquisition PBT to the acquirer’s market value to make the deals on the matched sample more comparable. I compare the resulting ATT estimates, their related ramifications on the decision of the acquiring firms, and their sensitivity to a missing covariate between these two specifications.  
3.5.1. Specification 1 I employ the Logistic model that is reported in Table 3.4 to estimate the propensity scores. Based on the estimated propensity scores, two matching algorithms are employed. The first algorithm in the Nearest Neighbor (NN) by which each earnout financed deal is matched to the non-earnout financed deal that has the closest propensity score level. The second algorithm is the Caliper Matching (CM) by which the matched sample is limited to earnout and non-earnout financed deals that lie within a specific propensity score distance. This distance is the result of the multiplication of a chosen caliper by the standard deviation of the estimated propensity scores. I allow matching with replacement, by which each non-earnout financed deal can be used more than once as a match, given that the number of earnout financed deals significantly exceeds the number of non-earnout financed ones.  The results reported in Table 3.5 (Panel A) indicate that the ATTs of earnout financing on the acquiring firm’s CAR, 0.88% and 0.82% with NN and CM respectively, are insignificant.36 The reported results in both Panels A and B also indicate that the matching algorithm balances the distribution of the propensity scores and the Logistic model’s covariates on the resulting                                                           36 My results also hold with a larger caliper (i.e. 0.1) and a smaller one (i.e. 0.01). 
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matched sample. In particular, the distributions of the propensity scores are not statistically different between earnout and non-earnout financed deals on the matched samples, as evidenced by the outcomes of the KS test (p-values of 0.88 and 0.82 for NM and CM respectively). Furthermore, none of the differences between the Logistic model’s covariates in earnout and non-earnout financed deals on the matched sample is significant at the 5% level. Such a balancing of the covariates is also evident from the reduction in Absolute Standardized Mean Difference. 
Table 3.5: PSM results without controlling for the effect of target-specific information Panel A Matching Algorithm NN CM Caliper - 0.05 Number of Treated Observations 310 292 Number of Control Observations 85 90 CAR of Treated Observations (%) 3.03*** 3.06*** CAR of Control Observations (%) 2.61*** 2.09*** KS before Matching (p-value) 0.00 0.00 KS after Matching (p-value) 0.88 0.82 
ܣܶܶ (%) (Abadie and Imbens (2006)  Standard Errors) 0.71 (1.12) 0.82 (1.02) Cut-off	Γ	value	(p≈0.05) 1.06 1.05 Cut-off	Γ	value	(p≈0.10) 1.02 1.01 Panel B  Before Matching After Matching  Treatment  Group Control  Group Abs Std Mean  Difference p-value Treatment  Group Control  Group Abs Std Mean  Difference p-value PROP_SCORE 0.74 0.59 102.08 0.00 0.74 0.74 0.24 0.20 CULT_IND 1.18 1.70 67.41 0.00 1.18 1.19 0.83 0.88 CBA 0.18 0.37 47.62 0.00 0.18 0.24 14.48 0.06 DUMMYRS 0.55 0.40 29.83 0.00 0.55 0.48 13.59 0.07 FREQ 0.25 0.15 23.12 0.00 0.25 0.30 10.67 0.12 ln(AGE) 7.72 8.12 30.83 0.00 7.72 7.82 7.69 0.27 ln(MV) 4.36 4.45 6.54 0.58 4.36 4.44 5.91 0.50 STOCK_PERC 10.53 17.97 42.72 0.01 10.53 9.83 4.06 0.61 LMP x IND 3.33 2.33 39.32 0.00 3.33 3.77 15.84 0.03 
Note:	Panel	A	reports	the	results	of	the	PSM	analysis	based	on	a	Logistic	model	in	which	the	dependent	variable	is	the	
dichotomous	 variable	(EA)	which	 takes	 the	value	of	1	 if	the	 transaction	includes	an	earnout,	and	0	otherwise.	The	
Logistic	Model	 in	Table	3.4	is	used	 to	estimate	 the	propensity	scores.	Panel	A	reports	the	matching	algorithm	used	
(Nearest	 Neighbor	 (NN)	 or	 Caliper	 Matching	 (CM)),	 the	 number	 of	 control	 observations	 matched	 per	 treated	
observation,	 the	 caliper	 used	 if	 caliper	matching	 is	 employed,	 the	 number	 of	 earnout	 (Treated)	 and	 non-earnout	
financed	deals	(Control)	in	the	resulting	matched	sample,	the	mean	CAR	for	both	the	treated	and	the	control	group	in	
the	matched	 sample,	 the	 p-value	 from	 the	 Kolmogorov-Smirnov	 test	with	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 that	 the	 propensity	
scores	estimated	 from	 the	 Logistic	model	 have	 the	same	distribution	 in	 the	 treated	and	control	groups	before	and	
after	the	matching	respectively.	Panel	A	also	reportsܣܶܶ	with	the	standard	error	(in	parentheses)	estimated	following	Abadie	and	Imbens	(2006),	 the	cutoff	value	of߁	at	which	the	initial	 inference	starts	to	change	qualitatively	with	the	
corresponding	p-value	of	5%,	and	the	cutoff	value	of߁	at	which	the	initial	inference	starts	to	change	qualitatively	with	
the	corresponding	p-value	of	10%.	Panel	B,	based	on	 the	1:1	NN	matching	with	replacement	in	Panel	A,	 reports	the	
means	 of	 the	 propensity	 scores	 (PROP_SCORE)	 and	 main	 covariates	 in	 the	 groups	 of	 earnout	 and	 non-earnout	
financed	deals	before	and	after	 the	matching,	 the	p-value	from	 the	 t-test	associated	with	the	null	hypothesis	of	 no	
statistical	difference	between	these	means	before	and	after	matching,	and	the	Absolute	Standardized	Mean	Difference	
defined	as	 the	absolute	difference	between	 the	 respective	means	 of	 the	covariate	 in	the	 two	groups	divided by the square root of the mean of the covariate’s variances in both groups. Please	 refer	 to	 Appendix	 1	 for	 an	 accurate	
description	of	the	variables.	***,**	and	*	represent	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	the	10%	levels	respectively.  Let PCEA and PCNEA represent the probability of deal completion in the presence and the absence of earnout financing, respectively. The ramification of an insignificant ATT of earnout financing on the acquirer’s CAR in my sample of completed deals can be illustrated as follows. 
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When valuation disagreements are significant, the contingent aspect of earnout financing presents a mechanism that allows the completion of the deal i.e. PCEA>PCNEA. Under such a condition, the acquiring firm can benefit from the use of earnout financing to generate higher expected CAR. In particular, even CAREA=CARNEA, we have PCEA x CAREA>PCNEA x CARNEA. Hence, the use of earnout financing will still be recommended to the acquiring firm. When valuation disagreements do not represent a challenge to the deal’s completion i.e. when the target firm is willing to complete the deal both in the presence and the absence of earnout financing (PCEA=PCNEA), the acquiring firm is indifferent between using and not using the earnout. However, it is worth noting that addressing the valuation difficulties during the takeover negotiations is only one function of earnout financing. In particular, given the deal’s completion, the earnout is presented as a mechanism that allows the acquiring firm to retain the target firm’s skilled human capital in the post-acquisition period to realise high synergies. The insignificant ATT of earnout financing in my sample of completed deals indicates that this function of the earnout has no significant wealth effects. Hence, when the acquiring firm is confident that the deal will be completed, and despite the literature’s emphasis on the relevance of retaining the target firm’s skilled human capital through earnouts (Datar et al., 2001; Kohers and Ang, 2001), earnout financing will be used in only 50% of the deals.  
3.5.2. Specification 2 In the estimation of propensity scores, I include a dummy variable that is assigned the value 1 if target firm had recorded losses (PBT<0) in the year preceding the acquisition, and 0 otherwise. For profitable targets, I include the variable LMP which is defined as ln ቀெ௏
௉஻்
ቁ. This variable links the acquiring firm’s specific market value with the target’s specific pre-acquisition profitability. I also introduce the product ln ቀெ௏
௉஻்
ቁ x IND to emphasise the relevance of LMP in the sectors in which the use of earnout financing is recommended due to the relevance of human capital. Given that the average profitability of the target firm in my sample is £1.58m and the average acquirer’s market value is £298, the natural logarithm is employed in order to reduce the impact of relatively large firms that acquire targets with limited profitability.  The aim of balancing this variable on the matched sample is to make the earnout and non-earnout financed deals more comparable. Possibly, acquiring firms that are relatively large with respect to their target’s pre-acquisition profitability are less dependent on such target’s post-acquisition performance. Such a characteristic of the deal makes the presence of earnout financing unlikely. However, if significant synergies are expected due to the investment of substantial resources in the target firm during the post-acquisition period, the benefits derived from the retention of the target’s human capital make the use of earnout financing more likely. 
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The results reported in Table 3.6 are in line with the second interpretation. Furthermore, the effect of LMP is strongly significant in the industries in which the role of human capital is highly relevant. More specifically, it is worth noting that the effect of LMP is significant only in such sectors. Furthermore, both the presence of losing targets (LOSS) and the acquiring firm’s age (ln(AGE)) have insignificant effects on the odds of the presence of earnout financing in Model 1. After imposing the restriction that the insignificant variables have a joint effect equal to 0, the Wald test yields a p-value of 0.49. Hence, I use Model 2 to estimate the propensity scores. 
Table 3.6: Predicting the use of earnout financing with target-specific information Explanatory Variables\Model (.) (1) (2) Intercept 1.620 (1.078) 0.604** (0.251) STOCKPERC -0.016*** (0.004) -0.015*** (0.004) CBA -0.497** (0.310) -0.599** (0.301) CULT_IND -0.262** (0.122) -0.250** (0.121) DUMMYRS 0.918*** (0.279) 0.874*** (0.231) FREQ 0.517* (0.304) 0.603** (0.291) LOSS 0.173 (0.706)  LMP 0.034 (0.115)  ln(AGE) -0.141 (0.098)  LMP x IND 0.131*** (0.044) 0.150*** (0.404) McFadden  R Squared 0.13 0.13 
p-value (LR test) 0.00 0.00 
Note:	This	 table	 presents	 the	 results	 of	2	Logistic	models	 that	predict	 the	 use	of	earnout	 financing.	The	 dependent	
variable	 (EA)	 is	 a	 dummy	 variable	 that	 is	 assigned	 the	value	 of	 1	 if	 earnout	 financing	 is	 used	 in	 the	 deal,	 and	 0	
otherwise.	As	independent	 covariates,	 I	 include	the	variables	discussed	 in	Section	3.2	 in	addition	to	LMP,	LOSS	and	LMP	 x	 IND.	Model	 2	 includes	the	significant	variables	 from	Model	1.	The	 restriction	 that	the	coefficients	associated	
with	 LOSS,	 LMP,	 and	 ln(AGE)	are	 jointly	 equal	 to	 0	 is	 not	 rejected	 based	 on	a	 Wald	 test	 (p=0.49).	 Please	 refer	 to	
Appendix	1	for	an	accurate	description	of	the	variables.	***,**	and	*	represent	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	the	10%	
levels	respectively.  The results reported in Table 3.7 (Panel A) yield conclusions that differ from those reported in Table 3.5 (Panel A). In particular, after balancing the propensity scores and most of the covariates used in Model 2, earnout financing is shown to have ATTs of 2.48% and 2.39%, based on NM and CM respectively, on the acquiring firm’s CAR when earnout financing used. Such a striking difference in the conclusion is mainly due to the change in the composition of the matched sample. For example, based on NN, 32% of the non-earnout financed deals that end up in the matched sample in Table 3.7 do end up in the matched sample in Table 3.5. Furthermore, 
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the variable LMP x IND that is balanced between the treated and the control groups on the matched sample in Table 3.7 (Panel B) (p=0.18) is not balanced in Table 3.5 (Panel B) (p=0.03). 
Table 3.7: PSM results after controlling for the effect of target-specific information Panel A Matching Algorithm NN CM Caliper - 0.05 Number of Treated Observations 310 288 Number of Control Observations 92 92 CAR of Treated Observations (%) 3.03*** 2.96*** CAR of Control Observations (%) 1.26* 1.61* KS before Matching (p-value) 0.00 0.00 KS after Matching (p-value) 0.19 0.20 
ܣܶܶ (%) (Abadie and Imbens (2006)  Standard Errors) 2.48** (1.14) 2.39** (1.04) Cut-off	Γ	value	(p≈0.05) 1.50 1.47 Cut-off	Γ	value	(p≈0.10) 1.53 1.50 Panel B  Before Matching After Matching  Treatment  Group Control  Group Abs Std Mean  Difference p-value Treatment  Group Control  Group Abs Std Mean  Difference p-value PROP_SCORE 0.74 0.60 97.22 0.00 0.74 0.74 0.30 0.22 CULT_IND 1.18 1.70 67.41 0.00 1.18 1.20 2.70 0.61 CBA 0.18 0.37 47.62 0.00 0.18 0.23 12.52 0.07 DUMMYRS 0.55 0.40 29.83 0.00 0.55 0.50 9.92 0.19 FREQ 0.25 0.15 23.12 0.00 0.25 0.31 12.39 0.07 STOCK_PERC 10.53 17.97 42.72 0.01 10.53 11.45 5.23 0.54 LMP x IND 3.33 2.33 39.32 0.00 3.33 3.60 9.83 0.18 
Note:	Panel	A	reports	the	results	of	the	PSM	analysis	based	on	a	Logistic	model	in	which	the	dependent	variable	is	the	
dichotomous	 variable	(EA)	which	 takes	 the	value	of	1	 if	the	 transaction	includes	an	earnout,	and	0	otherwise.	The	
Logistic	that	is	used	to	estimate	the	propensity	scores	 is	Model	2	 (Table	3.7).	The	 table	has	the	same	description	as	
Table	3.5.	Please	refer	to	Appendix	1	for	an	accurate	description	of	the	variables.	***,**	and	*	represent	significance	at	
the	1%,	5%	and	the	10%	levels	respectively.  The derived recommendation for the acquiring firm would be that earnout financing should always be used in deals characterised by either valuation difficulties or the need to retain the target’s human capital. In particular, because CAREA>CARNEA, the acquiring firm would value the use of earnout financing both when PCEA>PCNEA and when PCEA = PCNEA. Given that both approaches balance the propensity scores and the covariates included in their respective Logistic models, I adopt the RB analysis in the following section to examine each of the contradictory conclusions’ sensitivity to the effect of a missing covariate.   
3.5.3. The RB analysis  Rosenbaum (2002) developed a sensitivity analysis that can accompany the use of PSM. In particular, while PSM remains a method that addresses ‘selection on observables’ (Heckman and Robb, 1985), the Rosenbaum sensitivity analysis answers the question: how strong a missing covariate would have to be, in terms of influencing the odds of assigning a treatment, in order to alter the qualitative conclusions of the study?  In his analysis, Rosenbaum (2002) presents the parameter ߁ in the following relation: 
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1
߁
≤
௜ܲ(ܧܣ = 1|ܹ)1 − ௜ܲ(ܧܣ = 1|ܹ)
௝ܲ(ܧܣ = 1|ܹ)(1 − ௝ܲ(ܧܣ = 1|ܹ)) ≤ ߁   (D.1) Mainly, when ߁ = 1, the assignment of earnout between the two matched units is equivalent to a random assignment. As the value of ߁ increases, the assignment of the earnout no longer remains a random procedure. As shown by Rosenbaum (2002), the fraction of odds can be written as: 
௜ܲ(ܧܣ = 1|ܹ)1 − ௜ܲ(ܧܣ = 1|ܹ)
௝ܲ(ܧܣ = 1|ܹ)(1 − ௝ܲ(ܧܣ = 1|ܹ)) =
݁ݔ݌(݇(ܹ) + ߛݑ௜)
݁ݔ݌(݇(ܹ) + ߛݑ௝) = ݁ݔ݌൛ߛ(ݑ௜ − ݑ௝ൟ (D.2) 
ߛ ≥ 0 where ݇(ܹ) represents the impacts of the observed covariates which cancel out. 
ݑ௜andݑ௝ are the unobserved covariates influencing the presence of the treatment for units ݅ and 
݆ respectively. ߛ represents the influence of these covariates on the choice of treatment. Normalizing ݑ = ݑ௜ − ݑ௝between 0 and 1, ߁ can be written as ߁ = ݁ఊand a straightforward interpretation is that the matched units may differ in their odds of receiving the treatment by at most Γ(P. Rosenbaum, 2002).  The results of Specification 1 and Specification 2 substantially differ with respect to their sensitivity to the effect of a missing covariate. In particular, for two matched deals, a missing covariate in Specification 1 needs to make the odds of including the earnout in one deal 2% higher than the odds in the matched deal in order to alter the qualitative conclusion of an insignificant ATT.  In Specification 2, however, a missing covariate needs to make the odds of including the earnout in one deal 50% higher than the odds in its matched deal in order to alter the qualitative conclusion of a significant and positive ATT.  I follow DiPrete and Gangl (2004) and compare the magnitude of the missing covariate’s effect to the impact of the covariates that are used in the Logistic models. For instance, with 
߁ = 1.02,  a missing covariate dummy variable would have a coefficient in the Logistic model that is equal to ln(1.02)=0.019. Such an effect is considerably small given that the standard deviation of STOCKPERC is 23% in the sample. When the missing dummy variable takes the value of 1, its effect is equivalent to a decrease in the portion of the deal that is financed with stocks from 1.18% to 0, i.e. full cash financing. However, with ߁ = 1.5, the coefficient associated with the missing covariate is equal to ln(1.5)= 0.40. When the missing dummy variable takes the value of 1, its effect is equivalent to a decline in the portion of the deal that is financed with stocks from 25% to 0. Overall, my results are consistent with the notion that earnout financing has a positive and significant wealth effect on the acquiring firms in private target deals, an effect that cannot be captured by PSM in a straightforward manner. 
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3.6. Conclusion  The earlier results presented by Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) are somewhat inconclusive with respect to the earnout’s wealth effect in the particular case of private target acquisitions. In this chapter, after including target-specific pre-acquisition performance as a key predictor of the earnout’s use, my PSM-based results highlight the positive and highly significant wealth effects of this contractual mechanism. More specifically, relative to comparable private target deals, earnout financed transactions yield announcement period CARs that exceed 2%. However, in evaluating the earnout’s wealth effect in private target deals, the analysts should give special care to the feasibility of applying the PSM method. This chapter presents an example of the limitations of PSM by estimating the wealth effect of earnout financing in private target acquisitions on the acquirers’ shareholders. When 
‘selection on unobservables’ rather ‘selection on observables’ is more likely to be the main source of treatment effect estimation bias, PSM can lead to inaccurate inferences as shown by the statistical and economic underestimation of the earnout’s wealth effect. My findings, however, should be treated with caution. Rather than presenting a general condemnation of the use of PSM, I advocate a reliance on the RB analysis to determine the magnitude of the conclusions’ sensitivity to the effect of a missing covariate after balancing the key variables that influence the treatment’s presence.    
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Appendix 1 - Variables definitions Variable (Acronym) Description Source 
Acquirer’s	Age	(AGE) The	 number	 of	 days	 between	 the	acquirer’s	 listing	 in	Datastream	 and	 the	
announcement	date Datastream 
Acquirer’s	Market-to-Book	Value (ACQMTBV) The	 market	 value	 of	 the	 acquirer	 at	 four	 weeks	 before	 the	 acquisition,	divided	 by	 its	 book	 value	 of	 equity	 from	 the	 most 	 recent	 accounting	statement	prior	to	the	bid	announcement Datastream 
All	the	deals	covered	in	the	
sample	(ALL) Refers	to	the	number	of	deals	used	in	the	sample SDC 
Audited	Profits	Before	
Taxes	(PBT) The	target’s	Audited	Profits	Before	Taxes	for	the	financial	year	preceding	the	acquisition	as	covered	in	the	acquisition	announcement Investegate	+	Nexis	UK 
Audited	Profits	Before	
Taxes	(PBT) The	target’s	Audited	Profits	Before	Taxes	for	the	financial	year	preceding	the	acquisition	as	covered	in	the	acquisition	announcement Investegate	+	Nexis	UK 
Cash	Financed	
Transactions	(CASH) Dummy=1	if	the	consideration	is	100%	financed	with	cash	and	0	otherwise. SDC Cross-Border	Acquisition	(CBA) Dummy=1	when	 the	 transaction	 includes	a	UK	acquirer	and	non-UK	target	and	=	0	when	the	target	is	a	UK	firm	[=	DOM] SDC 
Culture	Index 
	(CULT_INDEX) 
An	 index	 that	 ranks	 the	countries	 in	which	 the	 targets	are	 listed	 from	the	
most	flexible	to	the	least	flexible,	and	from	the	most	transparent	to	the	least	
transparent,	 in	 dealing	 with	 accounting	 and	 organizational	 challenges.	 It	
takes	the	following	values: 
1.	 The	country	 of	 the	 firm	acquired	 belongs	 to	 the	Anglo-American	 group.	
The	 countries	 included	 are:	 United	 Kingdom,	 Canada,	 the	 Republic	 of	
Ireland,	United	States,	New	Zealand,	South	Africa	and	Australia. 
2.	 The	 country	 of	 the	 firm	 acquired	 belongs	 to	 the	 Nordic	 group.	 The	
countries	 included	 are:	 Sweden,	 Denmark,	 Finland,	 Norway	 and	 the	Netherlands. 
3.	The	country	of	the	firm	acquired	belongs	to	the	Asian-Colonial	group.	The	
countries	included	in	this	case	are:	Hong	Kong	and	Singapore. 
4.	 The	 country	 of	 the	 firm	 acquired	 belongs	 to	 the	 Germanic	 group.	 The	
countries	included	are:	Germany,	Austria,	Israel	and	Switzerland. 
5.	The	country	of	the	firm	belongs	to	the	remaining	groups.	The	underlying	
assumption	 in	 this	 case	 is	 that	 once	 high	 differences	 in	 the	 degree	 of	
flexibility	are	reached,	the	ordering	of	the	accounting	systems	becomes	less	relevant 
SDC	+	The	classification	provided	by	
Gray	(1988)	in	which	he	uses	cultural	
and	societal	values	as	primary	
characteristics	for	grouping	families	of	
countries.	The	ranking	of	the	flexibility	
of	these	groups’	accounting	systems	is	
represented	graphically	by	Radebaugh,	
Gray	and	Black	(2006).	 
Cumulative	Abnormal	
Returns	(CAR) The	 sum	 of	 the	 acquirer’s	 abnormal	 returns	 in	 the	 5-day	 window	surrounding	the	announcement Datastream 
	Deal	Value	(DV) Reported	 deal	 value,	 in	 millions	 of	 pounds.	 This	 value	 covers	 the	 initial	payment	and	the	maximum	value	of	the	reported	deferred	payment	when	an	
earnout	is	included SDC 
Diversifying	Transaction	(DVRD) Dummy=1	 when,	 in	 the	 transaction,	 the	 acquirer	 and	 the	 target	 have	different	primary	2-digit	SIC	codes	and	=	0	otherwise	[=	FCSD]. SDC 
Earnout	(EA) Dummy=1	 when	 the	 consideration	 includes	 an	 earnout	 [EA]	 and	 0	
otherwise	[NEA] SDC 
Frequent	Bidder	(FREQ) Dummy=1	 when	 the	 acquirer	 is	 classified	 as	 a	 frequent	 bidder	 and	 0	otherwise.	 Following	 Draper	 and	 Paudyal	 (2006),	 the	 acquirers	 who	 bid	
more	 than	 the	 third	 quartile	 of	bid	 counts	 per	 acquirer	 in	 the	 initial	 SDC	
sample	of	2797	deals	(9	bids)	are	classified	as	frequent	bidders SDC 
High	Relative	Size	of	the	Deal (DUMMYRS) Dummy=1	 if	 the	 deal	 value	 relative	 to	 the	market	 value	 of	 the	 acquirer’s	market	value	is	higher	than	the	third	quartile	of	17%	and	0	otherwise SDC FULL Dummy=1	if	the	acquirer	aims	to	control	100%	of	the	target’s	assets	and	0	otherwise SDC IND Dummy=1	 if	 the	 target	 firm	 is	 in	 the	Media and Entertainment, Consumer Products, High Technology, Healthcare and Telecommunications sectors, and 0 otherwise SDC LOSS Dummy=1	 if	 the	 target	 firm	 has	 a	 recorded	 negative	 PBT	 in	 the	 year	
preceding	the	acquisition,	and	0	otherwise InvestEgate	+	Nexis	UK 
Market	Value	of	the	
Acquirer’s	Equity	(MV) Acquirer’s	market	value	of	equity	at	four	weeks	prior	to	bid	announcement,	in	millions	of	pounds.	I	also	employ	the	natural	logarithm	of	this	variable Datastream 
Percentage	of	the	Deal	
Payment	Financed	With	
Stocks	(STOCK_PERC)	 The	 percentage	 of	 the	 total	 transaction	 value	 that	 is	 financed	 with	 the	acquiring	firm’s	stocks SDC 
Propensity	Score	(PROP_SCORE) The	 propensity	score	 estimated	 by	a	 Logistic	model	 that	predicts	 earnout	financing.	 The	 model’s	 specification	 for	 each	 propensity	 score	 model	 is	
appropriately	defined	in	each	table. Authors’	Estimations 
Relative	Bargaining	Powers	(LMP) The	natural	 logarithm	of	the	quotient	of	the	acquirer’s	market	value	divided	by	the	target’s	PBT InvestEgate	+	Nexis	UK	 
Relative	Size	of	the	Deal	(RS) Ratio	of	(DV)	to	(MV) Datastream	+SDC 
Stock	Financed	
Acquisitions	(STOCK) Dummy	=	 1	when	 the	 consideration	 is	 100%	 financed	 with	 stocks	 and	 0	otherwise SDC 
Transactions	financed	With	
a	Mix	of	Cash	and	Stocks	
Without	an	Earnout 
(MIXED)	 Dummy	=	1	when	the	deal	is	financed	with	a	mix	of	cash	and	stock	excluding	earnout	and	0	otherwise SDC   
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Chapter Four 
Takeover Premia in Earnout Financed M&As: 
Determinants and Wealth Effects     
Abstract I rely on both parametric and non-parametric methods to provide a robust solution to the long-standing issue on how earnout financing in takeovers influences the wealth of the merging firms’ shareholders. First, I quantify the effect of the earnout contract’s terms on the premia. Second, contrary to previous research, I demonstrate how moral hazard and adverse selection considerations lead the merging firms to set the initial payment in an earnout financed deal at a level that is lower than, or equal to, the full payment in a comparable non-earnout financed deal. Lastly, I show that while acquirers in non-earnout financed deals experience negative short-run abnormal returns from an increase in the takeover premia, this effect is neutralised in earnout financed deals.                    
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4.1. Introduction Following the previous chapter’s robust conclusion that earnout financing tends to have a positive effect on the acquiring firms’ returns, several important issues remain to be investigated to enhance our understanding of how earnouts are structured and how their structure influences returns of both merging firms’ shareholders. Specifically, it remains to be investigated: (a) how the earnout terms (size and length) influence the premia offered in earnout financed deals, (b) how the transaction value is divided between an initial and a deferred payment, and (c) how the abnormal returns gained by acquirers respond to the premia offered in both earnout and non-earnout financed deals.  Addressing these topics is important for several reasons. First, given the heterogeneous nature of earnouts, the exact impact of the earnout contract’s terms on the premium offered in an earnout financed deal provides a useful guide regarding the relationship between the deal’s riskiness of success and the extent to which this riskiness is shared between the merging partners. For example, in the presence of earnout financing, how much additional premium should be offered to the target firm’s shareholders to incentivise them to accept the deferral of a larger part of the deal’s payment, for an even longer period, than the already agreed upon ones? Second, the merging firms would be willing to have access to additional guidance on how to divide the transaction value between the initial payment and the deferred one. For example, should the acquiring firms offer a high initial payment to the target firm’s shareholders in order to motivate them to accept the deal? Alternatively, should the acquiring firm ensure that, despite offering a high premium, the initial payment remains low relative to some threshold?  Third, the acquiring firm’s shareholders would also value a deeper understanding of how the market is processing the information about the relatively high premia that are offered in earnout financed deals. Is the market interpreting the increase in the premia in earnout financed deals as a signal of overpayment, thus leading to lower acquirer abnormal returns? Alternatively, is the market interpreting such an increase in the premia as the result of a detailed contractual arrangement between the merging partners to address valuation disagreements without necessarily leading to target overpayment? In this chapter, given the extensive use of earnouts in the UK market for corporate control (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012), I rely on a UK-based dataset that covers private target M&As in order to establish the link between the terms of earnouts and the difference between the takeover premia offered in earnout and comparable non-earnout financed deals. Specifically, while the use of earnouts represents only 8.7% of private target deals announced by US acquirers (Officer et al., 2009), this contractual arrangement is a popular deal financing method for UK private target M&As, as evidenced by its presence in more than 38% of such deals (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012). On the methodological front, I combine both non-
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parametric (matching) and parametric analyses to derive results that are robust to changes in the models’ specifications and functional forms. Moreover, given the scarcity of publicly available private-target-specific information, and in addition to the use of a hand-collected dataset that covers the target’s pre-acquisition performance, I employ the Rosenbaum (2002) bounds sensitivity analysis to measure the impact that a missing covariate should have on the odds of earnout use to alter my conclusions, as in Peel and Makepeace (2012) and Chapter Three. Several important and new results are uncovered. First, I find that the heterogeneity in the structure of earnouts has a significant effect on the premia offered in earnout financed deals relative to non-earnout financed ones. More specifically, an additional 10% increase in the relative earnout size is associated with, on average, a 6.45% higher premium.37 Moreover, my results indicate that a 1-month increase in the length of the earnout period is, on average, associated with a 0.6% higher premium. This evidence suggests that the target firms’ owners are keen to ensure that the premia they are offered compensate them for (a) sharing the post-merger integration risk with the acquirers, (b) offering their valuable services to facilitate the integration of the both firms during the earnout period, and (c) forgoing alternative valuable business and employment opportunities during this period. These results also indicate that the magnitude of this compensation is not homogenous across all earnout financed deals but is rather strongly dependent on the terms of each earnout contract.  Second, while the previous studies have primarily focused on examining the variation in the relative earnout size (Cain et al., 2011; Kohers and Ang, 2000), I show that, when designing an earnout contract, moral hazard and adverse selection considerations lead to a specific rule of thumb based on which the merging firms divide the deal payment between an initial and a deferred payments. Specifically, despite the offering of a higher premium in an earnout financed deal relative to a comparable non-earnout financed one, moral hazard and adverse selection considerations lead the acquiring firm to insist on setting the initial payment in an earnout financed deal at a level that is lower than, or equal to, the full deal payment in a comparable non-earnout financed deal. This finding contradicts the earlier univariate results derived by Kohers and Ang (2000) which indicate that even if the target firm’s shareholders in an earnout financed deal do not receive the deferred payment, they still receive an initial payment that is higher than the full deal payment in a non-earnout financed deal (Kohers and Ang, 2000). I emphasise the relevance of carefully interpreting the previous results within the univariate context in which they were generated. More specifically, in their important contribution that highlights the determinants and wealth effects of earnout financing, Kohers and Ang (2000) provided a limited discussion of these results and did not employ a multivariate                                                           37 The relative earnout size is the maximum size of the deferred payment relative to the total deal value. 
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analysis or a matching-based one. I argue that their conclusion that the targets in earnout financed deals receive higher initial payments than the full payments in comparable non-earnout financed deals is exposed to concerns whether earnout financing, instead of addressing information asymmetry problems, creates its own ones. Specifically, the first problem is moral-hazard-based given that the target firm’s managers become less incentivised to co-operate with the acquiring firm during the integration period, as they already receive a higher initial payment than the full payment they would otherwise receive had the earnout not been included in the deal. The second problem is adverse-selection-based. In particular, the target firm’s managers are incentivised to exaggerate the magnitude of valuation disagreements by limiting the information they are prepared to share with the acquirer. Such an exaggeration aims to motivate the inclusion of the earnout in the deal’s financing process and hence leads the target firm’s shareholders to receive an initial payment that exceeds the full payment they would otherwise receive had the earnout not been included in the deal’s financing process. My findings that are based on the multivariate analysis of comparable earnout and non-earnout financed deals suggest that the merging firms, and mostly the acquiring firms, are aware of such concerns. This, in turn, leads the acquirers to insist on adopting the previously mentioned rule of thumb as a condition to proceed with the earnout presence in the deal’s financing process. Overall, this rule: (a) incentivises the target firm’s managers to co-operate with the acquirer and achieve the main objectives of the merger during the earnout period, and (b) limits the target managers’ incentives to exaggerate the extent of valuation disagreements in order to induce the use of the earnout as, otherwise, the initial payment they receive remains considerably lower than, or at most equal to, the full single-payment in a non-earnout financed deal. Third, while the findings presented by earlier studies confirm that acquirers enjoy higher short-run abnormal returns from earnout financed relative to non-earnout financed deals, I focus on the unexplored issues of: (a) the impact of the premia in earnout financed deals on the short-run abnormal returns gained by acquirers, and (b) the difference between the stock market’s assessments of the premia offered in earnout and non-earnout financed deals. An increase in the premia in non-earnout financed deals, which are comparable to earnout financed ones as identified via the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method, should be interpreted as a signal of overpayment. This interpretation should lead to lower short-run abnormal returns for the acquirers’ shareholders (Alexandridis et al., 2013; Mueller and Sirower, 2003). However, if earnout financing allows the acquirer to hedge against the risk of overpayment, the negative relationship between the premium and the acquirer’s short-run abnormal returns should be limited to only non-earnout financed deals. My reported results are consistent with this view: the negative relationship between the premium and the acquirer’s abnormal returns is fully 
55 
 
neutralised in earnout financed deals, as evidenced by the insignificant effect of the premium on the acquirer’s abnormal returns. Finally, given the limited (public) availability of private-target-specific information, I interpret my results within the context of a sensitivity analysis that quantifies what impact a missing covariate should have on the likelihood of earnout financing presence to alter the derived conclusions. Overall, the robust findings that are generally insensitive to the effect of missing covariates are consistent with the notion that properly designed contractual arrangements contribute towards the creation of wealth effects in M&As, provided that the merging partners are aware of the various trade-offs. I proceed as follows: Section 4.2 sets the hypotheses; Section 4.3 presents the methodology; Section 4.4 presents the dataset used; Section 4.5 discusses the empirical findings; Section 4.6 provides a sensitivity analysis and finally Section 4.7 concludes. 
4.2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
4.2.1. The impact of earnout financing on the premium Several explanations can be offered to justify the higher premia in earnout financed deals. First, as the target firm often operates as a subsidiary of the acquiring firm during the earnout period (Kohers and Ang, 2000), the target’s performance, and hence the likelihood of receiving the deferred payment, are affected by the acquiring firm’s overall business conditions. As a result, the target firm demands a higher premium to be compensated for sharing the post-acquisition business risk with the acquirer. Second, the target firm’s owners can also be exposed to concerns related to possible disagreements with the acquiring firm regarding the accurate assessment of the target firm’s performance, which reduces the likelihood of receiving the deferred payment at the end of the earnout period (Datar et al., 2001). Such concerns, in turn, may lead the target firm’s shareholders to demand higher premia in exchange of accepting the presence of the earnout in the financing process of the deal. Along these lines, Kohers and Ang (2000) show empirically that privately held targets in earnout financed deals are offered higher offer-to-book values than the targets in deals financed with single-payments. While such findings are based on a univariate analysis and are obtained from analysing deals that are not necessarily comparable, they are likely to persist in a matched sample that consists of treated (earnout) and comparable control (non-earnout) deals and on which I control for the effects of various deal characteristics on the premium. Accordingly, H1 is stated as follows: The takeover premia in earnout financed deals are, on average, higher than the 
premia offered in comparable non-earnout financed deals. 
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4.2.2. The effects of the earnout contract’s terms on the premium A strong emphasis has been placed in the previous literature on the positive influence of both the riskiness of the target firm’s business environment and the knowledge-base of its human capital on the relative earnout size (Cain et al., 2011; Datar et al., 2001). However, the association between the relative size of the earnout payment and the premium has only been theoretically investigated within the context of the game-theoretic option-based model of Lukas at al. (2012). The authors argue that the optimal investment decisions are determined by solving recursively an option pricing problem. The third stage of this problem refers to the settlement of the earnout payment, its second stage refers to the determination of the optimal level of cooperation by the target, and its first stage refers to the timing of the deal and its structure. At the third stage, given that the earnout can be treated as an option that is written on the underlying target firm’s cash flows, the value of the option is identified. Based on this value, the target determines its optimal co-operation level. Finally, given this co-operation level, the acquirer determines the size of the earnout payment, the premium, and the timing of the deal. When the target firm’s cash flow riskiness increases, the probability of the target’s satisfaction of the earnout’s performance requirement also increases. This is analogous to the increase in the probability of exercising a stock option when the stock’s riskiness increases. As a consequence, the target’s managers/owners incentive to co-operate during the earnout period is reduced and hence the synergies of the M&A are likely to decrease. To avoid this outcome, the earnout payment must increase to incentivise higher synergies. Moreover, the model shows that the initial payment is determined by a Nash Bargaining game in which the parties divide the value of the total payoff. Given that the initial payment is a function of the payoffs that are due to a high earnout payment, the initial payment also increases but such an increase is lower than the increase in the deferred payment. Consequently, there is a positive association between the relative earnout size and the overall premium, as they both reflect the degree of the deal’s riskiness. Accordingly, H2a is stated as follows: An increase in the relative size of the earnout 
payment is associated with an increase in the premium that is offered in an earnout financed deal.  The length of the earnout period, in turn, has the potential of being an influential factor in determining the overall level of the takeover premium. As emphasised by Cain et al. (2011), setting a relatively long earnout period is a response to the acquirer’s technical ability to accurately measure the target firm’s post-acquisition performance. Given that the average length of the earnout period exceeds 18 months in my sample, the target firm’s owners not only need to be rewarded for offering their business expertise to the acquirer to facilitate the merging firms’ integration but also need to be compensated for forgoing alternative employment and business opportunities during this period. Along similar lines, the comparative 
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statics resulting from Lukas et al.'s (2012) theoretical model indicate that long earnout periods are associated with high deal payments. As a result, I empirically test the Lukas et al. (2012) predictions by examining the significance of the positive relationship between the earnout period’s length and the premium. I develop H2b as follows: The longer the earnout period the 
higher the premium offered in an earnout financed deal.  
4.2.3. Moral hazard and adverse selection rule of thumb Datar et al. (2001) argue that ‘although earnouts may alleviate private information problems, these arrangements can also influence the incentives of the party managing the selling firm’s assets post-acquisition’ (p. 202). Hence, although earnouts are employed to address information asymmetry concerns, they have the potential to create their own ones when they are not properly designed. I argue that the relationship between the initial payment in an earnout financed deal and the full deal payment in a non-earnout financed deal is exposed to critical moral hazard and adverse selection concerns. The only findings I am aware of addressing this relationship are based on the univariate analysis of Kohers and Ang (2000) that shows that the target firms in earnout financed deals receive initial payments that are larger, on average, than the full deal payments in non-earnout financed deals.38 The moral hazard concern that arises from this finding is that the target firm’s owners in an earnout financed deal are less incentivised to co-operate with the acquirer during the integration period as they already receive a higher initial payment than the full payment in M&As that do not include an earnout. In turn, the adverse selection consideration that arises from these findings is that, as the target firm’s managers/owners know that they will be offered a higher initial payment compared to the full deal payment in a non-earnout financed deal, they are likely to exaggerate the extent of valuation disagreements to a level that unnecessarily leads to the involvement of earnout financing. Contrary to the findings of Kohers and Ang (2000), which are based on: (a) univariate analysis and, (b) possibly a sample of non-comparable deals, moral hazard and adverse selection considerations should primarily incentivise the acquiring firm to insist on setting the initial payment at a level that is lower than, or equal to, the full deal payment in a comparable non-earnout financed deal. Such a contract design is likely to lead to an arrangement under which the target firm’s owners are: (a) more incentivised to co-operate with the acquirer during the integration period in order to receive the deferred payment, and (b) less incentivised to exaggerate the magnitude of valuation disagreements to unnecessarily induce the inclusion of the earnout. Otherwise, they would receive a lower initial payment than, or at most an equal                                                           38The authors show that the average price-to-book value ratio in earnout financed deals, with the price excluding the deferred payment, exceeds the average price-to-book ratio in non-earnout financed deals (3.7>2.2). 
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payment to, the full deal payment in a comparable non-earnout financed deal.39 Accordingly, H3 is stated as follows: As a rule of thumb, the initial payment in an earnout financed deal is set to be, 
on average, at a lower level than, or equal to, the full deal payment in a comparable non-earnout 
financed deal. 
 
4.2.4. Earnout financing, the premium, and the acquirer’s abnormal returns The takeover premium has been employed in previous studies as a main determinant of the variation of the abnormal returns gained by acquirers (Hambrick and Hayward, 1997; Alexandridis et al., 2013). Mainly, the market’s assessment of an increase in the premium can be explained by either: (a) the synergy hypothesis whereby a high premium is interpreted as a reflection of high synergies to be realised from the merger (Antoniou et al., 2008; Díaz et al., 2009), or (b) the over-investment hypothesis whereby a high premium is interpreted as a signal of managerial discretion and hubris that are leading the acquiring company’s board to be engaged in a wasteful acquisition (Mueller and Sirower, 2003; Roll, 1986).40 The over-investment hypothesis can also explain the potential presence of high premia in private target deals (Cain et al., 2011; Capron and Shen, 2007; Datar et al., 2001; Kohers and Ang, 2000). Specifically, due to the limited available information about the private target’s performance (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005), the acquirer is likely to overpay for the combination of assets and managerial skills as information asymmetry prevents the accurate valuation of these factors’ effects on the potential synergies of the deal. If earnout financing addresses a significant part of the information asymmetry problem, such a likelihood of overpayment should vary significantly between earnout and non-earnout financed deals. Specifically, for comparable deals, one should anticipate the market to negatively interpret the increase in the takeover premia offered in non-earnout financed deals in which earnout financing is likely to be implemented. Such a negative relationship should not persist when earnout financing is used despite the offering of relatively high premia. This neutralisation of the negative effect of the premium on the acquirer’s Cumulative Abnormal                                                           39 It is worth noting that the moral hazard and adverse selection considerations are not mutually exclusive. Specifically, a target firm may operate in an intangible-rich sector, or in an environment that is characterised by high valuation complexity, which: (a) allows the target firm’s managers to report an inflated valuation about their firm, or demand a high premium, which gives rise to adverse selection, and (b) makes the retention of the target firm’s valuable human capital a critical input for the merger’s performance, leading in turn to a higher need to align the target’s incentives with those of the acquirer during the integration period, which gives rise to moral hazard considerations. 40 The literature reports mixed results regarding the effect of the takeover premia on the abnormal returns gained by the acquirers. Hambrick and Hayward (1997) and Mueller and Sirower (2003) find that premia have a negative effect on the acquirers gains. Alexandridis et al. (2013), in turn, find that the premium estimated using the piecewise regressions, based on the target’s stock 52-week high, has a statistically and economically significant negative effect on the acquirers gains. Antoniou et al. (2008) find a positive effect of the premia on the acquirers’ short-run gains. This effect is not reversed in the long-run. Díaz et al. (2009) document a non-linear relationship between the premia and the acquirers’ gains: initial increases of the premia are treated as signals of synergies, leading to higher acquirers gains. Later increases in the premia are treated as signals of over-investment and hence acquirers are penalised by the market. 
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Returns (CAR) is due to the earnout’s function of addressing information asymmetry concerns by linking the satisfaction of a significant portion of the deal’s payment to the target firm’s future performance. Following this discussion, H4 is stated as follows: The negative effect of the 
premia on the abnormal returns gained by acquirers in non-earnout financed deals is neutralised 
in comparable earnout financed deals.  
4.3. Methodology In response to the growing popularity of matching analysis in empirical research, Ho et al. (2007) argue that matching in itself is not an estimation method: once a matched sample (containing the treated and control units) is established, an estimation procedure needs to be adopted to determine the factors influencing the treatment’s outcome. Along these lines, the authors recommend that the researchers benefit from ‘their decades of experience with parametric models to adjust the matched sample’ (p. 213). Particularly, the matching on propensity scores is primarily used to balance the main covariates by simple t-tests on the matched sample (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Then, parametric methods can be applied on this matched sample. The previously discussed two-step approach provides results that are less dependent on the model’s: (a) specification, and (b) functional form. Regarding the model’s specification, Ho et al. (2007) point out that the two-stage approach is doubly robust: either the matching model or the parametric model needs to be correctly specified, but not necessarily both. Such an approach provides the researcher more flexibility in addressing the research question compared to the strict requirement of correct specification when parametric methods and matching are used separately. Regarding the functional form adopted in the model, King and Zeng (2005) further show that, by dropping observations that have no matches, the researcher not only reduces the degree of model dependence, but also needs to add less emphasis on non-linear relations and interactions among the explanatory variables. In advocating the use of parametric regressions, Ho et al. (2007) do not recommend a change in the computations of the standard errors from the procedures typically used for the particular parametric method adopted. Consequently, I first employ Propensity Score Matching (PSM) (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Peel and Makepeace, 2012) to create a matched sample that includes comparable earnout financed and non-earnout financed deals. Subsequently, I apply parametric estimation methods on the matched sample and proceed with the testing of the hypotheses developed in Section 4.2. Based on the estimated probabilities from a Logistic model that includes a rich set of dichotomous and continuous covariates, earnout and non-earnout financed deals which have 
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close estimated propensity scores are matched. Given that the number of earnout financed deals exceeds the number of non-earnout financed (control) deals in my sample, I rely on matching with replacement whereby a control observation can be used more than once, as in Dehejia and Wahba (2002). To benefit from the balancing offered by caliper matching (CM) while maintaining a considerable number of degrees of freedom to estimate the parametric models, I employ the highest possible matching caliper that leads to the balancing of the main covariates while maintaining the highest possible number of control observations. Then, I apply standard parametric analysis on the matched sample while controlling for the effects of the balanced variables, in addition to time and industry effects.41 An underlying assumption of the previously mentioned approach is that the main source of bias that the researcher is addressing is the one due to ‘selection on observables’ (Heckman and Robb, 1985). That is, it is assumed that the set of covariates that are balanced through the matching model and included in the parametric estimations include all the relevant factors. In a research field like private target acquisitions where target-specific information is rarely publicly available, the quantification of the effect of a missing covariate on the resulting conclusions remains critical.  
4.4 Data and Sample Features 
4.4.1. The dataset The sample includes acquisitions involving private target firms that are announced between January 1996 and December 2010 (inclusive) and recorded by the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Thomson ONE database.42 For a deal to remain in the sample it must satisfy the following criteria: (a) the acquirer is a UK public firm listed in the London Stock Exchange and has a market value of at least £1m four weeks prior to the announcement of the deal; (b) the target firm is privately held and is based in either the domestic or the foreign market; (c) the transaction value should be at least £1m, excluding fees; and (d) the acquirer should aim to control at least 50% of the target firm’s assets after the transaction. Furthermore, to avoid the inseparable effects of multiple deals on acquirers’ gains, deals that are announced by the same acquirer within 5 days (i.e. the event window analysed) are excluded from the sample. Following the statement by Officer (2007) that ‘acquisition multiple data from SDC is missing or inaccurate, and this data is critical to inferring the acquisition discount for unlisted targets’ (p. 579), I search in the acquisition announcements from Nexis UK and the InvestEgate Financial Press to obtain target-related measures that the acquiring firms are prepared to report to their shareholders. I find that, in the reports in which a target-specific performance                                                           41 The matching and parametric analyses are conducted using the R package MatchIt that is developed by Ho et al. (2006). 42 The choice of the starting date follows from the observation of Faccio et al. (2006) that the SDC coverage of deals outside the United States becomes more accurate after 1996. 
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measures are recorded, the acquirers often report the target firm’s pre-acquisition Audited Profits Before Taxes (PBT). I identify 445 deals for which the PBT is available. After excluding deals in which the target has negative PBT (as it makes the calculation of the acquisition multiple economically inaccurate), 424 deals remain in the sample (299 earnout financed deals and 125 non-earnout financed deals).43  
4.4.2. Sample statistics Table 4.1 (Panel A) records the annual distribution of the sample according to the deal’s payment method. In addition, the same table records the annual distributions of the sampled deals in which the acquirer aims to control 100% of the target (FULL) in addition to cross-border acquisitions (CBA). In this sample, which contains most of the observations from Chapter Three, the earnout is the most frequently used financing method (70.5% of the transactions) followed by acquisitions financed in single payments in cash (CASH) (18.9%). This result differs from the statistics of Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) where the authors report that 38.7% of their sampled UK deals include earnouts and 40.51% include cash payments. Given that the sample is limited to deals covering the target-specific pre-acquisition performance, a potential explanation for this result is that, as earnout financing requires the measurement of the target’s performance after the deal’s announcement, the acquirers are more often prepared to report target-specific information in earnout financed deals compared to non-earnout financed ones. I operate within this constraint. 
                                                          43 This sample represents 15.9% of the original sample of 2,797 observations. Such a percentage level is close to the level of 15.15% reported by Officer et al. (2009) who also deal with the inclusion of unlisted target-specific accounting measures in their sample. 
62 
 
 
Table 4.1: Annual distribution of private target acquisitions by UK acquirers arranged by deal characteristics and target sector  Panel A Panel B YEAR ALL CASH STOCK MIXED EA FULL CBA IND HCR CST MAT MED RTL CPS HT EPW TLC FIN RST 1996 29 9 0 4 16 28 4 10 0 4 4 1 0 1 6 0 2 0 1 1997 38 8 4 2 24 37 14 12 1 3 2 3 1 7 6 0 1 1 1 1998 37 10 0 6 21 37 11 8 0 0 4 2 3 12 7 0 0 1 0 1999 35 7 2 3 23 35 7 5 0 3 6 2 2 5 10 0 0 2 0 2000 35 10 0 2 23 35 12 3 1 1 3 4 1 10 11 0 1 0 0 2001 28 2 0 0 26 28 4 1 0 2 0 3 0 10 9 0 1 2 0 2002 12 1 0 0 11 12 2 2 1 0 0 2 0 3 1 0 1 2 0 2003 11 1 0 1 9 10 2 3 1 0 0 4 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 2004 18 1 0 2 15 18 2 1 0 1 0 6 0 4 3 0 1 1 1 2005 34 3 0 1 30 33 5 7 6 1 0 2 1 8 5 0 1 3 0 2006 32 2 0 3 27 31 6 6 1 0 0 2 1 11 10 0 0 1 0 2007 40 2 1 2 35 40 6 6 1 1 2 4 0 11 9 1 1 4 0 2008 22 8 0 0 14 22 8 2 1 1 1 1 1 8 4 0 0 3 0 2009 18 5 0 6 7 18 7 2 0 0 1 2 2 5 3 0 1 1 1 2010 35 11 1 5 18 30 12 6 1 0 0 4 2 8 8 2 3 1 0 
N 424 80 8 37 299 414 102 74 14 17 23 42 14 104 94 3 13 22 4 % 100 18.87 1.89 8.73 70.52 97.64 24.06 17.45 3.30 4.01 5.42 9.91 3.30 24.53 22.17 0.71 3.07 5.19 0.94  
Note:	Panel	A	 of	this	 table	represents	 the	annual	distribution	of	 private	target	M&A	bids	announced	by	UK	public	acquirers	between	January	1st,	1996	and	December	31st,	2010.	The	 distribution	of	the	
sample	 is	presented	according	to	 the	total	number	of	 transactions	(ALL),	method	of	 payment	 (earnout-financing	(EA)	or	single	upfront	payments	settled	 in	 cash	(CASH),	stock	 (STOCK)	or	mixes	of	both	
(MIXED)),	whether	the	acquisition	is	classified	by	SDC	as	a	full	acquisition	(FULL),	in	which	case	the	acquirer	controls	100%	of	the	target	once	the	acquisition	becomes	effective,	and	whether	the	acquisition	
is	classified	by	SDC	as	a	cross-border	transaction	(CBA)	whereby	the	target	is	not	registered	as	a	UK	company.	Panel B of this table represents the yearly distribution of private target M&A	bids	with	respect	
to	the	target’s	sector.	The	sectors,	as	reported	by	SDC,	are:	Industrials	(IND),	Healthcare	(HCR),	Consumer	Staples	(CST),	Materials	(MAT),	Media	and	Entertainment	(MED),	Retail	(RTL),	Consumer	Products	
(CPS),	High-Technology	(HT),	Energy	and	Power	(EPW),	Telecommunications	(TLC),	Financials	(FIN)	and	Real	Estate	(RST).	 
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Table 4.1 (Panel B) reports the annual distribution of the sampled deals according to the target firm’s industrial sector. Private targets from the Consumer Products and Services (CPS) sector are more often involved in acquisitions (24.5%) in the sample. They are followed by private targets in the High-Technology (HT) sector with a share of 22.1%. Consistent with earlier studies, the statistics show that earnout financing is more likely to be present in deals involving private targets from the hi-tech and other service-related sectors in which the value of the firm is dependent on the knowledge, skill, creativity, and efforts of a few personnel (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Kohers and Ang, 2000). On the contrary, the target sectors with the lowest acquisition activity in the sample are the Energy and Power (EPW) with a share of 0.7% and the Real Estate (RST) one with a share of 0.94%. The absence of target market value in private target deals makes the estimation of the premia offered in such deals a relatively challenging task. Kohers and Ang (2001) present the offer price-to-book value of equity ratio as the best available premium measure. However, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) emphasise the low quality of financial data reported by private firms. As a result, I rely on the target performance measure that the acquirer -after accessing the target’s records- is prepared to report in the acquisition announcement, which is the target’s positive Audited Profits Before Taxes (POSPBT). This allows for the calculation of the premium (PREMIUM), which is the outcome of the division of the deal payment, covering the initial payment and the deferred payment if the earnout is used, by the target’s pre-acquisition profitability. Table 4.2 reports the mean and median of PREMIUM in addition to other key variables included in the analysis. Among the sample statistics recorded in Table 4.2, I show that the mean (median) of PREMIUM in earnout financed deals is 39.27 (11.75), which is higher than the corresponding one offered in non-earnout financed ones (25.11 (8.82)). I also show that the acquirers that engage in earnout financed deals are younger and smaller, on average, than the ones engaged in single payment deals. Such results are consistent with findings from previous research indicating that such acquirers are more vulnerable to the consequences of target valuation risk and hence are more likely to rely on deferred payments to maximise the likelihood of the deal’s success (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Kohers and Ang, 2000). Regarding the terms of earnout contracts, I find that the mean (median) of the size of the earnout payment, as a percentage of the full deal value (REAS), of 36% (32%) is similar to the statistics reported by Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012), 38% (35%). Regarding the length of the earnout contract (LENGTH), I report an average (median) value of 19.8 (19) months. This is lower than the one of 31 (23) month periods reported by Cain et al. (2011). However, it is close to the levels of 21.86 (22) months reported in Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012). 
64 
 
Table 4.2: Summary statistics  MV(£m) ACQ_MTBV DV(£m) AGE (days) STOCK_PERC (%) RS  Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. ALL 294 71 4 2 13 6 4,833 3,398 12.35 0.0 0.48 0.08 CASH 323 92 3 2 13 4 6,451 5,323 0.00 0.0 0.17 0.05 STOCK 228 48 8 2 46 7 1,685 1,140 100 100.0 11.88 0.11 MIXED 409 51 4 2 9 5 5,968 4,501 33.6 29.3 0.24 0.09 EA 274 70 4 2 12 6 4,343 2,562 10.6 0.0 0.29 0.09 NEA 342 77 4 2 14 4 6,003 4,501 16.3 0.0 0.94 0.05 DOM 227 62 4 2 11 5 4,152 2,284 12.5 0.0 0.54 0.08 CBA 505 146 4 3 30 20 6,982 5,780 11.6 0.0 0.3 0.07  CULT_IND POSPBT (£m) PREMIUM EASIZE(£m) REAS LENGTH (months)  Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. ALL 1.3 1 1.68 0.5 35.09 10.87 - - - - - - CASH 1.8 1 3.61 0.48 15.58 7.75 - - - - - - STOCK 1.8 1 1.11 0.30 126.05 17.25 - - - - - - MIXED 1.6 1 1.04 0.54 23.87 10.14 - - - - - - EA 1.2 1 1.26 0.50 39.27 11.75 4.8 2.3 0.36 0.32 19.8 19 NEA 1.7 1 2.69 0.49 25.11 8.82 - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 DOM 1.0 1 1.02 0.44 37.8 10.96 3.8 1.9 0.38 0.33 10.7 1 CBA 2.4 1 3.78 0.90 26.56 10.17 9.3 4.7 0.29 0.25 15.1 12 
Note:	 This	Table	represents	the	mean	 and	median	values	 of	 a	 set	 of	 continuous	 covariates	 in	 the	sample.	The	covariates	 are	 the	
acquirer’s	market	value	 (MV),	the	 acquirer’s	market-to-book	 value	(ACQ_MTBV),	 the	 transaction	value	(DV)	and	the	bidder’s	age	(AGE).	The	table	also	includes	the	means	and	medians	of	the	portion	of	the	transaction	financed	with	stocks	(STOCK_PERC),	the	size	
of	 deal	 payment	 relative	 to	 the	 acquirer’s	 market	 value	 (RS),	 the	 Culture	 Index	 (CULT_IND)	 defined	 in	 Appendix	 2,	 the	 target’s	positive	Profits-before-Taxes	(POSPBT),	the	premium	measured	by	the	variable	(PREMIUM)	defined	 in	Appendix	2,	the	size	of	the	
deferred	payment	in	earnout	financed	deals	(EASIZE),	the	relative	earnout	size	(REAS)	and	the	length	of	earnout	period	(LENGTH).	These	measures	are	reported	for	the	sample	 covering	all	 the	 transactions	 (ALL),	 the	transactions	fully	financed	with	cash	(CASH),	
the	transactions	fully	financed	with	stocks	(STOCK),	the	transactions	fully	financed	with	a	mix	of	cash	and	stock	with	no	inclusion	of	
earnouts	(MIXED),	the	transactions	financed	with	earnouts	(EA)	and	the	general	group	of	 transactions	not	 financed	with	earnouts	
(NEA).	The	table	also	presents	the	means	and	medians	of	these	variables	based	on	the	geographic	scope	of	the	transaction	(domestic	
transactions	(DOM)	and	cross-borders	transactions	(CBA).	Please	refer	to	Appendix	2	for	an	accurate	description	of	the	variables.  
4.5. Results and Discussion 
4.5.1. The balancing of the main covariates To ensure that the effect of selection bias on the comparative analysis of the premia and the abnormal returns between earnout and non-earnout financed M&As is reduced, I employ the PSM method to identify similar single payment deals (in terms of characteristics/covariates) to those that have been financed with an earnout. The propensity score model aims to balance a large set of influential covariates with a caliper of 0.25. In addition to balancing the overall level of profitability level of the private targets between earnout and non-earnout financed deals on the matched samples, I also balance the	
portion	of	the	deal	payment	financed	with	stock	(STOCK_PERC)	in	order	to	reflect	 the	possible	trade-off	between	stock	and	earnout	financing,44	given	that	they	both	have	contingent	payment	
properties	 (Chang	 1998;	 Datar,	 Frankel,	 and	Wolfson	 2001;	 Officer,	 Poulsen,	 and	 Stegemoller	2009).45	 To	 emphasise	 the	 importance	of	balancing	the	portions	of	domestic	and	cross-border	
deals	in	the	matched	sample,	I	also	include	in	my	estimations	a	dichotomous	variable	(CBA)	that	
is	assigned	the	value	of	1	if	the	target	is	not	a	UK	company	and	0	otherwise.	Noting	that	cultural	
                                                          44 When the target firm’s shareholders receive the acquiring company’s stock as part of the deal’s payment, the value of this payment increases with increase in the latter firm’s stock price following the improvement in performance of the joint company. 45 I recognise that this measure is based on the deal value which is an outcome variable. Hence, in alternative estimations, instead of STOCK_PERC, I employ a dummy variable that is assigned the value of 1 if stock-financing is present and 0 otherwise. The findings remain qualitatively similar to the ones reported. 
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and	 societal	 values	 can	be	 a	 strong	 factor	 influencing	 the	post-acquisition	 integration	process	
especially	 in	 cross-border	deals,	 I	 also	 employ	 a	 Culture	 Index	 (CULT_IND)	 that	 allows	me	 to	
balance	 the	 influence	 of	 cultural	 heterogeneity	 between	 the	 merging	 firms	 on	 the	
challenges/difficulties	faced	during	the	integration	process.	This	index	is	based	on	the	graphical	
presentation	presented	 by	Radebaugh	et	 al.	 (2006)	which,	 in	 turn,	 is	 based	on	the	 traditional	classification	of	country	groups	by	cultural	and	societal	values	by	Gray	 (1988).	High	values	of	
CULT_IND	indicate	that	the	target	firm	belongs	to	a	group	of	countries	that	put	less	emphasis	on	
flexibility	and	more	emphasis	on	uniformity	 in	dealing	with	the	accounting	and	organisational	issues	 that	 might	 arise	 in	 a	 takeover	 compared	 to	 the	 UK.	 Along	 these	 lines,	 the	 use	 of	
contractual	 tools	 that	 require	 precise	 measurement	 of	 the	 target’s	performance,	 like	 earnout	
financing,	become	less	feasible.	This	variable	is	properly	defined	in	Appendix	2. I	also	control	for	the	presence	of	frequent	acquirers	(FREQ),	which	allows	me	to	account	for	
the	acquirers’	experience	in	engaging	in	M&As	as	well	as	their	experience	in	assessing	synergies	
and	evaluating	 the	success	of	their	deals.	 I	also	balance	 the	continuous	variables	representing	
the	acquirer’s	market	value	(MV)	and	age	(AGE).	 Finally,	having	balanced	 the	acquirer’s	 sizes,	
and	to	ensure	that	the	targets	in	the	matched	sample	have	close	sizes	relative	to	their	acquirers,	I	balance	the	dichotomous	variable	DUMMYRS	which	is	assigned	the	value	of	1	if	the	relative	size	
of	the	deal	value	to	the	acquirer’s	market	value	exceeds	17%,	which	is	the	third	quartile	in	the	
initial	SDC	sample,	and	0	otherwise.	Given	that	the	deal	value	is	an	output	variable	 that	should	
not	be	 included	as	 a	 covariate	 in	 the	matching	(Smith	and	Todd,	2005),	the	use	of	DUMMYRS	
allows	me	 to	 balance	 the	portions	 of	 relatively	 large	 targets	 in	 the	matched	 sample	 between	
earnout	and	non-earnout	financed	deals	without	necessarily	balancing	the	continuous	measure	
of	the	deal	value. Table 4.3 records statistics on the balancing of the main covariates between the treated (earnout) and control group (non-earnout) that I use in the analysis. This sample covers the 299 earnout financed deals and 87 comparable non-earnout financed deals. As it is presented by the 
p-values based on the t-test with the null hypothesis of 0 difference between the mean values between the treated and the control group, all covariates are balanced between the two groups. These results give a strong indication of an accurate matching. These covariates, in addition to further year and industry effects, are further controlled for in the multivariate analysis on the matched sample.      
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Table 4.3: Matching results 
 Panel A Intercept ln(MV) ln(AGE) FREQ STOCK CULT_IND CBA DUMMYRS POSPBT 1.783* (0.976) 0.247** (0.104) -0.229** (0.105) 0.589* (0.324) -0.012** (0.005) -0.302** (0.128) -0.642* (0.337) 1.037*** (0.284) -0.013* (0.007)  Panel B   Before Matching   After Matching   Treated Group Control Group p-value Treated Group Control Group p-value PROP_SCORE 0.74 0.60 0.01 0.74 0.75 0.75 STOCK_PERC 10.67 16.35 0.05 10.54 10.19 0.81 CULT_IND 1.18 1.75 0.00 1.17 1.18 0.86 CBA 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.18 0.18 0.90 AGE 4343.80 6003.70 0.00 4396.10 4731.70 0.27 FREQ 0.27 0.16 0.01 0.26 0.22 0.13 MV 274 342 0.48 274 266 0.93 POSPBT 1.26 2.69 0.20 1.26 3.18 0.15 DUMMYRS 0.54 0.04 0.01 0.54 0.57 0.40  Note: This table reports the results of the initial PSM exercise balancing the main covariates in the analysis. After the matching, the treated and control groups contain, respectively, earnout financed (EA) and non-earnout financed (NEA) deals on the matched sample of 386 observations. For each of the covariates, I report the mean in the treated and control group before and after the matching. The Absolute Standardized Mean Difference refers to the absolute value of the ratio of the difference between the mean of the variable in the treated group and the mean of this variable in the control group, divided by the square root of the mean of the covariate’s variances in both groups. Please	refer	to	Appendix	2	for	an	accurate	description	of	the	variables.  
4.5.2. Multivariate analysis of the premium The evidence recorded in Table 4.4 gives strong support to the notion that the presence of earnout financing, relative to its absence, leads to higher premia. Consistent with hypothesis H1, based on the interpretation of dummy variables in semi-logarithmic models that is offered by Kennedy (1981), the acquisition multiple in earnout financed deals is 31.11% higher than its equivalent in non-earnout counterparts.46 In line with H2a, Model 2 shows that the relative size of the deferred payment (REAS) has a significant positive association with the offered premium: a 10% increase in the relative size of the earnout payment is, on average, associated with 6.45% increase in the offered premium. In turn, as suggested by H2b, the length of the earnout period (LENGTH) has a qualitatively similar effect on the premia. Specifically, a one month increase in the length of the earnout period is associated with a 0.6% increase in the premium.  Despite the previous literature’s suggestion that the use of earnout financing is the initial step to establish a long term employer-employee relationship between the acquiring firm and the target’s owners/managers (Datar et al., 2001), it appears that the merging firms are keen to separate the takeover related considerations from the employment- and organisational-related ones. Along these lines, my results add strong emphasis on the notion that the target firm’s owners prefer that the acquisition contract explicitly recognises their compensation for bearing a significant portion of the post-acquisition integration risk and forgoing valuable alternative business/employment opportunities during the earnout period. 
                                                          46 Based on the interpretation offered by Kennedy (1981), if the coefficient associated with a dummy variable in a semi logarithmic equation is ܿ, the percentage impact of this variable on the outcome is ݁ݔ݌(ܿ − ݒܽݎ(ܿ)) − 1. 
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Table 4.4: Analysis of the determinants of the takeover premium  Model OLS OLS Dependent Variable ln(PREMIUM) ln(PREMIUM) Explanatory Variables\Model (.) (1) (2) Intercept 1.091*** (0.359) 0.898*** (0.351) EA 0.283*** (0.111)  ln(POSPBT) -0.594*** (0.057) -0.577*** (0.058) ln(MV) 0.159*** (0.036) 0.160*** (0.034) ln(AGE) 0.008 (0.031) 0.032 (0.031) CBA 0.275** (0.124) 0.287** (0.125) STOCK_PERC 0.007** (0.003) 0.009*** (0.003) CULT_IND -0.100 (0.065) -0.099 (0.062) FREQ -0.093 (0.090) -0.096 (0.086) REAS  0.645*** (0.174) LENGTH  0.006** (0.003) Year Effects YES YES Industry and Cross-Industry Effects YES YES Adjusted R-Squared 0.41 0.44 
N 386 386 
P-Value (LR-test) 0.00 0.00 Note: This table represents two models that explain the variation in the premium offered to the target shareholders.	The	first	model	
puts	 emphasis	 on	the	 impact	 of	 the	 presence	 of	earnout	 financing	on	 the	premium	while	 the	 second	model’s	 emphasis	 is	on	 the	
impact	 of	 the	 earnout	 contract’s	 terms	 on	 this	 premium.	 The	 standard	 errors	 reported	 in	 parentheses	 are	 corrected	 for	
heteroskedasticity	using	the	White	(1980)	heteroskedasticity	consistent	standard	errors.	Variables	not	 included	 in	this	table	were	
not	found	to	have	significant	effects.	***,	**,	and	*	represent	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively.	Please	refer	to	
Appendix	2	for	an	accurate	description	of	the	variables.  
4.5.3. The structure of the earnout payment To investigate the difference between the initial payment in earnout financed deals and the full deal payments in comparable non-earnout financed deals, I modify the approach adopted in Section 5.2 by introducing the following dependent variable: 
INITIALDV = ൞ ln ൬INITIALPMTPOSPBT ൰  in earnout financed dealsln൬ DVPOSPBT൰  in non − earnout financed deals Specifically, employing the INITIALDV as the dependent variable allows for the estimation of the premium based on the assumption that, in earnout financed deals, the deal payment is limited to the initial payment (INITIALPMT). The sign, magnitude and significance of the coefficient associated with the dummy variable referring to the presence of the earnout (EA) in a regression over the matched (treated and control) sample, with INITIALDV being the dependent variable, allow us to examine the difference between the initial payments in earnout financed deals and the full deal payments in comparable non-earnout financed ones, relative to the target’s pre-acquisition profitability. 
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Table 4.5 (Model 1) shows that, after controlling for several covariates over the matched sample, the initial payment in earnout financed deals is found to be significantly smaller than the full deal values in comparable non-earnout financed ones. This effect remains significant, yet at the 10% level, when time and industry effects are included in Model 2. Based on the interpretation of dummy variables in semi-logarithmic models that is offered by Kennedy (1981), the initial payment in an earnout financed deal is, on average, 21.10% lower than the full deal payment in a comparable non-earnout financed deal. Such findings lead to the non-rejection of H3 and highlight the importance of the hypothesised rule of thumb in dividing the deal payment between an initial payment and a deferred one. 
Table 4.5: Multivariate analysis of the earnout’s structure Dependent Variable INITALDV INITIALDV Explanatory Variable\Model (.) (1) (2) Intercept 0.974*** (0.248) 1.000*** (0.286) EA -0.227** (0.106) -0.212* (0.112) ln(MV) 0.187*** (0.039) 0.193*** (0.037) STOCK_PERC 0.011*** (0.003) 0.012*** (0.003) ln(POSPBT) 0.455*** (0.067) 0.457*** (0.067) CBA 0.371*** (0.125) 0.359*** (0.128) CULT_IND -0.094 (0.059) -0.091 (0.066) Year Effects NO YES Industry and Cross-Industry Effects NO YES 
N 386 386 Adjusted R-Squared 0.40 0.39 Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 Note: This table reports the results of the cross-sectional analysis explaining the relationship between the initial payments in earnout financed deals and the deal payments in non-earnout financed deals. The dependent variable is INITIALDV. The	standard	
errors	reported	in	parentheses	are	corrected	for	heteroskedasticity	using	the	White	(1980)	heteroskedasticity	consistent	standard	
errors.	Variables	not	included	in	this	table	were	not	found	to	have	significant	effects.	***,	**,	and	*	represent	significance	at	the	1%,	
5%	and	10%	levels	respectively.	Please	refer	to	Appendix	2	for	an	accurate	description	of	the	variables. This finding provides a strong indication that the acquiring firms are aware of the adverse selection and moral hazard distortions that arise from systematically committing to making significantly high immediate payments in earnout financed deals. Hence, despite the offer of high premia in earnout financed deals, the careful design of the initial and deferred payments to ensure the target firm’s co-operation appears to be an important condition for those firms to proceed with the transaction.  
4.5.4. The determinants of abnormal returns gained by the acquirer’s shareholders In examining the determinants of the abnormal returns gained by acquirers, I introduce the presence of earnout financing as an independent variable in Model 1 (Table 4.6). Consistent with previous evidence presented by Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012), my findings highlight the positive market response to the presence of earnout financing. Specifically, 
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controlling for known determinants47, earnout financed deals yield, on average, 2.2% higher Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) than non-earnout financed ones.48 To determine whether the market reacts differently to the premium level when the earnout is included compared to M&As in which the earnout is not included, I add PREMIUM and the product (EA × PREMIUM) as additional regressors in Model 2. Based on this specification, the coefficient associated with PREMIUM represents the market’s sensitivity to the premia in non-earnout financed deals. In turn, the sum of the coefficients associated with PREMIUM and (EA × PREMIUM) represents the market’s sensitivity to the premia paid in earnout financed deals. According to H4 the coefficient associated with PREMIUM should be negative and the coefficient associated with (EA × PREMIUM) should be positive, with an absolute value equal to that of the coefficient of PREMIUM. The results recorded in Model 2 indicate, as hypothesised in H4, the two new relations that emerge between the variables PREMIUM and CAR. The first is negative, which is due to the absence of earnout financing. Specifically, as expected in non-earnout financed deals, an increase in the premium is interpreted negatively. However, the second relationship is positive with a magnitude being close in absolute value to the previous relation.49 The null hypothesis being the restriction that the coefficient associated with (EA × PREMIUM) is equal to the opposite value of the coefficient associated with PREMIUM is not rejected by a Wald test with a 
p-value of 0.77. The sum of both coefficients is not statistically different than 0, which indicates that the market’s sensitivity to the premium in earnout financed deals is statistically insignificant. Moreover, the distinction I present between the premium’s influence on CAR in earnout and non-earnout financed deals explains the overall positive wealth effect of this financing method as it renders the coefficient of EA insignificant in the specification presented. Overall, the insensitivity of the acquirer’s CAR to the level of the premium in earnout financed deals indicates that the offered premium in an earnout financed deal, despite being relatively higher than the premium in a comparable non-earnout financed deal, carries no implication on whether the target firm is overpaid or not. Rather, this premium is interpreted by the market as the outcome of a detailed bargaining process that aims to ensure the 
                                                          47 For industry and year effects, I include dummy variables that refer to each sector covered in the sample and each year, respectively. For cross-industry effects, I include a dummy variable that is assigned the value of 1 if the merging firms have different 2-digit SIC codes and 0 otherwise.  48 As in Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) and Faccio et al. (2006), I estimate the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) as the sum of the daily differences between the acquiring firm’s stocks returns and the returns on a market index (the FT-ALL Share Index in particular) in the 5-day period (-2, 2) surrounding the acquisition’s announcement date. 49 In alternative estimations, I include ln(PREMIUM) instead of PREMIUM as an independent variable. My findings remain qualitatively similar to the ones reported when it comes to signs of the coefficients. However, the effects in these alternative estimations are not significant. Therefore, my findings indicate that the relation between the premia in earnout financed deals and non-earnout financed ones on one hand and the acquirer’s CAR on another hand are linear. 
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completion of the deal by addressing the valuation disagreements between the merging partners. 
Table 4.6: Determinants of the market’s reaction to the acquisition announcement Dependent Variable CAR CAR Explanatory Variables\Model (.) (1) (2) Intercept 0.036** (0.016) 0.044*** (0.017) EA 0.022** (0.010) 0.013 (0.011) ln(MV) -0.003 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) STOCK_PERC -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) CULT_IND 0.007* (0.004) 0.007* (0.004) PREMIUM  -0.0004** (0.0002) EA × PREMIUM  0.0004** (0.0002) Year Effects YES YES Industry and  Cross-Industry Effects YES YES 
N 386 386 Adjured R-Squared 0.02 0.04 Prob (F-Statistic) 0.00 0.00  
Note:	This	table	represents	the	cross-sectional	analysis	of	the	public	UK	acquirers’	CAR	in	the	5-day	period	(-2,	2)	surrounding	the	
acquisition	 announcement.	 Model	 1	 examines	 the	 determinants	 of	 CAR	 without	 introducing	 the	 interaction	 of	 the	 premium	
(PREMIUM)	with	 the	 presence	 of	 earnouts	 (EA).	 Model	 2	 examines	 whether	 the	 different	 interpretations	 by	 the	market	 of	 the	
acquisition	premia	explains	the	positive	market	reaction	to	the	presence	of	earnouts.	The	standard	errors	reported	in	parentheses	
are	corrected	for	 heteroskedasticity	using	White’s	(1980)	heteroskedasticity	consistent	 standard	errors.	Variables	not	included	in	
this	 table	 were	 included	 in	 alternative	 specifications	 and	 were	 not	 found	 to	 have	 significant	 effects.	 ***,	 **,	 and	 *	 represent	
significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively.	Please	refer	to	Appendix	2	for	an	accurate	description	of	the	variables. 
4.6. Sensitivity Analysis In the approach adopted in Section 4.5, I used matching analysis with the highest possible caliper to retain the highest number of comparable observations. Then, I applied parametric analysis on the resulting sample. In this Section, I add further emphasis on the validity of the results: (a) by using a smaller caliper to make the deals even more comparable, (b) by estimating the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT), which is the average difference in outcomes between the treated and the control observations on the matched sample, and (c) by applying a sensitivity analysis on the resulting ATT to quantify the effect that a missing covariate should have on the treatment’s presence (in the Logistic model) in order to alter my conclusions. How strong a missing covariate would have to be, in terms of influencing the odds of assigning a treatment, in order to alter the qualitative conclusions of the study? In the context of this analysis, this approach can be applied to the results related to the non-rejection of H1 and H3 in Section 4.5. In particular, to what extent can we be confident that (a) the increase in premia in earnout financed deals relative to non-earnout financed deals and, (b) the notion that ‘the initial payment in an earnout financed deal is lower than, or equal to, the full payment in a comparable non-earnout financed deal’ can hold with the introduction of a missing covariate? These examinations are relevant given that a large amount of private-target-
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related information is not publicly available to be introduced to the analysis in the form of covariates that influence the use of earnout financing. 
Table 4.7: Treatment effect estimates and sensitivity analysis Outcome ln(PREMIUM) INITIALDV 
ܣܶܶ (Abadie and Imbens (2006) Standard Errors) 47.25*** (0.07) -11.03 (9.92) Cut-off	Γ	value	(p≈0.05) 2.00 1.50 Cut-off	Γ	value	(p≈0.10) 2.20 1.41 Note: This table represents the outcome of the matching and the Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analyses. For both variables, ln(PREMIUM) and INITIALDV, I estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) with the Abadie and Imbens (2006) standard errors after a 1:1 matching exercise with caliper 0.1. I also present the cut-off Γ	levels	at	which	the	treatment	effects	become significant at the 5% and 10% levels for ln(PREMIUM) and insignificant for INITIALDV. ***,	**,	and	*	represent	
significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively.  The results reported in Table 4.7, based on PSM with a caliper of 0.01 and the Logistic model specification as in Table 4.3, present inferences that are in line with conclusions of Section 4.5.50 These inferences are strongly insensitive to the effect of a missing covariate. In particular, the ATT estimate of ln(PREMIUM) is 47.23% and is significant at the 1% level.51 In turn, the ATT estimate of the impact of earnout on INITIALDV is insignificant. Hence, the initial payment in an earnout financed deal is not statistically different than the full deal’s payment in a comparable non-earnout financed one. Based on the ߁ levels of the Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analysis, a missing covariate needs to increase the odds of one of two matched deals, including the earnout relative to the control from the non-earnout group, by a factor of 1.5 to 2 in order to: (a) make the impact of the earnout’s presence on the premium statistically insignificant and, (b) make the difference between the initial payment in an earnout financed deal and the full payment in a non-earnout financed one positive and statistically significant.52 The ߁ levels of 1.5 and 2 that I report are close, for instance, to the level of 1.55 that is reported as evidence of strongly insensitive results in the Peel and Makepeace (2012) study of the premium received by accounting auditors. Furthermore, in the Logistic model, these effects are equivalent to a required reduction in the portion of the deal that is financed by stocks from 57% and 34%, respectively, to 0, i.e. to employ full cash financing in order to alter my qualitative conclusions. These reductions reflect strong economic impacts given that the standard deviation of the portion of the deal financed by stocks is 23%. Following the emphasis of Core (2010) that results in empirical accounting and finance research are not frequently supported by sensitivity analyses, these results give a clear indication that my conclusions are                                                           50The key covariates are balanced on the resulting matched sample as in Table 4.3. This matched sample covers 135 earnout financed deal and 64 non-earnout financed ones. 51Abadie and Imbens (2008) show that estimators resulting from bootstrap procedures are not valid even under the simple conditions of a single continuous covariate and an unbiased ܰଵ/ଶ normally distributed estimator. The results of the Abadie and Imbens (2008) simulation show that the variance estimator they developed (Abadie and Imbens, 2006) tends to perform well even with small samples. Consequently, in testing the null hypothesis of zero 
ATT, theAbadie and Imbens (2006) standard errors are employed in the t-tests and reported with the results. 52 These results are based on the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test at each ߁ level. 
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relatively insensitive to the effect of a missing covariate on the odds of the earnout’s presence in the financing process of the deal. 
4.7. Conclusion Due to the heterogeneity in the structure earnout contracts, and the market participants’ need to have clear quantitative estimations of the various trade-offs associated with the design of such contracts, I present the first empirical contribution that investigates the relationship between the terms of the earnout  (size and length) and the premia. Specifically, I show that relatively large deferred payments and longer earnout periods are associated with increases in the premia in earnout deals compared to the premia in comparable single-payment deals. This finding indicates that the target firm’s owners in an earnout financed deal are compensated for sharing the post-acquisition business risk with the acquiring firm by being offered relatively higher premia. In addition, I present evidence concerning the presence of a specific rule of thumb that governs the relationship between the earnout financed deals and comparable non-earnout financed ones: the initial payments in the former group are set to be, on average, at a lower level than, or equal to, the full deal payments in the latter group. This result indicates that the acquiring firms are aware of the ramifications of making high immediate payments to their targets as such high payments might distort the incentives of the private target’s owners (often managers) in co-operating to achieve the takeover’s objectives. Moreover, I investigate the abnormal returns gained by acquirers’ shareholders in deals that are financed with earnouts and comparable deals that are financed with single-payments. I find that an increase in the premia in non-earnout financed deals is interpreted as a signal of overpayment. To the contrary, given that earnout contracts are employed to address information asymmetry issues that prevent the completion of the deal, the relatively high premium in an earnout financed deal is not interpreted by the market as a signal of overpayment. This result is expected given that the receipt of a significant portion of this premium is contingent upon the target’s satisfaction of pre-determined post-acquisition performance requirements. Finally, given the limitation of publicly available target-specific information in private target deals, I rely on the Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analysis to quantify what the effect that a missing covariate should be on the odds of earnout presence to alter my qualitative conclusions. I find that my results are robust and insensitive to the impact of an omitted unobserved covariate. Hence, my conclusions are likely to be highly consistent. Overall, this chapter adds further emphasis on the usefulness of earnout financing in addressing information asymmetry concerns in M&As and in providing a contextual framework that allows both the acquiring and the target firms to reap additional benefits from the M&A transaction. 
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Appendix 2 – Variables’ Definitions Variable (Acronym) Description Source 
Acquirer’s	Age	(AGE) The	number	of	days	 between	 the	acquirer’s	 listing	in	Datastream	
and	the	announcement	date Datastream Acquirer’s	Market-to-
Book	Value (ACQMTBV) The	 market	 value	 of	 the	 acquirer	 at	 four	 weeks	 before	 the	acquisition,	 divided	 by	 its	 book	 value	 of	 equity	 from	 the	 most	recent	accounting	statement	prior	to	the	bid	announcement. Datastream 
Audited	Profits	Before	
Taxes	(PBT) The	 target’s	 Audited	 Profits	 Before	 Taxes	 for	 the	 financial	 year	preceding	 the	 acquisition	 as	 covered	 in	 the	 acquisition	announcement InvestEgate	+	Nexis	UK 
Cash	Financed	
Transactions	(CASH) Dummy=1	if	 the	consideration	 is	100%	 financed	with	cash	 and	0	otherwise SDC Cross-Border	
Acquisition	(CBA) Dummy=1	when	the	transaction	includes	a	UK	acquirer	and	non-UK	target	and	=	0	when	the	target	is	a	UK	firm	[=	DOM] SDC 
Culture	Index	(CULT_INDEX) 
An	 index	 that	 ranks	 the	 countries	 in	which	 the	 targets	 are	 listed	
from	 the	 most	 flexible	 to	 the	 least	 flexible,	 and	 from	 the	 most	
transparent	 to	 the	 least	 transparent,	 in	 dealing	 with	 accounting	
and	organisational	challenges.	It	takes	the	following	values: 
1.	The	country	of	the	firm	acquired	belongs	to	the	Anglo-American	
group.	 The	 countries	 included	 are:	 United	 Kingdom,	 Canada,	 the	
Republic	of	 Ireland,	United	 States,	New	Zealand,	South	Africa	and	Australia. 
2.	 The	 country	 of	the	 firm	acquired	belongs	 to	 the	 Nordic	group.	
The	 countries	 included	 are:	 Sweden,	 Denmark,	 Finland,	 Norway	
and	the	Netherlands. 
3.	 The	country	of	the	 firm	acquired	belongs	to	 the	Asian-Colonial	
group.	 The	 countries	 included	 in	 this	 case	 are:	 Hong	 Kong	 and	Singapore. 
4.	The	country	of	the	firm	acquired	belongs	to	the	Germanic	group.	
The	 countries	 included	 are:	 Germany,	 Austria,	 Israel	 and	Switzerland. 
5.	 The	 country	 of	 the	 firm	belongs	 to	 the	 remaining	 groups.	 The	
underlying	assumption	in	this	case	is	that	once	high	differences	in	
the	degree	of	flexibility	are	reached,	the	ordering	of	the	accounting	
systems	becomes	less	relevant 
SDC	+	The	classification	provided	
by	Gray	(1988)	in	which	he	uses	
cultural	and	societal	values	as	
primary	characteristics	for	
grouping	families	of	countries.	The	
ranking	of	the	flexibility	of	these	
groups’	accounting	systems	is	
represented	graphically	by	Radebaugh	et	al.	(2006).	 
Cumulative	Abnormal	
Returns	(CAR) The	sum	of	 the	acquirer’s	abnormal	returns	 in	 the	5-day	window	surrounding	the	announcement Datastream 
	Deal	Value	(DV) Reported	deal	value,	in	millions	 of	 pounds.	 This	 value	 covers	 the	initial	payment	 and	 the	maximum	value	 of	 the	reported	deferred	
payment	when	an	earnout	is	included SDC 
Earnout	(EA) Dummy=1	when	the	consideration	includes	an	earnout	[EA]	and	0	
otherwise	[NEA]  SDC 
Earnout	Value (EASIZE) Value	of	the	reported	maximum	earnout	size,	in	million	pounds. SDC 
Frequent	Bidder	(FREQ) 
Dummy=1	when	the	acquirer	is	classified	as	a	frequent	bidder	and	
0	 otherwise.	Following	Draper	 and	Paudyal	(2006),	 the	acquirers	
who	bid	more	than	the	third	quartile	of	bid	counts	per	acquirer	in	
the	 SDC	 sample	 of	 2797	 deals	 (9	 bids)	 are	 classified	 as	 frequent	bidders SDC 
High	Relative	Size	of	the	Deal (DUMMYRS) Dummy=1	 if	 the	 deal	 value	 relative	 to	 the	 market	 value	 of	 the	acquirer’s	market	value	is	higher	than	the	third	quartile	of	17% SDC 
Initial	Payment	in	
Earnout	Financed	Deals	(INITIALPMT) The	value	of	the	initial	upfront	payment	in	earnout	financed	deals SDC 
Length	of	the	Earnout	Period (LENGTH) 
The	length	of	the	earnout	period	in	months	as	present	in	the	
acquisition	announcement.	When	no	earnout	is	present,	this	
variable	takes	the	value	of	0.	When	an	earnout	is	present	and	the	
acquisition	announcement	refers	to	the	auditing	of	the	target’s	
account	without	mentioning	the	length	of	the	earnout	period	I	give	
this	variable	a	value	of	1 
Nexis	UK	+	InvestEgate 
Market	Value	of	the	
Acquirer’s	Equity	(MV) Acquirer’s	 market	 value	 of	 equity	 at	 four	 weeks	 prior	 to	 bid	announcement,	 in	millions	 of	 pounds.	 I	 also	 employ	 the	 natural	
logarithm	of	this	variable Datastream 
Natural	Logarithm	of	
the	Deal	Value	for	Non-
Earnout	Financed	
Transactions	and	the	
Initial	Payments	in	
Earnout	Financed	
Transactions,	Divided	
A	continuous	variable	that	is	equal	to	the	deal	value	when	an	
earnout	is	not	included	and	equal	only	to	the	initial	payment	when	
the	earnout	is	included,	divided	by	the	target’s	pre-acquisition	profitability SDC 
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by	The	target’s	Profits	
Before	Taxes (INITIALDV) 
Percentage	of	the	Deal	
Payment	Financed	With	
Stocks	(STOCK_PERC)	 The	percentage	of	the	total	transaction	value	financed	with	stocks SDC 
Positive	Profits	Before	Taxes (POSPBT) 
The	audited	value	of	the	profit-before	taxes	of	the	target	for	the	
financial	year	preceding	the	acquisition.	As	this	measure	is	used	in	
calculating	acquisition	multiples,	I	only	include	transaction	in	
which	this	measure	has	a	positive	value Nexis	UK	+	InvestEgate 
Premium	Offered	to	the	Target (PREMIUM) The	ratio	of	the	deal	value	to	the	target’s	pre-acquisition	profitability SDC	+	Nexis	UK	+	InvestEgate 
Propensity	Score (PROP_SCORE) The	propensity	scores	estimated	by	the	Logistic	model	in	Table	4.3 SDC	+	Nexis	+	InvestEgate 
Relative	Size	of	the	Deal	(RS) Ratio	of	(DV)	to	(MV)  Datastream	+SDC 
Relative	Earnout	
Payment	Size (REAS) The	ratio	of	the	maximum	size	of	the	deferred	payment	to	overall	deal	 value	 which	 covers	 both	 the	 initial	 payment	 and	 the	maximum	value	of	the	deferred	payment SDC 
Stock	Financed	
Acquisitions	(STOCK) Dummy	=	1	when	the	consideration	is	100%	financed	with	stocks	and	0	otherwise SDC 
Transactions	financed	with	a	Mix	of	Cash	and	
Stocks	Without	an	Earnout 
(MIXED)	 
Dummy	=	1	when	the	deal	is	financed	with	a	mix	of	cash	and	stock	excluding	earnout	and	0	otherwise SDC   
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Chapter Five 
The Valuation Effects of the Scheme of Arrangement in 
the UK Market for Corporate Control     
Abstract In this chapter, I study why the Scheme of Arrangement (Scheme), as an alternative takeover method to the traditional Contractual Offer (Offer), has recently turned into the most popular takeover method in the UK market for corporate control. The Scheme is more likely to occur in deals involving large targets, deals financed with stock, in the presence of target termination fee agreements, as well as in deals that have been initiated by private equity acquirers. Despite evidence in the legal literature arguing in favour of the limited bargaining power of target shareholders in Scheme deals, my parametric and matching analyses show that the target shareholders receive similar premia in Scheme and Offer deals. My results also show that, before the proper codification of the Scheme by The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, the sub-optimal use of this takeover method was associated with a significant reduction in the abnormal returns gained by acquirers.  
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5.1. Introduction To acquire and eventually control all the shares of a publicly traded (or listed) company in the UK, two takeover methods can be employed. The first method is the Contractual Offer (hereafter ‘Offer’) via which the acquirer announces directly to the shareholders of the target company her willingness to acquire their shares at a pre-determined price-per-share. The second method is the Scheme of Arrangement (hereafter ‘Scheme’) via which a process administered by the court is involved, at the end of which, the target company as a single unit accepts or rejects selling her shares to the acquirer at the pre-determined price-per-share that has been initially offered (Boardman, 2012). Approval of the Scheme is the result of a voting process that occurs in separate class meetings. These classes are determined by the court and require the approval of more than 75% of the shareholders in each class (Parliament, 2006). Part 26 of the Companies Act defines the Scheme as ‘a compromise or arrangement… between a company and its creditors, or any class of them, or its members or any class of them’ (p. 423) (Parliament, 2006). However, the Offer was the standard takeover method for conducting listed target takeovers in the UK, as the Scheme was described as ‘inflexible, time-consuming and costly’ (p. 2) (Myners, 2008). Franks and Harris (1989) highlight the unpopularity of the Scheme due to the need for extensive dealings with the target board of directors and the involvement of the court. Yet, during the last decade, the increased predictability of the approval of the court, in addition to the guidance and further codification that has been offered by The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (hereafter ‘Panel’), have enhanced the popularity of the Scheme to the extent that it has become the main takeover method in the UK (Boardman, 2012). As a result, while the legal literature has contributed to our understanding of the definitions and regulations associated with both the Scheme and the Offer, the determinants of the choice between the Scheme and the Offer, as well as the effect of each takeover method on the premia offered to the target shareholders and the abnormal returns gained by acquirers, remain to be investigated. This chapter aims to offer insights on the dynamics influencing the choice of the takeover method in listed target acquisitions in the UK and also to shed light on what explains the cross-sectional differences in abnormal returns under each takeover method. The determinants of the choice of merging firms to implement the Scheme as the takeover method has been discussed in several reports issued by financial and legal consultants (Boardman, 2012; Lombers et al., 2008; Martin, 2007).53 Among other relevant features, they mainly refer to several firm- and deal-specific factors that contribute to the favourability of the Scheme takeover method, relative to the Offer. For instance, the Scheme guarantees, once it is sanctioned by the court, the immediate acquisition of 100% of the target’s shares without the                                                           53 I rely on such reports in discussing the different aspects of the Scheme due to the limited finance-based scholarly work in this area. However, when appropriate, I refer to the related legal scholarly contributions. 
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need to negotiate with the target minority shareholders, as it happens in the case of the Offer. This is likely to make the Scheme a favourable takeover method in deals initiated by acquirers that are interested in the immediate control of all the assets of the target for, possibly, financial reasons, i.e. in the case of acquisitions initiated by private equity acquirers that often use debt to finance their deals and the target assets being used as collateral (Lombers et al., 2008). Moreover, while the acquirers using the Scheme, contrary to their counterparts using the Offer, do not pay the stamp duty that amounts to 0.5% of the deal value, the high advisory fees and the length of the court procedure are presented by merger consultants as a cost that possibly outweighs the benefits of tax savings (Ashurst LLP, 2004).54 Given the overwhelming evidence that public target acquirers experience substantial declines in wealth, or at best break even, following the M&A announcements (Draper and Paudyal, 2006), this 0.5% tax savings can be a critical source of additional returns especially when acquiring relatively large targets (Boardman, 2012). The influence of these factors, among others, on the likelihood of the use of the Scheme rather than the Offer, remains to be empirically investigated. Along similar lines, earlier studies discuss the consequences of the weak bargaining power of the target shareholders under Scheme, relative to that under the Offer. Specifically, Payne (2011) analyses the Scheme-related regulations and the attitude of the court to highlight the limited ability of the dissenting target shareholders in influencing the takeover outcome under the Scheme. Such a limitation gives the acquirer a strong bargaining position in the takeover process by allowing her to complete the deal at a relatively low premium. Therefore, it remains to be empirically investigated whether the target shareholders under the Scheme manage to ultimately receive as high premia as those received by the target shareholders in comparable Offer deals. In this chapter, in addition to tackling this issue by applying a parametric analysis, I employ the non-parametric Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method to create a matched sample of comparable Scheme and Offer deals in order to accurately evaluate the difference in premia offered between the two groups of deals. Moreover, given that the Scheme is a relatively complicated legally and regulatory procedure, its use should be limited to those deals in which any associated benefits, in terms of tax deductions or guaranteeing the full acquisition of target’s assets, exceed its advisory costs and the costs arising from possible delays in the deal completion. Based on the approach implemented by Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012), in addition to evaluating the overall difference in the abnormal returns gained by acquirers between Scheme and Offer deals, I examine the difference in the acquirers’ abnormal returns between the deals in which the use of the Scheme is classified as optimal and the deals in which it is classified as sub-optimal. More                                                           54 The Telegraph reports that, in 2008 and 2009, the total amount of tax savings enjoyed by acquirers in Scheme deals amounted to £45 million (Wilson, 2010). 
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specifically, I expect that the sub-optimal use of the Scheme to be associated with significant losses for acquirers’ shareholders, relative to the optimal use of this method. Moreover, I apply the same approach across different periods in the sample in order to determine how any observed difference in acquirers’ gains has evolved over time, especially given that the use of the Scheme has become less regulatorily demanding in more recent times following the updated clarifications offered by the Panel in Appendix 7 which reduced the heavy reliance on advisors. My main findings indicate that the likelihood of the Scheme being used as a takeover method in the UK market for corporate control is positively influenced by the fraction of deal’s stock financing. As the acquirer is revealing detailed business- and synergy-related information to convince the target’s board of directors to accept stock financing, the immediate guarantee of an explicit completion of the deal through the sale of 100% of the target shares sets the Scheme as the favourable takeover method. Along these lines, the tax advantages of the Scheme also contribute to its favourability since the choice of stock financing is likely to be positively influenced by the financial constraints that prevent cash financing (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). I also find that the likelihood of the Scheme being used is influenced by the size of the target firm. Specifically, as acquirers using the Scheme, rather than the Offer, do not pay the stamp duty that amounts to 0.5% of the deal value, the size of the deal presents an important factor that is positively affecting the use of the Scheme takeover method. Likewise, the previously mentioned taxation, ownership, and also the guaranteed deal completion features of the Scheme make it more likely to be used: (a) in acquisitions initiated by private equity acquirers, and (b) when the target’s board of directors signs a binding termination fee agreement.55 I also find that, while these features make the Scheme a more favourable takeover method for domestic diversifying acquirers, foreign diversifying acquirers are less likely to implement it, possibly due to their unfamiliarity with the UK regulatory and legal requirements. Regarding the premia offered in Scheme and Offer deals, my initial multivariate analysis shows that, on average, the target shareholders in Scheme deals receive almost 7% higher premia than their counterparts in Offer deals. However, when matching analysis is employed, I find that the effect of the takeover method on the offered premia is statistically and economically insignificant. Moreover, based on the Rosenbaum-bounds sensitivity analysis, the conclusions based on the latter analysis are found to be relatively insensitive to the effect of a missing covariate. These findings clearly indicate that the target shareholders, despite their theoretically weak relative bargaining power, manage to receive premia that are, at least, as high as the premia received by their counterparts in comparable Offer deals. Additionally, the voting outcomes of the shareholders’ court meeting, in which most of the Schemes receive an                                                           55 A termination fee agreement requires the party deciding not to proceed with the deal to pay a pre-specified sum to its counterpart. 
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overwhelming support exceeding 95% of the overall votes, offer further validation to the notion that the Scheme target shareholders are in general satisfied with the premia they are offered. Lastly, my analysis indicates that the abnormal returns gained by acquirers in Scheme and Offer deals are not significantly different from each other. However, I find significant differences in the acquirers’ abnormal returns between the optimal and the sub-optimal use of the Scheme relative to the Offer. Specifically, before the year 2008 (the time at which the Panel issued formal clarifications of the Scheme’s procedures and timetable) the sub-optimal use of the Scheme is associated with at least 2.5% decline in the abnormal returns gained by acquirers. This possibly suggests that when the Scheme is not properly codified and/or it is used in circumstances in which such a use is not recommended, as it is classified as sub-optimal by the outcome of the Logistic model, it allows the legal and advisory costs to exceed its tax benefits. I proceed as follows: Section 5.2 discusses the main procedural differences between the Scheme and the Offer. Section 5.3 presents the theoretical framework and designs the hypotheses. The methods in estimating the takeover premia offered to target shareholders and the abnormal returns gained by acquirers are presented in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 refers to the dataset and discusses the sample’s summary statistics. Finally, Section 5.6 discusses the empirical results and Section 5.7 offers a conclusion. 
5.2. The Scheme versus the Offer The discussion of the regulations related to the Scheme and the Offer uncovers several procedural, ownership-specific, as well as tax-related distinctions between the two takeover methods. This section refers to the main aspects of the Scheme and the Offer that I expect to have a significant influence on: (a) the choice of one over the other, and (b) any observed difference in the offered premia to targets and the abnormal returns gained by acquirers’ shareholders. The first difference between the two takeover methods lies in their diverse approaches regarding the participation of the target firm’s shareholders, and also the target firm’s board of directors, in the deal’s process under each method. Specifically, in the case of the Offer, based on Rule 25.2 of the Takeover Code (the ‘Code’), the acquirer announces the bid directly to the target firm’s shareholders with the target firm’s board of directors only expressing its opinion regarding the deal. However, in the case of the Scheme, a friendly target board presents a crucial element that is compulsory to complete the deal. In particular, as the Scheme is an agreement between a company and its investors, it is the target firm’s board of directors that often sets a court meeting in which the shareholders vote on the Scheme as required by Section 896 of the Companies Act (Parliament, 2006). Therefore, while an Offer can be a friendly deal when it has the approval of the target’s board of directors, a Scheme has to be a friendly deal as it is a 
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process that is mainly controlled by the target company through both its management and shareholders.56 I accommodate this difference in our analysis by focusing on friendly deals that satisfy the Scheme’s practical requirement. The second difference between the two methods is the necessary involvement of the court in the case of the Scheme rather than the Offer. The Companies Act is explicit in making the court’s approval a necessity for a Scheme to be binding: Part 26 provides a detailed description of the steps involved in the Scheme process with special emphasis on the role of the court. Specifically, in order to proceed with the Scheme, the target company should start the process by submitting a claim to the court. Then, a first hearing takes place before The Registrar of Companies in which the target company seeks the court’s approval to hold a general meeting to vote on the Scheme.57 Once the necessary documents are posted to the shareholders, at least one court meeting is required to vote on the Scheme (Parliament, 2006). Payne (2011) argues that this process allows the target shareholders to make an undistorted choice after they are fully informed about all the aspects of the deal. After the vote on the Scheme, the court’s approval is needed and the Scheme becomes effective only when a copy of the court order is delivered to The Registrar of Companies. The immediate consequence of the court’s involvement, placing aside the possibility that a court might not sanction the Scheme, is what makes the Scheme a lengthy process, compared to the Offer (Payne, 2011). The third difference between the Scheme and the Offer is related to the objectives that can be achieved via each of the two takeover methods. A Scheme necessarily involves the acquisition of 100% of the target shares. In fact, once the Scheme is sanctioned, the acquirer immediately owns and controls all of the issued target shares and has to satisfy the payment of the offered price-per-share to all the target shareholders, as detailed in Rule 31.8 of the Code. However, the Offer can result in a situation in which the acquirer controls the target company while also dealing with the target minority shareholders. As specified by Rule 10 of the Code, an Offer is declared unconditional if the ‘offerer has acquired or agreed to acquire (either pursuant to the offer or otherwise) shares carrying over 50 percent of the voting rights’. If an acquirer is aiming to control 100% of the target shares via an Offer, a 90% approval requirement is needed to benefit from the ‘squeeze-out’ right, as mentioned in Section 979 of the Companies Act, by which she can compulsorily acquire the remaining 10% of the voting rights with the same price offered to the members of the 90% majority (Parliament, 2006). Payne (2011) argues that the requirement that all the shareholders receive the same price, either the original offer or the revised one, for Scheme and Offer deals, limits the acquirer’s ability to divide and conquer by                                                           56 Lombers et al. (2008) claim that a hostile Scheme has not been attempted since 1981 when Trust House Forte made a bid to acquire the Savoy Hotel. 57 The Registrar of Companies for England, Wales and Scotland is the official responsible for the Companies House which is an executive agency of the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2014). 
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offering different prices to different shareholders in the bidding process. I accommodate this difference in my analysis by focusing on transactions in which the acquirer aims to control all the target firm’s shares at the completion of the deal. The fourth difference between the two takeover methods lies in the pre-determined percentages of required approval. While the 75% approval requirement in the case of the Scheme is lower than the 90% that is required under the Offer, whether these percentages apply to the same shareholders is related to the determination of the classes of investors that are required to vote in the case of a Scheme. A basic rule for the constitution of the class comes from the 1892 case of Sovereign Life Assurance Company v Dodd in which the class is supposed to be formed by persons whose rights are not so dissimilar to the point where they cannot consult together (Payne, 2011). As a result, two main groups are excluded from the vote on the Scheme: (a) the creditors of the company, mainly because a change in the company’s ownership does not affect the holders of its debt and, (b) the acquiring firm, if she holds shares in the target company, mainly because her interest as a future owner differs substantially from that of the remaining shareholders selling their shares. While the creditors are also excluded from the Offer process because they do not own shares to tender to the acquirer, this does not apply to the acquiring firm when she owns shares in the target. Consequently, the two thresholds are not necessarily comparable unless: (a) the acquirer is aiming to purchase 100% of the target shares, (b) she owns zero percent of its issued share capital, and (c) the holders of all the target shares are classified as one class by the court. The last difference between the Scheme and the Offer takeover methods lies in the tax treatment associated with each of them. The examination of the tax treatment of the Scheme starts by highlighting the two main methods by which the Scheme can be executed. The first method, known as Cancellation Scheme, involves the cancellation of the target company’s shares and using the resulting reserves from capital reduction to issue new shares to the acquirer (Ashurst LLP, 2004). The second method, known as the Transfer Scheme, involves the transfer of the existing target shares to the acquirer (Payne, 2011). The Cancellation Scheme, which is used for takeovers, is characterised by a critical tax advantage compared to the Offer: as Cancellation Scheme does not require a direct transfer of target shares to the acquirer, the 0.5% stamp duty that is paid under the Offer is not paid under Cancellation Schemes (Ashurst LLP, 2004).58 
5.3. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses In addition to controlling for the size of the target firm in order to account for the tax benefits that are associated with large Scheme deals, this section presents the hypotheses that aim to                                                           58 All the Schemes covered in this chapter’s empirical analysis are Cancelation Schemes. 
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identify the factors influencing the choice of the Scheme over the Offer, as well as the impact of the chosen takeover method on the takeover premia offered to targets and the abnormal returns gained by acquirers. While the effects of several other firm- and deal-specific features are not discussed in detail in this section, their impact in influencing the choice of the takeover method, the takeover premia, as well as the abnormal returns gained by acquirers, is discussed in the remaining sections of the chapter.  
5.3.1. The payment method The Scheme, with the immediate guarantee of owning 100% of the target shares once it is sanctioned, can be very valuable for acquirers willing to finance their deals with stock. Specifically, in stock-financed deals the acquirers are likely to share a significant amount of business- and synergy-related information with the targets during the due-diligence process in order to convince them to accept their stock and, hence, share the post-acquisition business or integration risk with the acquirer (Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Hansen, 1987).59 As a result, the acquirers might prefer to proceed with the Scheme in order to guarantee the full ownership of the target shares and minimise the possibility of any revelation being exploited by a competing bid. Moreover, based on the results of Faccio and Masulis (2005) that highlight the positive association between the acquirer’s debt constraints and stock financing, the tax savings in Scheme deals can also be valuable for acquirers employing stock as the payment method.60 On the contrary, given that the Scheme is likely to require a considerably longer period to become sanctioned, the target shareholders might prefer cash financing as the payment method over volatile securities. Based on this discussion, the first hypothesis H1 is formed as follows: The 
higher the portion of the deal that is financed with the acquiring firm’s stock, the higher the 
likelihood that the Scheme is used as a takeover method.  
5.3.2. Target termination fees Previous studies have been devoted to the analysis of the inclusion of target termination fee provisions in corporate takeovers (Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Jeon and Ligon, 2011; Officer, 2003). A target firm may prefer to proceed with the Scheme once she has signed a termination fee agreement, which is specifying particular cash sums that she must pay to the acquirer if she decides not to consummate the deal. By guaranteeing the acquisition of all the target shares 
                                                          59 In general, stock financed deals are tax-deferred as the target shareholders continue to have ownership in the combined firm. On the contrary, cash financed deals require target shareholders to exchange ownership for cash, and thus the transaction is necessarily taxable. Therefore, cash financed deals are associated with higher premium relative to stock offers, which compensate target shareholders for the immediate tax payment (Davidson and Cheng, 1997; Franks and Harris, 1989; Huang and Walkling, 1987). 60 Faccio and Masulis (2005) argue that the financing constraints, e.g. the high level of leverage, limits the acquirer’s ability to use cash financing and, as a result, stock financing is more likely. 
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once the Scheme is sanctioned, the Scheme presents a device that provides an explicit end to the commitment that has been signed by the target firm’s board. However, such framework is not available under the Offer. Specifically, in the potential presence of target minority shareholders owning less than 10% of the target shares and an acquirer is proceeding with the ‘squeeze-out’ provision, the target minority shareholders can request the court’s assistance to: (a) object to the acquirer’s right to buy their shares at the pre-determined price-per-share that has been initially offered, and (b) not sanction the termination fee agreement (Payne, 2011). Consequently, the second hypothesis H2 is formed: The likelihood of using the Scheme increases 
with the use of a target termination fee agreement in the deal.  
5.3.3. Financial aspects of the transaction Earlier evidence suggests that the Scheme is likely to be a favourable method in highly leveraged deals (Ashurst LLP, 2004). Specifically, the requirement of the lending party (i.e. bank) that the target firm’s assets become fully controlled by the acquirer at a specific date, as such assets are likely to be used as collateral in deals financed by debt, makes the Scheme, due to its immediate ownership aspect, more likely to be implemented relative to the Offer. Martin (2007) states that the uncertainty of ultimate control of the target’s assets makes ‘lending banks very nervous’ (p. 1). The full ownership aspect of the Scheme, in addition to its associated tax benefits, also makes it attractive for non-strategic acquirers that prefer to control the target for a limited period and sell it for profit. As these characteristics mostly fit the description of deals announced by private equity acquirers (Fidrmuc et al., 2012), hypothesis H3 is formed as follows: The Scheme is more likely to be used when the deal is a private equity transaction.  
5.3.4. Acquirer and target relatedness The Scheme can also be a favourable takeover method for a specific type of acquirers: those that are aiming to acquire targets operating in a different economic environment than the one in which they operate. The acquisitions of targets in different sectors than those of the acquirers, i.e. diversifying deals, and the acquisitions that are initiated by non-UK acquirers, represent possible candidates for such deals. Under both categories, the acquirers relying on the Scheme takeover method are likely to highly value the immediate and guaranteed ownership of all the target shares. In addition, the tax savings resulting from the use of the Scheme can partially or fully offset the potentially high costs, and other advisory fees, that are covered by acquirers when assessing the foreign/diversified target firm’s business environment. Therefore, the following testable hypotheses are formed: H4a: The Scheme is more likely to be used in 
diversifying acquisitions; and H4b: The Scheme is more likely to be used in the acquisitions of UK 
targets by non-UK acquirers. 
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5.3.5. The riskiness of the target’s returns The concerns presented by Franks and Harris (1989) and Myners (2008) with respect to the complexity of the Scheme, make it a less favourable takeover method in deals involving targets that are subject to high valuation uncertainty. In such deals the acquirer is likely to be subject to the ramifications of the changes in the target’s market valuation, in addition to the emergence of competing bids. Moreover, a potential increase in the target’s market valuation following the initial bid can make the target shareholders, who initially expressed their willingness to accept the bid, reluctant to vote on the acceptance of the Scheme. This can also lead to objections from the Panel that is aiming to protect the target’s shareholders, as the value of the initial bid no longer reflects the value of the target firm. Therefore, the variation in the target’s abnormal returns is more likely to make the Scheme an un-attractive takeover method. Following this discussion, the hypothesis H5 is formed as follows: The higher the variation in the target’s 
abnormal returns, the lower the likelihood of using the Scheme.  
5.3.6. The target’s returns Payne (2011) argues that, when it comes to ensuring that the target shareholders make undistorted choices, the Scheme and the Offer are on an equal footing. However, with respect to target minority shareholders, Payne (2011) indicates that they are less protected under the Scheme, relative to the Offer. In particular, the author highlights two reasons that support this relative reduction in protection. First, she highlights the importance of the criteria used in determining the class of shareholders voting in each meeting. After welcoming the recent guidance offered by the court in making such criteria more explicit, Payne warns of the ramifications of the current practice of dividing shareholders into classes based on the rights carried by their shares.61 Specifically, while such classification is straightforward, it leads to fewer classes being formed than the classification based on the hard-to-be-determined criterion of shareholders’ actual interests. As a result, with the reduced shareholder approval requirements in the Scheme, such an approach leads to a higher likelihood of the Scheme being approved compared to the Offer.62 Second, Payne (2011) raises specific concerns related to whether enough protection is devoted to the target minority shareholders in the last stages of the Scheme process. Specifically, she expresses her concerns regarding the ‘reasonable man test’ by which, before sanctioning the Scheme, the court simply examines whether the decision made by the shareholders is equivalent to the decision of an agent seeking her own interest.                                                           61 For instance, the owners of ordinary shares will be included in one class while the owners of various types of preference shares are included in other classes. 62 For instance, if only one class is formed, the target minority shareholders under the Scheme deal end up in the same position as the minority shareholders subject to the squeeze-out provision, yet with a benchmark of 75% instead of 90%. 
85 
 
Accordingly, once the required majority approves the Scheme, and if the court is already satisfied with the way in which classes were determined, the likelihood of following the desire of minority shareholders and refusing to sanction the Scheme is extremely low. The legal argument presented by Payne (2011) is highly critical as it shows that the ‘rules of the game’ make target shareholders under the Offer better off than their Scheme counterparts. Specifically, assuming the presence of target minority of shareholders holding similar percentages of the target firm’s shares under Scheme and Offer deals in response to a given offered premium, the minority group in the Scheme deals is less capable of blocking the completion of the transactions and, hence, less capable of forcing the acquirers to increase the premia. However, following the classic emphasis of Pound (1910) on the distinction between ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’ (p. 12), the bargaining though the Scheme and the Offer can be treated as embedded games included in a larger game (Baird et al., 1994). That is, the target firm’s shareholders may choose to proceed with the Offer provided that they are aware that the rules of the Scheme requiring the court’s involvement and places them in a weak bargaining position, compared to the rules of the Offer. Alternatively, such shareholders can demand an additional premium as a condition to proceed with a Scheme.63 Examining the voting outcomes of the court-meetings related to the Scheme in Nexis UK, I find that the Schemes received overwhelming support from target shareholders: out of the 113 outcomes court-meetings from which we managed to retrieve detailed information, 93 (82.30%) of the Schemes passed with the approval of more than 95% of the target shareholders, 19 (16.81%) passed with approval levels between 80% and 95% and only one passed with an approval of 78%. None of the Schemes covered in the analysis were rejected. Hence, it appears that Scheme target shareholders are satisfied with the premia they are offered.64 Following this discussion, hypothesis H6 is formed as follows: The Scheme target shareholders receive premia 
that are at least as high as the premia received by the Offer target shareholders.  
5.3.7. The abnormal returns gained by acquirers In addition to studying the overall difference in the acquirer’s abnormal returns between Scheme and Offer deals, I offer special emphasis on the distinction between the optimal and sub-optimal use of the Scheme. More specifically, despite its advantages in terms of tax savings 
                                                          63 The findings reported by Franks and Harris (1989) over a relatively old sample of UK listed target acquisitions that have been announced between 1955 and 1985, after measuring the abnormal returns as deviations from a market model, show that in the month when the acquisition is made, Offer target shareholders receive total abnormal returns of 24% compared to the 14.8% abnormal returns received by the Scheme target shareholders. For the five-month period surrounding the acquisition, the returns are 30.1% and 20.0% for Offer and Scheme target shareholders, respectively. 64 The voting outcomes are available upon request from the author. 
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and guaranteeing the acquisition of all the target shares, the Scheme remains a complicated and regulatorily demanding takeover method that should be implemented only when its benefits exceeds its economic costs. Otherwise, the requirement to hire a significant number of advisors and the possible complications due to the reliance on the court procedure can delay the integration process of the merged companies and raise concerns about unexpected costs. Such concerns can be reflected in a reduction in the acquirer’s abnormal returns when the Scheme is used under circumstances in which it is not recommended. I limit the analysis to the subsample of UK listed acquirers whose stock performance can be compared to the FT-All Share Index and hence calculate the abnormal returns gained by acquirers. I then apply the methodological framework discussed in Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) to identify the deals in which the Scheme is used optimally and sub-optimally, as follows: when the Scheme is used and the likelihood of its use, over the Offer, as estimated via a Logistic model that involves several deal and merging firms’ features, exceeds a threshold level that is the apriori probability of the Scheme use, then the use of the Scheme is labelled as optimal. Likewise, when the Scheme is used and the estimated likelihood of its use, over the Offer, is below the threshold level that is the apriori probability of Scheme use, then it is labelled as sub-optimal. Following this discussion, hypothesis H7 is formed as follows: The 
sub-optimal use of the Scheme yields lower abnormal returns to acquirers than its optimal use. Recognising that the use of the Scheme has increased gradually throughout the period covered in the sample, which is more so after the Panel introduced its formal reforms in 2008 through what is known as Appendix 7 that was added to the takeover Code, I test H7 on two subsamples. The first covers the period preceding the formal introduction of Appendix 7 in January 2008 while the second covers the period following the introduction of Appendix 7. This follows from the emphasis that the procedural clarifications provided in this appendix potentially reduced the reliance on expensive advisors and made the use of the Scheme more likely (Lombers et al., 2008). 
5.4. Estimating the Takeover Premia and the Abnormal Returns Gained by Acquirers I estimate the premium (PREM) offered to target shareholders in both Scheme and the Offer deals by dividing the deal value by the target firm’s market value of equity 43 days prior to the announcement of the deal, and subtract 1 from the result, as in Officer (2003).65 While Officer (2003) excludes from his analysis deals with premia that lie outside the 0 to 2 range, the exclusion of deals with negative premia from the analysis reduces the sample significantly, 
                                                          65 Alexandridis, Fuller, Terhaar, and Travlos (2013) calculate the premium by using the market value of the target 30 days prior to the acquisition’s announcement day. I follow the same method and reach the same qualitative conclusions in alternative estimations. 
87 
 
especially in the period following the recent financial crisis.66 As a result, while my findings remain qualitatively similar with and without the exclusion suggested by Officer (2003), the final analysis is conducted by including deals that also experience negative premia. I also introduce an alternative estimate of premia, the PREMADJ, which accounts for the variation in the premia across different sectors. In particular, this estimate represents the difference between the premium offered and the average premium level in the target’s sector. Moreover, the announcement period abnormal returns gained by acquirers is captured by the acquiring firms’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) over different windows surrounding the acquisition announcement’s day. The abnormal returns are estimated using the adjusted market model, as in Fuller et al. (2002), in which the differences between the daily acquirer stock returns and the returns on a market index (FT-ALL share index) are calculated for each day within the announcement period window. 
5.5. Data and Summary Statistics 
5.5.1. The dataset The sample covers acquisitions announced between January 1st 2002 and December 31st 2011. They involve both UK and non-UK listed or privately owned (at the ultimate parent level) acquirers and UK listed targets. The sample’s starting date is chosen due to the limited use of the Scheme before the year 2002. A deal to be retained in the sample needs to meet the following sample-selection criteria: (a) the deal value should exceed £1m, (b) the transaction’s payment method should be available from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Thomson One database, (c) the deal needs to be friendly to satisfy the Scheme’s practical requirement, and (d) the takeover premia should be available and lower than 2, as in Officer (2003). To guarantee that all acquirers involved in the sampled deals share the same objective, the analysis is limited to only deals in which the acquirer aims to control 100% of the target shares. Once the above sample criteria are satisfied, 552 completed deals remain in the sample.67 All the variables in the analysis are retrieved from SDC except the age of the target firm, and both the target and the acquiring firms’ market-to-book value and price-to-earnings ratios, which are retrieved from Datastream.68                                                             66 48 out of the 111 deals that are associated with negative premium are announced between August 2007 and December 2009, representing 17.69% of the deals announced during that period. 67 The inability to identify withdrawn deals that satisfy my sample criteria prevents the analysis of the possible role of the takeover method in influencing the odds of the deal’s completion. The deficiency of SDC in providing accurate incidences of withdrawn deals has been also discussed by Netter et al. (2011). 68 As in Boone and Mulherin (2007), I find that SDC understates the presence of the acquirer and target termination fees. While SDC reports 151 (23) incidences of target (acquirer) termination fees, I examined the acquisition announcement accessed via the InvestEgate financial press website and found this number to be 287 (34). 
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5.5.2. Summary statistics Table 5.1 records the annual distribution of the sampled deals according to the geographic scope of the deal, the industry relatedness of the merging firms, as well as the listing status of the acquirer. While only 10.64% of the deals were conducted via the Scheme takeover method in 2002, the percentage of Scheme deals, relative to the total number of deals in the sample, has grown in popularity throughout the decade by reaching a high of 63.64% in 2010. Overall, the use of the Scheme as a takeover method has increased across all the deal- and firm-related features. For example, in 2011, 75% of the deals announced by UK acquirers were Scheme deals. As for the acquisitions announced by foreign (CBACQ), diversifying (DVRD), as well as privately held acquirers (PRIVACQ), the majority of deals announced in 2011 were Scheme ones. Overall, out of the 552 deals involved in the sample, 38.88% are Scheme ones and the remaining deals (61.12%) are Offer ones. As a result, deals conducted under the Scheme takeover method present an important segment of the UK market for corporate control and hence the study of the impact of the Scheme on the wealth effects of the shareholders of the merging firms proposes an interesting problem that calls for investigation. Table 5.2 records the descriptive statistics of the premium estimates employed in this chapter. Overall, using the standard estimate of the premium (PREM), I find that the target shareholders receive significantly higher premia from Scheme deals rather than Offer ones. The premia are ranging, on average, from about 34.65% for the overall sample to 37.60% and 32.93% for the Scheme and Offer deals, respectively. I also find that Scheme target shareholders receive significantly higher premia from domestic acquirers (DOMACQ), diversifying acquirers (DVRD), and from deals announced during the period following the introduction of Appendix 7 (APPND). Moreover, the results recorded in Table 5.3 further show that the number of days required for the deal to become effective (DAYSEFFECTVE) is not different between the deals conducted under the Scheme and Offer takeover methods. While this contradicts the statement of Payne (2011) that the Scheme deals need considerably more time to become effective, relative to Offer deals, it is worth noticing that this conclusion is based on a univariate analysis and needs to be validated in a multivariate context.69 Moreover, stressing the complexity of Scheme deals, I find that they involve significantly more advisors (legal and financial) (TOTALADV), relative to the Offer ones. These results further show that such a difference in terms of the number of advisors between the two groups of deals persists even when the analysis is restricted to financial advisors (FINADV) and legal advisors (LEGALADV), separately. Lastly, the statistics record that Scheme deals are associated with larger targets (TARGMV),                                                           69 Indeed, in a regression analysis in which DAYSEFFECTIVE is the dependent variable and in which the deal-, acquirer- and target-related factors are controlled for, Scheme deals are found to need significantly more time to become effective compared to Offer deals. 
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higher percentage of stock financing (STOCK_PERC), as well as with more mature target firms (TARGAGE), relative to Offer deals. The age-related finding indicates that the Scheme is more likely to be used in acquiring targets with a relatively longer history of objectively verifiable information. 
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Table 5.1: Annual distribution of the characteristics of the sample  ALL DOMACQ CBACQ FCSD DVRD PRIVACQ PUBACQ YEAR SCHEME OFFER % SCHEME OFFER % SCHEME OFFER % SCHEME OFFER % SCHEME OFFER % SCHEME OFFER % SCHEME OFFER % 2002 5 42 10.64 5 31 13.89 0 11 0.00 2 21 8.70 3 21 12.50 2 25 7.41 3 17 15.00 2003 10 40 20.00 8 34 19.05 2 6 25.00 3 20 13.04 7 20 25.93 5 21 19.23 5 19 20.83 2004 7 29 19.44 5 20 20.00 2 9 18.18 2 7 22.22 5 22 18.52 5 22 18.52 2 7 22.22 2005 18 45 28.57 11 36 23.40 7 9 43.75 8 18 30.77 10 27 27.03 10 30 25.00 8 15 34.78 2006 25 41 37.88 23 30 43.40 2 11 15.38 6 14 30.00 19 27 41.30 15 29 34.09 10 12 45.45 2007 43 50 46.24 31 39 44.29 12 11 52.17 14 15 48.28 29 35 45.31 28 28 50.00 15 22 40.54 2008 24 35 40.68 17 25 40.48 7 10 41.18 12 12 50.00 12 23 34.29 18 21 46.15 6 14 30.00 2009 19 29 39.58 12 21 36.36 7 8 46.67 9 14 39.13 10 15 40.00 14 15 48.28 5 14 26.32 2010 35 20 63.64 22 10 68.75 13 10 56.52 11 7 61.11 24 13 64.86 25 11 69.44 10 9 52.63 2011 17 18 48.57 12 4 75.00 5 4 55.56 5 8 38.46 12 10 54.55 10 10 50.00 7 8 46.67 Total 203 349 36.77 146 250 36.86 57 89 39.04 72 136 34.61 131 213 58.83 132 212 38.37 71 137 34.13  Note: The table represents the annual distribution of the deals in the sample with respect to different groups of transactions. For the total number of transactions (ALL), transactions	
classified	based	on	the	acquirer’s	domicile	(domestic	acquirer	(DOMACQ)	and	cross-border	acquirer	(CBACQ)),	industry	relatedness	based	on	the	2-digit	SIC	codes	(focused	(FCSD)	
and	diversifying	(DVRD))	and	the	listing	status	of	the	acquirer	at	the	ultimate	parent	level	(a	listed	acquirer	(PUBACQ)	or	a	private	one	(PRIVACQ)).	I	present	the	number	of	Scheme	
deals,	Offer	deals,	as	well	as	the	percentage	(%)	relative	to	the	total	number	of	deals.	             
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Table 5.2: Univariate analysis of the takeover premia   PREM PREMADJ PREM PREMADJ   ALL SCHEME OFFER ALL SCHEME OFFER SCHEME	vs. OFFER SCHEME	vs. OFFER ALL Mean 34.65*** 37.60*** 32.93*** 0.00 3.51 -2.04 4.67 5.55 Median 31.63*** 34.87*** 30.63*** -3.89 0.41 -5.69** 4.24 6.10 
N 552 203 349      DOMACQ Mean 32.68*** 37.43*** 30.01*** -1.33 3.67 -4.15 7.42* 7.82* Median 30.01*** 33.65*** 28.45*** -6.46** -1.10 -7.63*** 5.10* 6.53* 
N 406 146 260      CBACQ Mean 40.13*** 38.01*** 41.49*** 3.72 3.11 4.11*** -3.48 -1.00 Median 36.85*** 37.05**** 36.49*** 4.04 6.52*** 3.70 0.56 2.82 
N 146 57 89      FCSD Mean 35.63*** 36.80*** 35.00*** 0.42 0.97 0.13 1.80 0.84 Median 32.29*** 29.60*** 32.49*** -4.17 -1.03 -4.89 -2.89 3.86 
N 208 72 136      DVRD Mean 34.06*** 38.03*** 31.61*** -0.25 4.92 -3.44*** 6.42 8.36* Median 31.48*** 34.93 30.28442 -3.50 0.67 -6.38 4.64 7.05* 
N 344 131 213       Mean 31.36*** 29.59*** 32.14*** -2.47 -3.59 -1.98*** -2.55 1.61 BEFOREAPPND Median 28.64*** 28.05*** 28.96*** -5.73*** -2.56*** -6.28 -0.91 3.72  N 356 109 247       Mean 40.63*** 46.88*** 34.87*** 4.507 11.76** -2.19*** 12.01* 13.95** APPND Median 38.90*** 46.40*** 32.49*** 4.433 13.80*** -3.55 13.91* 17.35**  N 196 94 102       Mean 24.57*** 29.17*** 22.18*** -8.13** -2.15 -11.24*** 6.99 9.09 PRIVACQ Median 21.22*** 25.42*** 19.07*** -12.76*** -7.39 -16.08*** 6.35 8.69  N 208 71 137       Mean 40.74*** 42.13*** 39.88*** 4.92** 6.57* 3.89 2.25 2.68 PUBACQ Median 35.99*** 36.63*** 35.39*** -0.15 3.89 -2.03 1.24 5.92  N 344 132 212      Note: The table documents the premium offered to UK listed target shareholders in different groups of transactions. For the total number of transactions (ALL), transactions	 classified	based	on	 the	
acquirer’s	domicile	(domestic	acquirer	(DOMACQ)	and	cross-border	acquirer	(CBACQ)),	 industry	 relatedness	based	on	 the	2-digit	SIC	codes	(focused	(FCSD)	and	diversifying	(DVRD)),	timing	of	 the	deal	
(before	the	introduction	of	Appendix	7	to	the	Takeover	Code	(BEFOREAPPND)	and	after	the	introduction	of	this	Appendix	(APPND))	and	the	listing	status	of	the	acquirer	at	the	ultimate	parent	level	(a	listed	
acquirer	(PUBACQ)	or	a	private	one	(PRIVACQ)),	two	measures	of	the	premium,	PREM	and	PREMADJ	are	reposted	as	discussed	in	Section	5.4.	For	each	group,	the	mean	and	median	premia	in	addition	to	the	
number	of	observations	N	are	presented.	The	table	also	presents	the	difference	between	the	premia	in	deals	conducted	via	the	Scheme	and	the	premia	in	those	conducted	via	the	Offer.	Next	to	 the	means,	
the	significance	based	on	the	t-test	under 	the	null	hypothesis	that	the	premium	is	equal	to	0	is	reported.	Next	to	the	medians,	the	significance	of	the	Wilcoxon	Rank	Sum	test	under	the	null	hypothesis	that	
the	median	is	equal	to	0	is	reported.	Next	to	the	differences	in	means,	the	significance	of	the	t-test	with	the	null	hypothesis	that	the	difference	in	means	is	equal	to	0	is	reported.	Next	to	the	differences	in	
medians,	the	significance	based	on	the	Wilcoxon	Rank	Sum	test	with	the	null	hypothesis	that	the	two	populations	whose	sample	median	differences	are	presented	have	the	same	continuous	distribution	is	
presented.	***,**,	and	*	represent	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively. 
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Table 5.3: Continuous covariates and the takeover method Variable N No. of SCHEME deals No. of OFFER deals Mean of Variable  in SCHEME deals Mean of Variable  in Offer deals SCHEME vs. OFFER ACQMTBV 156 59 97 2.31 2.409 -0.09 ACQMV 156 59 97 8577.66 5137.37 3440.29 ACQPE 156 59 97 16.73 55.01 -38.28 DAYSEFFECTIVE 552 203 349 104.77 96.75 8.02 FINADV 546 203 343 3.00 2.38 0.62*** LEGALADV 546 203 343 3.43 2.02 1.41*** PERCHELD 552 203 349 2.58 5.07 -2.48*** STDV 552 203 349 0.025 0.029 -0.004* STOCK_PERC 552 203 349 24.21 16.81 7.40** TARGAGE 552 203 349 5372.88 4449.2 923.63** TARGMTBV 343 132 211 2.88 2.85 0.029 TARGMV 552 203 349 826.28 182.04 644.24*** TARGPE 343 132 211 24.92 59.12 -34.19 TOTALADV 546 203 343 6.13 4.40 1.72*** Note: The table represents for each continuous covariate employed in the analysis: the size of the sample N in which the covariate is available, the number of Scheme and Offer deals in the sample analysed, the mean value of this covariate in the group of Scheme deals, its mean value in the group of Offer deals, the difference between these two mean values and its significance based on the null hypothesis that it is equal to 0. ***,**,	and	*	represent	significance	
at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively.	 
5.6. Results and Discussion 
5.6.1. The use of the Scheme Table 5.4 records the Logistic model estimations that aim to identify the factors influencing the choice between the Scheme and the Offer takeover method in the UK market for corporate control. As expected, the size of the target firm has a positive and significant effect on the use of the Scheme (Models 1 to 6). Specifically, the higher tax savings in the presence of a large target in a Scheme deal (0.5% of the deal value) are likely to exceed the advisory costs. Similarly, the percentage of stock financing in the deal’s financing process is found to be associated with higher use of the Scheme, which supports H1. This indicates that the tax benefits of the Scheme are expected to be relevant to acquirers that use stock financing due to possible cash constraints (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Moreover, as such acquirers (in stock financed deals) reveal critical information about their business activities to ultimately convince the target shareholders to accept their stock, the guaranteed ownership of 100% of the target shares via the Scheme limits the extent to which such information can be exploited by the target minority shareholders, or even by competing acquirers. Overall, both the size of the target firm and the proportion of the deal’s financing by stock appear to be highly correlated with the use of the Scheme as the takeover method in the UK market for corporate control.     
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Table 5.4: Predicting the use of the Scheme Dependent Variable  SCHEME = 1 Offer = 0 SCHEME = 1 Offer = 0 SCHEME = 1 Offer = 0 SCHEME = 1 Offer = 0 SCHEME = 1 Offer = 0 SCHEME = 1 Offer = 0 Explanatory Variables\Model (.) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Intercept -4.320*** (1.028) -4.943*** (1.288) -3.163*** (1.229) -2.701** (1.110) -5.381*** (1.223) -2.706*** (0.969) ACQMTBV      0.099 (0.140) ACQPE      -0.033 (0.025) ACQTERM  0.099 (0.434) 0.006 (0.521) -0.138 (0.543)   APPND 1.291*** (0.225) 1.303*** (0.239) 1.159*** (0.256)  0.879** (0.359) 2.017*** (0.609) CBACQ -0.152 (0.245) 0.510 (0.379)  -0.434 (0.471)  0.773 (0.598) DVRD 0.359 (0.232) 0.703*** (0.277)  0.550* (0.333) 0.534* (0.315)  ln(TARGAGE) 0.027 (0.113) 0.029 (0.117) -0.031 (0.120) -0.171 (0.131)   ln(TARGMV) 0.535*** (0.066) 0.528*** (0.074) 0.593*** (0.079) 0.813*** (0.107) 0.685*** (0.116) 0.917*** (0.206) MOE   -1.747*** (0.239) -2.046*** (0.324) -1.689*** (0.309) -1.904*** (0.545) PERCHELD -0.010 (0.011) -0.011 (0.011) -0.009 (0.010) -0.010 (0.010) 0.004 (0.015)  PRIVACQ -0.050 (0.280) -0.111 (0.286) 0.195 (0.256)  -0.179 (0.400)  PRIVEQ 0.490* (0.287) 0.515* (0.288)   0.459 (0.368)  STDV -1.626 (5.711) 0.920 (5.647) -2.856 (6.285) -1.630 (10.201)   STOCK_PERC 0.011*** (0.003) 0.011*** (0.003) 0.010*** (0.003) 0.011*** (0.003) 0.013*** (0.004) 0.016*** (0.005) TARGMTBV     -0.044*** (0.017)  TARGPE     -0.001 (0.001)  TARGTERM 0.618*** (0.218) 0.662*** (0.230) 0.697*** (0.237) 0.734*** (0.239) 0.939*** (0.310) 0.123 (0.456) CBACQ x DVRD  -0.965** (0.502)  -0.618 (0.515)   CBACQ x APPND    0.937* (0.511)   DVRD x APPND    -0.012 (0.466)   ln(TARGAGE) x APPND    0.341*** (0.106)   ln(TARGMV) x APPND    -0.502*** (0.154)   MOE x APPND    0.787* (0.463)   STDV x APPND    -3.232 (11.406)   ln(ACQMV)      -0.326** (0.158) INDUSTRY EFFECT NO YES YES NO YES NO 
N 552 552 552 552 343 156 McFadden R-squared 0.20 0.21 0.28 0.29 0.307 0.40 Prob(LR-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note:	The	table	presents	the	output	of	6	Logistic	regressions,	which	aim	to	highlight	the	factors	influencing	the	use	of	
the	Scheme	(SCHEME).	The	Maximum	Likelihood	coefficients	are	presented	with	the	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
The	McFadden	R-squared	is	reported	to	highlight	the	models’	goodness	of	fit.	The	p-values	from	the	Likelihood	Ratio	
(LR)	test	with	the	restriction	that	all	the	model	coefficients	are	jointly	equal	to	0	are	reported.	Variables	not	included	
in	the	 table	were	 included	in	alternative	 specifications	and	were	not	found	 to	have	significant	effects.	 ***,	 **,	 and	*	
represent	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively.  
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The results further convey that the presence of target termination fees (TARGTERM) is associated with an increased use of Scheme, which supports H2.70 That is, by guaranteeing an explicit completion of the deal via the acquisition of 100% of the target shares, the target’s board that grants termination fee provisions prefer to complete the deal under the Scheme rather the Offer takeover method. However, this does not apply to the case of acquirer termination fees (ACQTERM). Noting the Panel’s priority of addressing the concerns of the target shareholders, it is the target’s board, rather than the acquirer’s one, that ultimately values the guaranteed completion of the deal when a binding termination fee agreement is signed. Otherwise, the requirement to deal with minority shareholders through the ‘squeeze-out’ provision under the Offer, with the presence of a binding commitment by the target’s board, can raise concerns by both the Panel and the court. The findings in Models 1 and 2 (Table 5.4) provide evidence of a marginal effect of private equity acquirers (PRIVEQ) on the use of the Scheme, which supports H3. However, this effect is sensitive to particular target characteristics as it becomes insignificant once the target’s market-to-book value (TARGMTBV) and price-to-earnings ratio (TARGPE) are included in Model 5. Specifically, while TARGPE has no significant effect on the likelihood of the Scheme presence as a takeover method in the UK, this takeover method is more likely to be used in acquisitions of low, rather than high, market-to-book value targets, as verified by the negative effect of TARGMTBV. One possible explanation of this can be offered by Morck et al. (1990). The authors contend that deals involving high market-book-value targets are often initiated by acquirer’s managers that are primarily willing to enlarge the firms they manage and ultimately increase their personal short-term privileges at the expense of their shareholders. Hence, the finding that low-growth targets are more likely to be acquired via the Scheme indicates that this takeover method, which is carefully scrutinised and investigated by both the court and the Panel, is used by acquirers focusing on the long-term prospects of the merger rather than short-term artificial growth. The results in Model 1 (Table 5.4) also suggest that the Scheme is not a favourable takeover method in deals announced by foreign acquirers (CBACQ) and diversifying (DVRD) ones, which leads to the rejection of H4a and H4b. Model 2 further predicts a negative relationship of the presence of the Scheme in foreign diversifying deals (DVRD × CBACQ), yet a positive and significant relationship between domestic diversifying deals and the Scheme use.71 That is, while domestic diversifying acquirers are more likely to employ the Scheme, foreign diversifying acquirers are less likely to prefer this takeover method, possibly due to their                                                           70 In alternative estimations, simultaneous equation systems with various exclusion restrictions indicate that the presence of target termination fees agreements and the use of the Scheme are jointly determined. The results from these estimations are available upon request from the authors. 71 The restriction that the coefficients associated with DVRD and (DVRD × CBA) have the same absolute value but opposite signs is not rejected based on the LR-test with a p-value of 0.67. 
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unfamiliarity with the UK-specific regulations.72 However, foreign deals (CBACQ) appear to be strongly associated with the use of Scheme takeover method after the introduction of the Appendix 7 (APPND) from the Panel in 2008. That is, the Panel’s reforms have clarified specific procedures that used to prevent the reliance on the Scheme by foreign acquirers before the year 2008. Moreover, the findings that are recorded in Models 1 to 4 lead to the rejection of H5 as the coefficient associated with STDV and the use of the Scheme is found to be statistically insignificant. This indicates that the valuation uncertainty of the target is not by itself a factor influencing, positively or negatively, the choice the Scheme takeover method. The time effect representing the introduction of the Panel’s reforms (APPND) is found to have a strong and positive effect on the use of the Scheme. Moreover, controlling for the product of APPND and other relevant factors sheds more light on the influence of the Panel’s reforms on the favourability of the Scheme under specific conditions. Interestingly, in Model 4, the effect of ln(TARGMV) on the likelihood of using the Scheme has weakened after the introduction of Appendix 7. Hence, as the distinctions between the Scheme and the Offer became more clarified, the Scheme became more likely to be used in the acquisitions involving smaller targets, relative to earlier times (before the introduction of Appendix 7). A likely interpretation of this finding would be that the clarifications offered by Appendix 7 allowed the acquirers aiming to benefit from the tax savings of the Scheme, but were initially reluctant to implement it, to rely on the Scheme takeover method. Furthermore, while the target’s age was an irrelevant factor in the absence of the Panel’s reforms, its effect on the choice of the Scheme as the takeover method appears positive and highly significant with the introduction of the reforms. Such a finding suggests that, while acquirers are involved in deals with smaller targets by relying on the Scheme, they are still reluctant to apply this potentially complicated method in acquiring targets with short financial history (Henderson, 1999). For example, the acquiring company might have concerns that, in the absence of a verifiable performance history of the target firm, the court might refuse to proceed with the Scheme under the pretext that the offer does not reflect the target value. Moreover, while the Panel’s reforms increased the effect of mergers of equals (MOE) on the likelihood of using the Scheme, this effect remains negative, which suggests that similar in size merging partners, in terms of bargaining power (Wulf, 2004), are unlikely to choose the Scheme that is potentially a lengthy and a complicated method.73 Lastly, Model 6 is estimated on the sample of deals announced by listed acquirers for which the acquirer’s market value (ACQMV), market-to-book value (ACQMTBV) and price-earnings ratio (ACQPE) are available to be accounted in the analysis. Among other                                                           72 In alternative estimations, I divide the group of foreign acquirers into two groups: (a) the first group includes acquirers from the United States, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong which are countries in which the Scheme is an aspect of the takeover scene (Damian and Rich, 2013), (b) the second group includes acquirers from the remaining countries. I find insignificant differences in the results. 73 Summing both the coefficients associated with MOE and (MOE × APPND) yields an overall coefficient of -1.26. 
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characteristics, ln(ACQMV) has a negative and significant effect on the likelihood of the Scheme use. Hence, smaller acquiring firms, for which the tax benefits of the Scheme are likely to be highly relevant, seem to prefer the use of the Scheme takeover method despite the possible complications and delays that might arise when such a method is used.74  
5.6.2. Effect on the premium 
5.6.2.1. Regression analysis Evidence recorded in the first two Models of Table 5.5 shows that Scheme target shareholders receive, on average, 7.30% to 7.50% higher takeover premia relative to Offer ones. Combined with the voting results that are presented in Section 5.3 of this chapter, such results, although marginally significant, indicate that Scheme target shareholders overcome their ‘law in books’ (Pound, 2010) limited bargaining power and eventually tip the balance in their favour. Emphasising the importance of relying on the analysis of comparable observations, the last two Models present the estimations in the variation of the premium based on samples of deals announced before and after the introduction of Appendix 7 (356 and 196 deals respectively). Accordingly, the results recorded in Models 3 and 4 show that the effect of SCHEME on the offered premia becomes statistically insignificant. Yet, in the period following the introduction of Appendix 7, the Scheme’s effect, 6.90% higher premium, remains relatively close to the levels of 7.30% and 7.50%. In turn, the results reported in Table 5.6 show that, on average, the target shareholders in Scheme deals earn significant gains varying between 4.70% and 7.50% higher three-day CAR (CARTHREE) before and after the introduction of Appendix 7. The results reported in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 also highlight some important determinants of the takeover premia and the abnormal returns gained by target shareholders. For instance, in Table 5.5 (Models 1, 2 and 3), foreign acquirers offer significantly higher premia than domestic ones. A possible explanation of this finding is that, with the assistance of the Panel, the UK target shareholders are able to exploit their home advantage, relative to foreign acquirers, and thus receive higher premia. Moreover, as larger acquisitions are hard to finance, the reduced completion for large targets leads to lower premia (Alexandridis et al., 2013), as it is indicated by the negative and significant relation between ln(TARGMV) and the premia. In turn, the negative effect of toehold (PERCHELD) on the premia is in line with the previous literature (Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Eckbo and Langohr, 1989). In particular, the increase in the toehold not only reduces the number of shares that need to be acquired, but also reflects an improved bargaining position for the acquiring firm due to its familiarity as a shareholder with the target’s business activity. However, an interesting observation in Table 5.6 (Models 2, 3 and 5) is that the effect of PERCHELD on CARTHREE becomes positive and significant once PREM is                                                           74 Noticeably, smaller acquirers are more sensitive to negative NPV projects and also to high advisory costs. 
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controlled. This indicates that, by holding the effect of the premium constant, the familiarity of the acquiring firm with the target’s business activity through its ownership is reflected in higher synergies which, in turn, lead to higher target CAR. 
Table 5.5: Multivariate analysis of the takeover premia Dependent Variable  PREM PRMADJ PREM PREM Explanatory Variables\Model (.) (1) (2) (3) (4) Intercept 0.531*** (0.069) 0.157** (0.069) 0.285** (0.126) 0.526*** (0.111) ACQTERM 0.003 (0.065) -0.001 (0.062) -0.054 (0.052) 0.109 (0.134) CBACQ 0.139*** (0.041) 0.106*** (0.040) 0.156*** (0.048) 0.071 (0.078) DVRD -0.001 (0.040) -0.003 (0.040) -0.088* (0.055) 0.143 (0.062) ln(TARGMV) -0.038*** (0.009) -0.029*** (0.009) -0.033*** (0.012) -0.029* (0.015) MOE 0.049 (0.043) 0.035 (0.043) 0.019 (0.058) 0.053 (0.070) PERCHELD -0.015*** (0.001) -0.013*** (0.001) -0.015*** (0.001) -0.014*** (0.002) PRIVACQ -0.170*** (0.046) -0.142*** (0.046) -0.065 (0.056) -0.284*** (0.088) PRIVEQ 0.060 (0.048) 0.056 (0.048) 0.036 (0.052) 0.096 (0.095) SCHEME 0.075* (0.044) 0.073* (0.044) 0.023 (0.055) 0.069 (0.072) STOCK_PERC -0.002*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.0006) -0.0009 (0.0008) -0.002** (0.001) TARGTERM 0.047 (0.036) 0.0362 (0.036) 0.058 (0.042) 0.032 (0.070) INDUSTRY EFFECT NO - YES YES Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.21 Prob(F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 N 552 552 356 196 Note: The table presents the outcome of 4 regressions explaining the variation in the premium paid to the target shareholders. The two measures of the premium, PREM and PREMADJ, are defined in Section 5.5. The	Adjusted	R-
squared	is	reported	to	highlight	the	models’	goodness	of	fit.	The	p-values	from	the	F-test	with	the	restriction	that	all	
the	model	coefficients	are	jointly	equal	to	0	are	reported.	The	standard	errors	reported	in	parentheses	are	corrected	for	heteroskedasticity	using	the	White	(1980)	heteroskedasticity	consistent	standard	errors.	Variables	not	included	in	
the	 table	were	 included	 in	 alternative	 specifications	 and	 were	 not	 found	 to	 have	 significant	 effects.	 ***,	 **,	 and	 *	
represent	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively.              
98 
 
Table 5.6: Multivariate analysis of the abnormal returns gained by target shareholders Dependent Variable CARTHREE CARTHREE CARTHREE CARTHREE Explanatory Variables\Model (.) (1) (2) (3) (4) Intercept 0.160*** (0.046) 0.131*** (0.044) 0.178 (0.160) 0.031 (0.138) ACQTERM -0.015 (0.036) -0.009 (0.034) 0.020 (0.084) -0.002 (0.075) CBACQ 0.046* (0.024) 0.030*** (0.025) 0.011 (0.050) 0.007 (0.040) DVRD -0.066*** (0.021) -0.057*** (0.021) 0.040 (0.054) -0.005 (0.045) ln(TARGMV) -0.008 (0.006) -0.005 (0.006) -0.031** (0.013) -0.025** (0.011) MOE 0.023 (0.019) 0.021 (0.019) 0.016 (0.046) -0.013 (0.039) PERCHELD 0.001 (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) 0.003* (0.0016) PRIVACQ -0.029 (0.025) -0.022 (0.025) -0.043 (0.061) 0.075 (0.054) PRIVEQ -0.020 (0.026) -0.024 (0.026) -0.056 (0.062) -0.097* (0.055) SCHEME 0.047* (0.025) 0.044* (0.024) 0.075* (0.046) 0.025 (0.039) STOCK_PERC -0.001*** (0.0002) -0.001*** (0.0002) -0.002*** (0.0006) -0.0003 (0.0006) TARGTERM 0.043** (0.021) 0.037* (0.021) 0.003 (0.048) -0.004 (0.042) PREM  0.102*** (0.029)  0.394*** (0.056) INDUSTRY EFFECT YES YES YES YES Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.03 0.34 Prob(F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 N 356 356 196 196 Note: The table presents the outcome of 4 regressions explaining the variation in the target’s CAR around the acquisition announcement. The measure of CAR, i.e. CARTHREE, represents estimation over the three (-1, 1) day window. The	Adjusted	R-squared	is	 reported	 to	highlight	 the	models’	 goodness	of	 fit.	The	p-values	 from	 the	 F-test	
with	the	restriction	that	all	the	model	coefficients	are	jointly	equal	to	0	are	reported.	The	standard	errors	reported	in	
parentheses	 are	 corrected	 for	 heteroskedasticity	 using	 the	 White	 (1980)	 heteroskedasticity	 consistent	 standard	
errors.	 Variables	not	 included	 in	 the	 table	were	 included	 in	alternative	 specifications	and	 were	not	 found	 to	 have	
significant	effects.	***,	**,	and	*	represent	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively.  
5.6.2.2. Matching analysis results Following the estimation of the propensity scores from the Logistic models, as in Dehejia and Wahba (2002), I use caliper matching with replacement to create matched samples. On these samples (including treated -Scheme- and control -Offer- deals), the difference in the propensity scores, and also the differences between the main covariates, between the groups of Scheme and Offer deals should not be statistically significant to allow for the analysis of comparable deals. On the matched samples, I estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ܣܶܶ) based on the following equation: 
ܣܶܶ = ∑ ൛ܴܲܧܯܫܷܯ௜(ܵܥܪܧܯܧ) − ܴܲܧܯܫܷܯప(ܱܨܨܧܴ)෣ ൟ௜:ௌ஼ுாொୀଵ
ଵܰ
= ∑ ൜൬ܵܥܪܯܧ௜ − (1 − ܵܥܪܧܯܧ௜)ܭெ(݅)ܯ ൰ܴܲܧܯܫܷܯ௜ൠே௜ୀଵ
ଵܰ
 with ܰ representing the number of observations in the matched sample, ଵܰ representing the number of Scheme (Treated) deals, ܴܲܧܯܫܷܯ௜(ܵܥܪܧܯܧ) representing the measure of the observed premium (PREM or PREMADJ) for deal ݅ when the Scheme is used and 
ܴܲܧܯܫܷܯప(ܱܨܨܧܴ෣ ) representing this outcome when the Offer is used. Hence, 
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ܴܲܧܯܫܷܯప(ܱܨܨܧܴ෣ ) represents the counterfactual outcome for a treated unit ݅  when it does not receive the treatment, i.e. it is not executed via the Scheme takeover method. ܵܥܪܧܯܧ௜  is a dichotomous (dummy) variable assigned the value of 1 when the Scheme is used as the takeover method, and 0 otherwise. ܯ represents the number of control units matched to each treated one. ܭெ(݅) represents the number of times unit ݅ is used as a match when matching is performed with replacement. Given that PSM relies on the strong assumption that the assignment of the Scheme in the matched sample is random on the matched sample, I also employ the Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analysis to assess the extent to which a missing variable affects the choice of the takeover method. In particular, I incrementally increase the impact of a missing covariate on the likelihood of assigning the Scheme for each matched pair. On the resulting upper and lower bounds, I present the Hodges and Lehmann (1963) point estimates and apply the Wilcoxon signed rank test to test the hypothesis of no treatment effect. The outcomes of the matching exercises are presented in Table 5.7. The variables that are strongly significant (at 5% level) are automatically included in the Logistic model and the inclusion of the remaining covariates is dependent on whether the matching exercise balances the mean of each covariate between the treated and control groups in the matched sample. The results reported in Panel B based on matching exercises with replacement, in addition to the outcomes of Kolmogorov-Simonov (KS) tests reported in Panel A, show that the propensity scores and most of the main covariates become balanced in the matched samples. The estimated ATT in both matching exercises (-3.42% and -0.91%) are statistically insignificant. Such levels are smaller in magnitude than the differences in premium exceeding 7% in the initial regression analysis. Furthermore, results of the Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analysis indicate that a missing covariate needs to increase the relative odds of one of two matched deals being conducted via a Scheme by 87% and 61% (Γ levels of 1.87 and 1.61) to alter the initial qualitative conclusion of insignificant treatment effect and replace it with a significant treatment effect at the 5% level.75 Such effects of missing covariates are relatively high compared to the results of previous research (e.g. the 50% effect reported by Peel and Makepeace (2012).76 These results confirm the earlier emphasis on the relevance of analysing comparable deals to draw accurate conclusions as to the reliance on the initial regression analysis results leading to a qualitatively different conclusion from the one resulting from                                                           75 The treatment effect can be either positive or negative as shown by the values of the HL estimates at the upper and 
lower	bounds	established	by	each	Γ. 76 My findings remain qualitatively similar to the ones reported in terms of the significance of treatment effects and the relative sensitivity to the influence of missing covariates when matching is conducted on: (a) the sample of deals announced by listed acquirers in which I balance the size, price-earnings ratio and market-to-book value of the acquirers in the matched samples, and (b) the sample of deals classified as mergers of equals. In the latter sample, the size of the private acquirer is represented by the size of the target company. 
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matching analysis. The economic interpretation of these findings, following DiPrete and Gangl (2004), can be presented as follows. For Γ=1.8, the change in the natural logarithm of the odds of the Scheme being used is ln(1.8)=0.58. In Model 3 (Table 5.5), and the model used to estimate propensity scores, this effect is equivalent to, for example, a 58% increase in the percentage of the deal financed with stock.77 
Table 5.7: Results of the matching analysis Panel A Matching Algorithm CM CM Control Observations per Treated Observation 1:1 2:1 Caliper 0.01 0.05 Number of Scheme Observations 62 130 Number of Offer Observations 50 101 KS before Matching (p-value) 0.00 0.00 KS after Matching (p-value) 0.99 0.99 PREMADJ of Scheme Observations (%) 4.72 4.90 PREMADJ of Offer Observations (%) 4.79 3.21 
ܣܶܶ  (%) (Abadie and Imbens (2006) Standard Errors) -3.42 (3.41) -0.91 (3.67) HL Estimate (%) at Γ=1 5.14 4.47 Cut-off	Γ	value	(p≈0.05) 1.87 1.61 HL Estimate at the Upper Bound (%) (p≈0.05) 20.74 15.48 HL Estimate at the Lower Bound (%) (p≈0.05)	 -10.91 -6.70 Cut-off	Γ	value	(p≈0.10) 1.71 1.52 HL Estimate at the Upper Bound (%) (p≈0.10) 18.31 14.24 HL Estimate at the Lower Bound (%) (p≈0.10) -8.42 -5.39 Panel B  Before Matching After Matching  Treatment Group Control Group Abs Std Mean Difference p-value Treatment Group Control Group Abs Std Mean Difference p-value PROP_SCORE 0.59 0.26 130.52 0.00 0.39 0.39 0.02 0.73 APPND 0.40 0.28 24.01 0.02 0.37 0.43 13.52 0.47 TARGTERM 0.65 0.51 28.88 0.00 0.62 0.54 17.38 0.31 CBACQ 0.24 0.23 2.03 0.84 0.20 0.26 12.77 0.51 STOCK_PERC 20.59 13.64 18.86 0.06 17.22 17.60 1.11 0.94 ln(TARGMV) 5.34 3.89 77.99 0.00 4.50 4.47 1.62 0.90 TARGPE 23.50 57.93 110.33 0.05 27.53 33.03 12.19 0.59 TARGMTBV 2.75 2.84 1.85 0.88 2.48 2.80 10.53 0.51 PERCHELD 2.32 4.54 29.12 0.02 2.46 3.42 12.81 0.54 PRIVACQ 0.38 0.38 1.57 0.88 0.33 0.38 9.57 0.57 PRIVEQ 0.34 0.24 20.55 0.04 0.27 0.26 1.49 0.93 ln(TARGAGE) 8.34 8.12 23.45 0.02 8.24 8.49 28.46 0.08 MOE 0.44 0.77 66.44 0.00 0.67 0.63 8.55 0.62 Note:	Panel	A	reports	the	results	of	the	PSM	analysis	based	on	a	Logistic	model	in	which	the	dependent	variable	is	the	dichotomous	
variable	(SCHEME)	which	takes	the	value	of	1	if	the	deal	is	a	Scheme	deal	and	0	otherwise.	The	results	of	the	two	matching	exercises	
are	 based	 on	 a	 Logistic	 model	 in	 which	 the	 independent	 variables	 are	 ln(TARGMV),	 APPND,	 TARGPE,	 ln(TARGAGE),	 MOE,	
TARGMTBV,	PRIVACQ,	 CBACQ,	STOCK_PERC,	TARGTERM,	PERCHELD	and	PRIVEQ.	The	matching	algorithm	used	 is	Caliper	Matching	
(CM).	The	Panel	also	reports	the	number	of	control	observations	matched	per	treated	observation,	the	caliper	used,	 the	number	of	
Scheme	 and	 Offer	 deals	 in	 the	resulting	matched	sample,	 the	mean	 (PREMADJ)	 for	both	the	 treated	and	 the	control	group	 in	 the	
matched	sample,	the	p-value	from	the	Kolmogorov-Smirnov	test	with	the	null	hypothesis	that	the	propensity	scores	estimated	from	
the	 Logistic	 model	 have	 the	 same	 distribution	 in	 the	 treated	 and	 control	 groups	 before	 and	 after	 the	 matching,	 ATT	 with	 the	
standard	error	 (in	 parentheses)	 estimated	 following	Abadie	and	Imbens	(2006),	 the	Hodges-Lehman	point	estimate	at	Γ = 1,	 the	
cutoff	value	of	Γ	at	which	the	initial	inference	starts	to	change	qualitatively	with	the	corresponding	p-value	of	5%with	the	value	of	
the	 Hodges-Lehman	 point	 estimates	 at	 the	 upper	 and	 lower	 bounds	 established	 by	 Γ,	 the	 cutoff	 value	 of	 Γ	 at	 which	 the	 initial	
inference	starts	to	change	qualitatively	with	the	corresponding	p-value	of	10%	and	the	value	of	the	Hodges-Lehman	point	estimates	
at	 the	 upper	 and	 lower	 bounds	established	by	 Γ.	 Panel	B,	 based	on	 the	 first	matching	exercise	presented	 in	 Panel	A,	reports	 the	
means	of	 the	propensity	scores	and	each	main	covariate	 in	the	groups	of	Scheme	(Treated)	and	Offer	(Control)	groups	before	and	
after	the	matching,	the	p-value	 from	the	t-test	associated	with	the	null	hypothesis	of	no	statistical	difference	between	these	means	
before	and	after	matching,	and	the	Absolute	Standardized	Mean	Difference	defined	as	the	absolute	difference	between	the	means	of	
the	 covariate	 in	 the	 two	groups	divided by the square root of the mean of the covariate’s variances in both groups.	 ***,**,	and	*	
represent	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	the	10%	levels	respectively. 
                                                          77 The matching results related to CAR are highly dependent on the choice of the event window. For instance, for a three-day (t-1, t+1)	CAR,	the	level	of	Γ	at	which	the	initial inferences change is equal to 1.2. However, for an eleven-day (t-5, t+5)	CAR,	the	level	of	Γ	is	equal	to	1.6. 
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Overall, these results are consistent with the notion that, for comparable deals that are likely to be conducted by either the Scheme or the Offer, the choice of the takeover method has no significant impact on the target shareholders gains.  
5.6.3. The abnormal returns gained by acquirers The results reported in Table 5.8 (Model 1) show that the announcement period abnormal returns gained by acquirers do not differ between Scheme and Offer deals. This highlights that, on average, and despite the concerns raised by Payne (2011) about the limited bargaining power of the target shareholders relative to that of the acquirers, there is no evidence that the acquirers shareholders benefit from the use of the Scheme rather than the Offer. 
Table 5.8: Abnormal returns gained by the acquirers Dependent Variable  ACARFIVE ACARFIVE Explanatory Variables\Model (.) (1) (2) Intercept 0.022** (0.010) 0.022** (0.011) SCHEME -0.006 (0.012) -0.028* (0.015) SCHEME  OPTIMAL  0.052** (0.024) SCHEME  APPND  0.028* (0.015) SCHEME  APPND  OPTIMAL  -0.064** (0.027) STOCK_PERC -0.001 (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) STDV -0.593** (0.297) -0.523* (0.318) ACQMV -0.001 (0.001) -0.004 (0.003) TARGMV -0.002 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.04 Prob (F-test) 0.07 0.07 N 141 141 
Note:	 The table presents the outcome of 2 regressions explaining the variation in the target’s CAR around the acquisition announcement. The measure of CAR, i.e. ACARFIVE, represents estimation over the five (-2, 2) day window. The	Adjusted	R-squared	is	 reported	 to	highlight	 the	models’	 goodness	of	 fit.	The	p-values	 from	 the	 F-test	
with	the	restriction	that	all	the	model	coefficients	are	jointly	equal	to	0	are	reported.	The	standard	errors	reported	in	
parentheses	 are	 corrected	 for	 heteroskedasticity	 using	 the	 White	 (1980)	 heteroskedasticity	 consistent	 standard	
errors.	 Variables	not	 included	 in	 the	 table	were	 included	 in	alternative	 specifications	and	 were	not	 found	 to	 have	
significant	effects.	***,	**,	and	*	represent	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively.  My next task is to identify the deals in which the Scheme is used optimally and examine whether such optimality leads to higher abnormal returns to acquirers shareholders, as hypothesised by H7. Accordingly, in the 141 deals announced by UK listed acquirers, I use the 30.5% (43/141 = 30.49%), which is the apriori probability of an included observation belonging to the treated group, as the threshold or cut-off point to which the probabilities estimated from the Logistic model (Panel A; Table 5.9) are compared. Along these lines, a Scheme deal is classified as optimal if the probability estimated from the Logistic model exceeds 30.5% cut-off point and the Scheme is actually used. Alternatively, a Scheme deal is classified as sub-optimal if the probability estimated from the Logistic model is below 30.5% cut-off point and a Scheme is 
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actually used. The results are presented in a matrix form where the columns indicate the expected number of acquisitions using Scheme and Offer whereas the rows indicate the number of acquisitions that actually used the Scheme and the Offer. Sensitivity is a measure of classification accuracy, i.e. the model predicted group is the same as the actual group of a sampled acquisition. This sensitivity is 77% for the Scheme group, meaning that the model ‘optimally’ classifies 77% of sampled Scheme deals. Similarly 78% of Offer deals are ‘optimally’ classified. The overall sensitivity of the model is 77%. Misclassification rate is referred to as ‘false positive’, i.e. Offer deals being classified as Scheme (=40%) and as ‘false negative’, i.e. Scheme deals being classified as Offers (=12%). 
Table 5.9: Logistic model and classification matrix 
Panel	A:	Logistic	Model 
  Intercept APPND STOCK_PERC ln(TARGMV) TARGTERM STDV ACQMV McFadden R-squared N Coeffic. -4.3396 2.0454 0.0146 0.7657 -0.1344 -27.3835 -0.0002 0.31 141 s.e. 0.9110 0.5667 0.0057 0.1808 0.4719 13.2731 0.0001 
Note:	This	Panel	compares	the	actual	use	of	the	Scheme	and	the	Offer	compared	to	the	predictions	from	a	Logistic.	When	the	Scheme	
is	used	as	a	takeover	method	(SCHEME=1)	and	the	probability	of	such	a	use	estimated	by	the	Logistic	model	exceeds	30.4%,	the	use	
of	the	Scheme	is	classified	as	optimal.	The	same	applies	to	the	case	of	the	Offer	(SCHEME=0).	The	Logistic	model	used	includes	the	
following	explanatory	variables:	an	intercept,	APPND,	STOCK_PERC,	ln(TARGMV),	TARGTERM,	STDV,	and	ACQMV.  
Panel	B:	Classification	Matrix 
   Expected / Classified Group   Scheme Offer All Sensitivity % Actual group Scheme 33 10 43 77% (=33/43) Offer 22 76 98 78% (=76/98) All 55 86 141 77% [=(33+76)/141) Misclassification 40% (=22/55) 12% (=10/86)   
Note:	The Panel presents the predictions of the logistic regression for Scheme use (logistic regression estimates in Panel A). The results are presented in a matrix form where the columns indicate the expected number of acquisitions using Scheme and Offer whereas the rows indicate the number of acquisitions that actually used Scheme and Offer. The matrix is based on the a priori probability of a sample observation belonging to the Scheme group. This is the same as the sample proportion of Scheme, i.e. 30.5% representing the percentage of Scheme deals in the sample. Sensitivity is a measure of classification accuracy, i.e. the model predicted group is the same as the actual group of a sampled acquisition. It is 77% for the Scheme group, meaning that the model ‘correctly’ classifies 77.6% of sampled Scheme deals. Similarly 78% of Offer deals are ‘correctly’ classified. The overall sensitivity of the model is 77%. Misclassification rate is referred to as ‘false positive’, i.e. Offer deals being classified as Scheme (=40%) and as ‘false negative’, i.e. Scheme deals being classified as Offers (=12%).  I employ the dichotomous variable (OPTIMAL) that is assigned the value of 1 if the Scheme is optimally used and 0 otherwise in Table 5.8, Model 2. Under this specification Iexamine the difference in the acquirer’s 5-day CAR (ACARFIVE) between the optimal and sub-optimal use of the Scheme in the period preceding the introduction of Appendix 7 and the period following to the introduction of APPDN. Moreover, in the specification of Model 2 of Table 5.8, we have: (a) the coefficient associated with (SCHEME) refers to the added effect of the sub-optimal use of the Scheme on the acquirers CAR over the use of the Offer before the introduction of Appendix 7; (b) the sum of the coefficients associated with (SCHEME) and (SCHEME × OPTIMAL) refers to the effect of the optimal use of the Scheme on the acquirers abnormal returns before the introduction of Appendix 7; (c) the sum of the coefficients associated with (SCHEME) and (SCHEME × APPND) refers to the effect of the sub-optimal use of 
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the Scheme on the acquirers CAR after the introduction of Appendix 7; and (d) the sum of the coefficients associated with (SCHEME), (SCHEME × APPND), (SCHEME × OPTIMAL) and (SCHEME × OPTIMAL × APPND) refers to the effect of the optimal use of the Scheme on the acquirers CAR after the introduction of Appendix 7.78 The reported results yield a strong support for H7 in the period preceding the introduction of Appendix 7. That is, the UK listed acquirers that used the Scheme under circumstances in which this use is not recommended (based on several merging firms and deal specific characteristics) experienced a 2.80% lower announcement period CAR while their counterparts that optimally used the Scheme did not incur such a loss. Interestingly, in the period following the introduction of Appendix 7, the losses arising from the sub-optimal use of the Scheme became statistically and economically insignificant. In particular, I apply the Wald test to determine whether the acquirer CAR associated with the optimal use of the Scheme and the sub-optimal use of this method yields equal acquirer announcement period CAR after the introduction of Appendix 7, i.e. (c)=(d). The restriction is not rejected with a p-value of 0.46. Therefore, following the detailed clarifications that the Panel presented with respect to the procedures and timetables associated with the Scheme, and with the likelihood of using the Scheme increasing significantly after these reforms, the sub-optimal use of this takeover method became inconsequential in terms of the losses incurred by acquiring firms. Overall, these results confirm the notion that the takeover method used is not trivial and that the proper codification and standardisation of the procedures associated with each takeover method are required to assist the acquiring firms’ shareholders avoid substantial losses. 
5.7. Conclusion I investigate the growing reliance on the Scheme of Arrangement (Scheme), as a takeover method in the UK market for corporate control. Based on a rigorous methodological analysis of a hand-collected dataset representing several firm- and deal-specific features, as well as the voting outcomes of the court-meetings related to the Scheme that have been collected from Nexis UK, my analysis identifies the main determinants that influence the use the Scheme as a takeover method in the UK, relative to the traditional Contractual Offer (Offer). Moreover, my analysis concentrates on the influence of the takeover method on the premia offered to target shareholders, as well as the abnormal returns gained by acquirers during the announcement period. The latter is conducted by employing both parametric and non-parametric methods. Specifically, in addition to standard univariate and multiple regression analyses, I provide                                                           78 In this model specification the SCHEME coefficient refers to the added effect of the sub-optimal use of the Scheme over the Offer, this is due to the introduction of the intercept term and the product (SCHEME × OPTIMAL) in the model. Alternative specifications in which the intercept term is omitted and dummy variables are introduced representing: (a) the use of the Offer, and (b) the sub-optimal use of the Scheme before and after the introduction of Appendix 7, yield quantitatively similar conclusions to the ones reported in Table 5.8 (Model 2). 
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robust estimates on the influence of the takeover method on the premia offered to target shareholders based on the non-parametric Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method that is augmented with the Rosenbaum-bounds (RB) method. Lastly, in addition to standard multiple regression analyses on the abnormal returns gained by acquirers, I implement the method identifying the optimal versus sub-optimal use of the Scheme and, hence, examine the impact of such optimality on acquirers’ gains. My main findings suggest that the Scheme’s use is more likely to occur in deals involving large targets that are financed with stock, especially when the target firm’s board of directors has signed termination fee agreements and when the acquirer is a private equity company. I also find that while the use of the Scheme before the introduction of the Appendix 7 by the Panel of Takeovers and Mergers in the UK is limited to only domestic acquirers, after the introduction of the Appendix 7, the use of the Scheme is more likely to be used by foreign acquirers. Moreover, regarding the premia offered to the target shareholders and despite the concerns raised in the legal literature about the limited protection that is offered to target shareholders in a Scheme deal, my findings indicate that the target shareholders under the Scheme are offered premia that are as high as those offered to the target shareholders under the Offer. More specifically, my results based on the initial parametric analysis show that target shareholders under the Scheme receive 7% higher premia compared to the premia received by target shareholders under the Offer. However, when the analysis is limited to comparable deals, following the analysis based on the non-parametric PSM, the effect of the takeover method (Scheme and Offer) on the premia becomes statistically and economically insignificant. Lastly, I demonstrate how the sub-optimal use of the Scheme during the period preceding the formal codification of this takeover method was associated with a significant reduction of the announcement period abnormal returns gained by the acquirers. While the initial parametric analysis shows that acquirers in Scheme deals do not experience different abnormal returns than the acquirers’ returns in Offer deals, these acquirers’ shareholders experienced significant losses when the Scheme was used sub-optimally, especially before the introduction of Appendix 7 by The Panel on Takeover and Mergers. Overall, my results offer a strong emphasis on the relevance of adopting the appropriate takeover method when conducting takeovers in the UK market for corporate control. These results also emphasise the role that regulatory bodies have in properly codifying the use of the takeover methods. In particular, while the takeover method is usually considered as a process that precedes the completion of the deal, the market participants’ sub-optimal reliance on a possibly poorly defined takeover method might lead to substantial losses. Additionally, in a well-functioning takeover market, the shareholders must be aware of the regulatory and tax-related advantages of each of the available takeover methods in order to proceed with the 
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method that strengthens their bargaining position. Given that the Scheme is gaining popularity in the United States, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong, the empirical framework applied in this chapter can be extended to evaluate the determinants of the use of the Scheme as a takeover method and also investigate its effects on various deal outcomes worldwide.     
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Appendix 3- Variables’ Definitions 
Variable	(Acronym) Description Source ACARFIVE The	 acquirer’s	 announcement	 period	 five-day	 (-1,	 1)	 Cumulative	
Abnormal	Returns Datastream ACQMTBV The	 acquiring	 firm’s	 market-to-book	 value	 43	 days	 before	 the	
deal’s	announcement Datastream ACQMV The	 acquiring	 firm’s	market	 valuation	 43	 days	 before	 the	 deal’s	announcement SDC ACQPE The	acquiring	firm’s	price-earnings	value	43	days	before	the	deal’s	announcement Datastream ACQTERM Dummy=1	 if	 the	 deal	 includes	 an	 acquirer	 termination	 fee	
agreement,	0	otherwise SDC	&	InvestEgate ALL Refers	to	the	total	number	of	observations	in	the	sample SDC APPND Dummy=1	 if	 the	 deal	 is	 announced	 after	 the	 introduction	 of	
Appendix	7	in	January	2008,	0	otherwise SDC BEFOEAPPND Dummy=1	 if	 the	 deal	 is	 announced	 before	 the	 introduction	 of	
Appendix	7	in	January	2008,	0	otherwise SDC CARTHREE The	 target’s	 announcement	 period	 three-day	 (-1,	 1)	 Cumulative	
Abnormal	Returns Datastream CBACQ Dummy=1	if	the	acquirer	is	a	not	UK	firm,	0	otherwise SDC DAYSEFFECTIVE Number	of	days	until	the	deal	is	declared	effective SDC DOMACQ Dummy=1	if	the	acquirer	is	a	UK	firm,	0	otherwise SDC DVRD Dummy=1	 if	 the	 acquirer	and	the	target	have	different	2-digit	SIC	
code,	0	otherwise SDC FCSD Dummy=1	if	the	acquirer	and	the	target	have	the	same	2-digit	SIC	
code,	0	otherwise SDC FINADV Number	of	financial	advisors	involved	in	the	deal SDC LEGALADV Number	of	legal	advisors	involved	in	the	deal SDC MOE Dummy=1	if	the	deal	is	classified	as	a	merger	of	equal,	0	otherwise SDC OFFER Dummy=1	if	the	Offer	is	used	as	a	takeover	method,	0	otherwise SDC OPTIMAL Dummy=1	 if	 the	 use	 of	 the	 Scheme	 is	 judged	 to	 be	 optimal,	 0	otherwise Table	5.9 PERCHELD The	 percentage	 of	 target	 shares	 owned	 by	 the	 acquiring	 firm	
before	the	announcement SDC PREM The	ratio	 of	 the	 deal	value	to	 the	acquirer’s	market	valuation	43	
days	before	the	announcement	minus	one SDC PREMADJ The	 difference	 between	 PREM	 and	 its	 average	 in	 the	 target’s	macro-industry	during	the	period	covered	in	the	sample SDC PRIVACQ Dummy=1	if	the	acquirer	is	a	listed	firm,	0	otherwise SDC PRIVEQ Dummy=1	if	the	deal	is	classified	as	a	private	equity	transaction,	0	otherwise SDC PROP_SCORE The	propensity	score	estimated	by	a	Logistic	model Table	5.7 PUBACQ Dummy=1	if	the	acquirer	is	a	privately	listed	firm,	0	otherwise SDC SCHEME Dummy=1	if	the	Scheme	is	used	as	a	takeover	method,	0	otherwise SDC STDV The	standard	deviation	of	the	target	firm’s	returns	from	240	to	43	
days	before	the	announcement	date Datastream STOCK_PERC The	percentage	of	the	deal	value	that	is	financed	with	stock SDC TARGAGE Number	 of	days	separating	the	announcement	days	from	the	date	
at	which	the	target	firms	was	listed	in	Datastream Datastream TARGMTBV The	 target	 firm’s	market-to-book	 value	43	 days	 before	 the	 deal’s	announcement Datastream TARGMV The	 target	 firm’s	 market	 valuation	 43	 days	 before	 the	 deal’s	announcement SDC TARGPE The	 target	 firm’s	 price-earnings	 value	 43	 days	 before	 the	 deal’s	announcement Datastream TARGTERM Dummy=1	if	the	deal	includes	a	target	termination	fee	agreement,	
0	otherwise SDC	&	InvestEgate TOTALADV The	 total	 number	 of	 advisors,	 financial	 and	 legal,	 involved	 in	 the	deal SDC 
Note:	The variables used in the chapter and their data sources are summarised. SDC is Thomson-Reuters’ SDC database; the voting outcomes discussed in Section 5.3 are based on company announcements retrieved from Nexis UK; the adjusted termination fee-related variables are retrieved from the announcements in the InvestEgate financial press website; acquirer- and target-related financial variables are retrieved from Datastream. 
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Chapter Six 
Target Termination Fee Provisions: 
Their Determinants and the Merits of Banning Them 
in the UK 
 
 
Abstract I present the first empirical contribution that examines the determinants of the presence of target termination fee provisions and the effect of such provisions on the premia in UK public target deals. In the presence of various forms of shareholder commitments in the UK market, my empirical evidence suggests that termination fee provisions are granted by the target boards when the target shareholders agree in principle to complete the deal but remain reluctant to grant binding commitments. Given that my sample covers the deals announced before the ban imposed by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers on the inclusion of termination fees, I find that neither public nor private acquirers systematically exploited the inclusion of these provisions to the detriment of their targets’ shareholders. Consequently, I recommend that the Panel end its ban.                             
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6.1. Introduction An established array of studies investigates the determinants of the decision to include a Target Termination Fee Provision (hereafter ‘TTFP’) in the acquisition deal and the effect of the presence and the size of the termination fee payment on particular deal outcomes (Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Chapple et al., 2007; Coates and Subramanian, 2000; Coates, 2009; Jeon and Ligon, 2011; Officer, 2003). This provision requires the target that decides not to proceed with the deal to pay a pre-specified sum to the acquirer (Bates and Lemmon, 2003). The relevant literature mostly revolves around investigating whether the granting of such a provision by the target’s board is: (a) an efficient contractual device that incentivises potential acquirers to initiate bids and leads them to offer relatively high premia, or (b) a symptom of a principal-agent problem in the target company reflected by the directors’ attempt to protect a sweetheart deal that offers them particular private benefits to the detriment of their shareholders (Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Jeon and Ligon, 2011; Officer, 2003). On September 19th 2011, the ban that the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers in the UK imposed on the inclusion of TTFPs became effective. The rationale behind this ban was not related to concerns about agency problems in the target companies: the Panel is praised for her role in addressing the concerns of the target shareholders with respect to the performance and loyalty of their boards (Armour and Skeel, 2007).79 Rather, this decision was motivated by many market participants’ complaints that, with the inclusion of a TTFP becoming a market standard, ‘the balance of negotiating power has shifted away from the boards of offeree companies in favour of offerors, to the extent that the board of an offeree company may consider itself unable to resist the package’(p. 80) (The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 2010). Yet, TTFPs in the UK market, despite their popularity in the last decade and being subject to a ban by the Panel, have received limited coverage in the empirical finance literature. The only study I am familiar with is presented by Coates (2009). The author compares and contrasts several outcomes of the deals with a TTFP between the US and UK markets. However, no comparisons of deal outcomes between transactions including a TTFP and transactions not including this provision are executed. This chapter aims to fill this gap. Accordingly, in this chapter, I present two main contributions which aim to enhance our understanding of the determinants of the decision to include a TTFP and the effect of this provision on the takeover premium in the UK market. First, given that the target shareholders in the UK can also make various types of commitments to the acquirers, I present the first contribution which examines how the different conditions under which these commitments cease to be binding have varying effects on the target boards’ decision to grant TTFPs. Second, I                                                           79Armour et al. (2009) find that the likelihood of a UK director being sued by her shareholders under the UK Company Law is extremely small. 
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investigate whether the target shareholders receive low premia when a TTFP is granted and, consequently, whether the Panel’s concern with respect to the reduction in the target’s bargaining power is empirically justified. In pursuing these enquiries, I attempt to overcome the significant data constraints that characterise the termination fees-related research. In particular, I employ a dataset that documents not only the accurate incidences of TTFP presence, but also the alternative forms of commitments made by the UK target shareholders. The previous literature examines the determinants of the percentage of target shares subject to shareholders’ commitments to accept the offer (Wright et al., 2007). The literature also studies the association between the presence of target shareholders’ commitments and: (a) the presence of a TTFP (Boone and Mulherin, 2007), and (b) the size of the termination fee payment relative to the deal payment (Jeon and Ligon 2011). This literature treats the various shareholder commitments as a homogenous group. In practice, however, these commitments can vary with respect to the degree by which they bind the target shareholders that offer them. Hence, the different conditions under which the shareholders’ commitments can cease to be binding and, in particular, the varying influence of the percentage of target shares subject to these different conditions on the inclusion of a TTFP, remain unexplored. Given that a TTFP binds the entire company rather than a particular group of shareholders, I hypothesise that the target boards grant TTFPs to encourage bidders to proceed with the deals when the target shareholders are reluctant to offer fully binding commitments to accept the deal. Furthermore, given that a loyal target board will not grant a TTFP unless the target shareholders show some sign of approval, I hypothesise that the likelihood of TTFP presence increases with the portion of the target shares subject to weakly binding commitments, i.e. those commitments to accept the offer that cease to be binding under particular conditions.   In turn, if the standardised inclusion of a TTFP reduces the target boards’ options in the due diligence process, as indicated by the Panel, such a reduction in bargaining power is supposed to be reflected in losses of takeover premia. Therefore, parametric and matching analyses are applied in order to accurately evaluate the effect of the inclusion of a TTFP on the premia relative to deals not including such a provision. While the targets in my analysis are publicly traded companies, the acquirers are both public and private. In investigating the effect of TTFPs on the premia, to make the conclusions more reliable by analysing comparable deals, this chapter builds on the extensive literature highlighting the differences in resources, managerial motives and sensitivity to the deal’s failure across different types of acquirers (Bargeron et al., 2008; Coates and Subramanian, 2000; Jensen, 1989, 1986). Therefore, in addition to examining the overall difference in premia between the deals including a TTFP and the deals not including this provision, I examine this 
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difference within each of the groups of deals announced by public operating, private operating and private equity firms, respectively. Along these lines, I hypothesise that, when TTFPs are granted, the target shareholders receive premia that are at least as high as the premia in comparable deals announced by the same group of acquirers and which do not include such provisions. To further emphasise that none of the market participants systematically exploit the inclusion of TTFPs, I also hypothesise that the deals announced by public operating, private operating, and private equity acquirers do not systematically differ in their likelihood of including a TTFP. Alternative evidence that acquirers from a particular group systematically manage to include a TTFP, and that the acquirers belonging to this group pay significantly low premia in deals with a TTFP, will give support to the Panel’s argument. Following this discussion, the contributions of this chapter are as follows: First, after demonstrating how the frequently used SDC database understates the extent of the presence of TTFPs (as in André, Khalil, and Magnan (2007), Boone and Mulherin (2007) and Jeon and Ligon (2011)), the evidence that I present suggests that the influence of the overall percentage of target shares subject to commitments on the presence a TTFP is insignificant. However, emphasising the relevance of the different conditions at which the shareholders’ commitments cease to be binding, I find that a TTFP is more likely to be present when the percentage of shares subject to binding commitments is relatively low. Furthermore, the likelihood of including a TTFP increases with the percentage of target shares subject to commitments that cease to be binding under particular conditions and non-binding promises. Such findings can potentially be interpreted as evidence that target managers, by granting a TTFP that binds the entire company when their shareholders are reluctant to make their shares subject to binding commitments, possibly distort the acquisition process for their personal benefit. However, such concerns remain negligible because: (a) the target shareholders are still expressing interest in the acquisitions by making other types of commitments to the acquirer, and (b) the Panel’s Consultation Paper discussing the reasons behind the ban does not report any shareholder concerns related to the loyalty of target managers (The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 2010). Second, I present new and robust evidence suggesting that, in the UK market, the inclusion of a TTFP is not detrimental to the target shareholders with respect to the premia they are offered. In fact, for the premia offered in the acquisitions announced by private operating acquirers, a TTFP has an Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) exceeding 27% in premium. As the relative size of the termination fee payment is capped (and rather standardized) at 1% of the deal value (The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 2011), I do not present my findings as evidence that these relatively large increases in premia are fully caused 
111 
 
by the target board’s granting of a TTFP.80 Rather, I argue that the inclusion of this provision provides some form of compensation for high-paying private operating acquirers that incur high costs in assessing the synergies of their deals. My conclusions complement the previous literature by indicating that the granting of a TTFP facilitates the completion of transactions at higher premia relative to transactions with comparable deal and target characteristics (Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Officer, 2003). Moreover, as expected, I do not find significant differences in the likelihood of including TTFPs among the deals announced by public operating, private operating and private equity acquirers. The lack of systematic use of TTFP by particular groups of acquirers represents a further indicator that TTFPs do not offer any of these groups specific bargaining advantages relative to the target shareholders. I also address the potential influence of unobservable covariates on the derived conclusions by relying on the Rosenbaum (2002) bounds analysis. The treatment effect estimates based on the matching analyses for transactions announced by each of the three groups of acquirers are less sensitive to such a missing covariate. Specifically, for the comparable deals within each of these groups, a missing covariate needs to increase the odds of one of two matched deals including a TTFP, relative to the other, by a factor ranging from 1.47 to 1.70 in order to alter the qualitative conclusions. Such levels are very close to the levels reported in earlier financial research as evidence that inferences resulting from the matching exercises are relatively insensitive to the effect of a missing covariate (Bartram et al., 2011; Peel and Makepeace, 2012). Overall, this chapter offers a specific regulatory recommendation that the Panel reconsiders its decision to ban TTFPs. I recognise that the conclusions are primarily related to the termination provision’s relationship with the premium rather than its relationship with the likelihood of deal completion or the emergence of competing bidders, as SDC does not report uncompleted deals or deals with a competing bidder that satisfy the restrictions I impose on the sample. I also recognise that the Panel’s decision to ban TTFPs might also be driven by concerns not strictly related to the premium as the target shareholders’ long-term interest might not be in an acquisition in the first place. However, the premium-related conclusions should be interpreted in the context of other theoretical and empirical conclusions showing that low or moderate termination fee payments, like the ones capped at the maximum 1% level in the UK, neither hurt the target shareholders with respect to the premia they receive nor influence the allocative efficiency in the market for corporate control (Ayres, 1990; Calcagno and Falconieri, 2014; Coates, 2009; Jeon and Ligon, 2011).                                                           80 Coates (2009), using a sample of UK public target deals announced between 1999 and 2008, finds that the relative size of termination fee payments clusters around the 1% cap. Furthermore, as the acquisition announcements indicate that the relative size of termination fees is 1% of the deal value in all the deals including a TTFP in the sample, I limit my analysis to the presence of TTFP rather than the relative sizes of the termination fee payments. 
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Following this discussion, this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the relevant literature. In Section 6.3, I provide a detailed discussion of the reasons behind the Panel’s decision in addition to the early assessment of the consequences of this decision by both the Panel and particular merger consultants. The empirical hypotheses are discussed in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 describes the Dataset. Section 6.6 discusses the empirical results and Section 6.7 concludes. 
6.2. Related Literature 
6.2.1. The presence of a TTFP The empirical literature on termination fees highlights several deal- and firm-related factors influencing the merging partner’s decisions to include a TTFP. Given that the TTFP is granted by the target boards, which makes it present in friendly deals by definition, this literature either highlights a significantly strong reduction in the likelihood of a TTFP being present in a deal classified as hostile (Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Chapple et al., 2007; Officer, 2003) or limits the empirical analysis to friendly transactions (Coates and Subramanian, 2000). Furthermore, as the inclusion of a TTFP is likely to be a part of a reciprocal agreement between the merging partners, a positive relation is documented between its presence and the presence of an Acquirer Termination Fee Provision (Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Officer, 2003). Among the target’s characteristics, its size has been presented as a major factor positively influencing the presence of a TTFP. While large deals are hard to finance which makes them less likely to attract competing offers and therefore limits the requirement to include a TTFP (Alexandridis et al., 2010), such deals are usually complex to assess and are conducted by relying on experienced and highly compensated lawyers familiar with the use of the TTFP as a deal protection measure (Bates and Lemmon, 2003). This, consequently, makes such deals more likely to include these provisions (Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Chapple et al., 2007; Coates and Subramanian, 2000; Officer, 2003).  The financing of the deal using the acquirer’s securities, in turn, is also presented as a positive contributor to the presence of a TTFP. Coates and Subramanian (2000) present an explanation for this positive effect. Specifically, as straightforward cash payments induce the target shareholders to tender their shares more quickly than the complex stock financing, there is less of a need to protect the deal from the emergence of a competing bidder in cash-financed deals relative to stock-financed ones. Furthermore, a complementary explanation is presented by Bates and Lemmon (2003) who consider stock financing as a proxy for the risk of information expropriation faced by the bidder: a bidder deciding to finance the transaction with stocks, in order to convince the target’s board to accept this financing method, reveals private 
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information about the expected synergies of the deal and wants to prevent competing bidders from free riding and benefiting from the shared information. The documented effect of the bidder’s toehold on the TTFP’s presence remains mixed and highly dependent on the accuracy of the datasets. On the one hand, Officer (2003) presents evidence of a negative effect of bidder toeholds on the likelihood of TTFP presence. Qualitatively similar results are presented by Bates and Lemmon (2003) who report that the deals including a TTFP have average toeholds of 0.59% while deals not including this provision have average toeholds of 6.42%. Such findings are presented as evidence that toeholds and TTFPs are equivalent as both of them compensate the bidder financially in case a competing higher paying offer emerges.81 On the other hand, Boone and Mulherin (2007) show that these results are based on inaccurate data reported by SDC and that the results based on the more accurate data retrieved from the offer documents indicate an insignificant relation between toeholds and TTFPs. Finally, the previous literature presents interesting patterns related to the likelihood of TTFP presence in particular industries. Coates and Subramanian (2000) find that TTFPs are frequently used in high-tech and healthcare deals and attribute this finding to the valuation difficulties which characterise these sectors.82 Bates and Lemmon (2003) report a qualitatively similar result in addition to emphasising the strong reliance on these provisions in utilities industries acquisitions which require extended time for regulatory approval.83 Officer (2003), however, finds that the rate of TTFP presence is constant across industries with the exception of a significantly reduced presence of TTFPs in the financial industry. Such findings are in line with the argument of Coates and Subramanian (2000) stating that firms in this industry have regulatory capital rules preventing the granting of such financial commitments.84  
6.2.2. Effect of the TTFP on the premium The takeover premium has been presented as a main yardstick for determining whether the granting of a TTFP is a symptom of an agency problem in the target company or an efficient contractual device. Both Officer (2003) and Bates and Lemmon (2003) test similar hypotheses explaining the TTFP’s relationship with the premium. As the initial bidders invest substantial                                                           81 When a higher paying competing bid emerges, the acquiring company, despite losing the bid, can earn significant returns by selling her shares to the rival bidder.  82 While the acquisition of targets in a different industry than the acquirer’s is presented as example of a case in which the acquirer might have concerns related to the emergence of a higher-paying competing bidder more familiar with the target’s business activities, Officer (2003) and Bates and Lemmon (2003) find that the likelihood of TTFP presence is not influenced by the industry relatedness of the merging parties. 83 Stressing the relevance of valuation difficulties and growth opportunities as determinants of the inclusion of a TTFP, Officer (2003) and Bates and Lemmon (2003) account for the target’s market-to-book in their Logistic models. While Officer (2003) documents and insignificant effect of this variable on the likelihood of TTFP presence, Bates and Lemmon (2003) document a positive significant one. 84As an example of such restrictions in the US, Coates and Subramanian (2000) note the restriction by the Federal Reserve Board rules on cash commitments by financial firms exceeding more than 10% of their net worth. 
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resources in assessing the synergies of their acquisitions and share private information with their targets’ boards regarding these synergies, the contractual efficiency hypothesis indicates that TTFPs compensate these bidders for the costs they incur and the likelihood of competing bidders emerging and free riding on the information shared. Under such an arrangement, a TTFP’s effect on the premium should be positive or, at least, neutral. However, a disloyal target board can make this commitment to a low-paying bidder in exchange for managerial or financial privileges in the acquiring company during the post-acquisition period.  The results of the survey presented in Table 6.1 give overwhelming support to the contractual efficiency hypothesis. In particular, the effect of a TTFP on both the premium and the market’s assessment of the deal is positive and significant or, at worst, insignificant when firm and deal characteristics are controlled for in a multivariate setting. Interestingly, both Bates and Lemmon (2003) and Jeon and Ligon (2011) present evidence of the negative effect of excessively high termination fee payments, 10% and 5% of the deal value respectively, on the premia. However, these excessively high payments exceed the 1% limit imposed in the UK. Among the studies presented in Table 6.1, the results presented by Chapple, Christensen, and Clarkson (2007), based on an analysis of acquisitions in the Australian market, go against the conclusions of the other studies. Specifically, the authors’ conclusions convey a negative relationship between the inclusion of a TTFP and the premium. Such findings are especially relevant for UK analysis as they are based on transactions taking place in a market with a similar 1% cap on the relative size of termination fee payments. The authors, however, do not find that the granting of TTFPs reduces competition in the Australian market. Consequently, they contrast their conclusions with those of US and Canadian studies and present them as evidence that capping the size of the termination fee payments limits the ability of such provisions to positively influence the target’s wealth. That is, potentially high-paying acquirers are reluctant to announce their bids given that the commitments granted by the target’s board are not enough to compensate them for the research costs they will incur in assessing the merits of the deal. An alternative perspective on the relationship between the TTFP and the premium is offered by Coates and Subramanian (2000). The authors employ the premium as an independent variable in their models which aim to predict the presence of a TTFP. These models document an insignificant effect. The rationale behind this approach follows from the assumption that a high premium protects the deal from competing bidders and reduces the need to include a TTFP. Nonetheless, the results of the attempts to estimate the endogenous relation between the TTFP and the premium remain mixed: while Officer (2003), using various exclusion restrictions, documents that the TTFP presence causes an increase in the premium, the evidence presented by both Bates and Lemmon (2003) does not support the notion that 
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Table 6.1: Summary of the empirical studies that examine the relation between TTFPs, the takeover premia and the market’s reaction Study Data Variables Investigated Measure of Premium and/or market reaction Conclusions 
Officer (2003) Acquisitions of US public targets announced between 1988 and 2000  The presence of a TTFP 
 The total value of the bid deflated by the target’s market value of equity 43 days before each acquisition, minus one. 
 7-day (-3, 3) CAR  
 Premia are 7% higher in deals with a TTFP. This effect becomes insignificant as deal and target characteristics are accounted for 
 CAR are 3% higher in deals with a TTFP. This effect becomes insignificant when the premium and target characteristics are accounted for 
Bates and Lemmon (2003) 
Acquisitions of US public targets announced between 1989 and 1998 
 The Presence of a TTFP 
 The presence of  jumbo fees exceeding 10% of the deal value 
 The total value of the bid deflated by the target’s market value of equity 42 days before the acquisitions, minus one.  
 3-day (-1, 1) CAR  
 Premia are 3.7% to 6.3% higher in deals with a TTFP. However, when the relative size of the termination fee payment exceeds 10%, the premium is reduced by 16.3% 
 3% higher CAR in deals with a TTFP. This effect becomes insignificant as deal and target characteristics are accounted for 
André, Khalil, and Magnan (2007) 
Acquisitions of Canadian public targets including  a TTFP and announced between 1997 and 2004 
 The relative size of termination fee payments  3-day (-1,1) and 41-day (-20, 20) CAR   Weak evidence based on univariate results that termination fee payments above the median relative size are associated with higher CAR 
Chapple, Christensen, and Clarkson (2007) 
Acquisitions of Australian public companies announced between 2002 and 2006 
 The presence of a TTFP 
 The relative size of termination fee payments 
 The total value of the bid deflated by the target’s market value of equity 30 days before the acquisitions, minus one. 
 7-day (-3, 3) CAR 
 7.5% reduction in the premium and 3.5% reduction in CAR in deals with a TTFP. The results are contrasted with the US based results and presented as evidence that the 1% cap imposed on the relative size of the termination fee payment is preventing these provisions from positively impacting the target shareholders’ wealth in Australia 
 The results become less significant (at the 10% level) when endogeneity bias is addressed 
Jeon and Ligon (2011) Acquisitions of US public targets announced between 2001 and 2007 
 The relative size of termination fee payments  3-day (-1, 1) and 5-day (-2, 2) CAR 
 Insignificant effect of the continuous measure of relative size of the termination fee payment on CAR. 
 The dummy variable indicating that this relative size exceeds 5% has a weakly negative effect on CAR. However, such deals are documented to have a higher completion rate (7%) than other deals. 
 The negative effect of this dummy variable is stronger for middle sized targets  Note. This table summarises the results of four empirical studies examining the relation between TTFPs and/or the relative size of termination fee payments on one hand and the different measures of the takeover premium and announcement period returns on another. For each contribution, the sample employed, the variables investigated, the measures of the premium and/or market reaction and the main empirical results are presented 
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causality runs in either direction between the premium and the presence of a TTFP. André, Khalil, and Magnan (2007) find a qualitatively similar result with respect to the causality between the relative size of termination fee payment and the premium. Finally, the previously mentioned negative effect of TTFP on the premium documented by Chapple, Christensen, and Clarkson (2007) becomes less significant when endogeneity bias is addressed by applying a simultaneous equation system with various exclusion restrictions.  
6.2.3. Deal completion Officer (2003) and Bates and Lemmon (2003) report that the presence of a TTFP is a significant and positive contributor to the likelihood of deal completion. Officer (2003) presents his results as evidence that TTFPs represent efficient contractual devices protecting the investments the bidders make in researching the synergies of the deal. In particular, a bidder granted such a provision will share more detailed private information with the target shareholders which, in turn, increases the likelihood of them accepting the offer. Bates and Lemmon (2003), in turn, present their findings as evidence that TTFPs are either used by target managers to lock deals with a friendly bidder or as an efficient method of reducing the cost of information exchange between the merging parties. The authors’ previously presented premium-related findings are consistent with the second explanation. The effect of the size of the termination fee payment on deal completion also received attention in the relevant literature. Coates and Subramanian (2000) show that the higher the relative size of this payment compared to the deal value, the higher the likelihood of deal completion. Jeon and Ligon (2011) report a qualitatively similar result for their full sample but find this effect to be insignificant when the analysis is limited to the sample of deals including a TTFP. The authors complement Officer (2003) and Bates and Lemmon (2003) by examining whether the presence of a TTFP facilitates the completion of deals with high premia while also taking into account the size of the termination fee payment. Interestingly, they provide evidence of a non-linear effect of the payment on deal completion as moderate fees significantly increase the likelihood of deal completion while high fees significantly reduce this likelihood.85 Moreover, Coates (2009) offers the only contribution covering datasets from the UK as he examines the relation between the relative size of the termination fee payment to the deal value and the likelihood of deal completion. In particular, given the inaccuracy of SDC’s coverage 
                                                          85 A possible explanation for these findings, not presented by Jeon and Ligon (2011), is that the high termination fee payments in such high-premium deals are demanded by bidders aiming to protect the deal to benefit from significantly high synergies arising from acquiring the target. Such an aspect of the deal signals to the target shareholders the possibility of finding a higher-paying bidder despite making a substantial termination fee payment to the initial one.  
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of the presence of a TTFP, the author limits his analysis to deals including such a provision.86 The author argues that, due to the relatively small cap of 1% imposed in the UK, the deals in this country are documented to be completed 60% as often as their US equivalents.   
6.2.4. Competing bidders and allocative efficiency In addition to the empirical finance literature, the legal literature which discusses the merits of banning lockups in the US courts provides relevant insights that can be applied to the case of TTFPs.87 The application of the Ayres (1990) model for lockups on TTFPs demonstrates that these provisions can foreclose a higher-paying competing bidder when the size of the termination fee payment, as a percentage of the deal value, exceeds the increase in the competing bidder’s valuation relative to the current bid. Based on this result, excessively high termination fee payments should be banned. The application of the Fraidin and Hanson (1994) approach, however, indicates that TTFPs do not affect allocative efficiency as the authors appeal to the Coase theorem to support their argument. In particular, in the presence of particularly high termination fee payment from which the initial bidder gains more from losing the bid than completing the deal, and as long as transaction costs are low, the initial bidder compensates the higher valuing competing potential acquirer by forgoing part of the gain from the termination fee payment in order to motivate the latter bidder to announce her bid. However, Coates and Subramanian (2000) argue the buy-side distortions from the acquirer’s side can influence allocative efficiency.88 For instance, they find that, due to the agency problems characterising public acquirers relative to private ones, they are less likely to accept the termination fee payment and prefer to complete the deal even if their true valuation of the target is below that of the competing bidder. Also, the authors present their finding that deals with a TTFP are more likely to be completed than deals with stock lockups in the presence of a competing bidder as further evidence of the effect of buy-side distortions on allocative efficiency. That is, the acquirer proceeds with the deal despite the fact that the increase in the competing bid’s value increases the value of stock lockups relative to the fixed termination fee payment. Officer (2003), in turn, finds a 3% reduction in the probability of the emergence of a competing bid when a TTFP is granted. However, such a relatively small effect is mainly driven by correlated deal characteristics. Bates and Lemmon (2003) report qualitatively similar findings and estimate the target’s returns in the period of multiple bids. The author’s findings highlight the trade-off between the reduction in the likelihood of competing bids and a resulting                                                           86 The author limits the analysis to deals exceeding 1 billion dollars in size, with 1989 as the base year, to make the comparison more valid as US deals are usually larger than UK ones. 87 Contrary to the fixed pre-specified cash sums in TTFPs, lockups grant the bidder a call option on a pre-determined number of target shares at a specific strike price. 88 I discuss these distortions in detail in Section 6.2.5. 
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increase in the returns accrued to the target shareholders. To stress that capped termination fee payments do not deter competing bidders, Coates (2009) shows that UK deals with a TTFP are more likely to be subject to post-bid competition compared to their US equivalents in which termination fee payments have no legal cap.89 Post-bid competition, however, captures only a part of the competitive process surrounding the acquisitions. For instance, Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2010) focus on potential competition, rather than on the documented presence of competing bids, as a significant contributor to the premium.90 Boone and Mulherin (2007), in turn, present an alternative measure of competition by examining whether the targets were contacted by multiple bidders (auction) or a single one (negotiations) before the acquisition announcement. They find that auctions are more likely to include a TTFP than negotiations. Consequently, their findings are consistent with the notion that TTFPs encourage potential acquirers to announce their bids without deterring competitors.  
6.2.5. The acquirer’s agency characteristics and the premium Coates and Subramanian (2000), Roll (1986), Jensen (1986) and Bargeron et al. (2008) focus on the agency characteristics on the acquirer’s side as potential determinants of her bidding strategy. In particular, Roll (1986) emphasises the role of managerial hubris in causing acquisitions as the companies’ managers might exaggerate their abilities to realize gains from takeover deals. A by-product of the hubris hypothesis is that the managers of public firms attempt to develop a reputation for toughness in acquisition bids by not withdrawing their attempt to acquire their targets even if they had to pay additional premia (Coates and Subramanian 2000).91 Furthermore, especially in the presence of free cash flows (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), managers are incentivised to grow their companies beyond their optimal levels in order to benefit from large compensations (Murphy, 1985). Such problems are more likely to be influential in public companies characterised by a separation between management and ownership (Coates and Subramanian 2000). Public companies have other agency characteristics that lead them to be less reluctant to withdraw their bids even if they have to pay higher premia. Coates and Subramanian (2000) argue that, for large public companies characterised by a hierarchical structure with multiple layers, switching strategies by deciding to withdraw from a specific merger project is costly to                                                           89 Stressing that relatively low and capped termination fee payment limits the bidder’s compensation for investigating the merits of the deal, Coates (2009) reports that the bidding activity, measured as the percentage of M&A bids relative to the total number of companies, is smaller in the UK compared to the US. 90Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2010) use the increase in the overall corporate control activities in the target’s industry, the growing buyout fund activity and indicators of overall economic expansions to represent this potential competition. 91 Coates and Subramanian (2000) also present the psychological phenomenon of endowment as a representative of buy-side distortion. Specifically, the acquirer’s managers tend to be more averse to the loss of a deal once they familiarise themselves with the notion that the target’s assets will become part of their companies. 
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implement. In particular, even in the absence of managerial hubris, deciding not to proceed with a merger deal requires that the company reassesses the entire business strategy in addition to abandoning future projects dependent on the acquisition of the target’s assets. Likewise, the literature related to acquisitions by firms engaged in private equity transactions emphasises the high-powered incentives of these firms’ managers (Jensen, 1989; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). A private equity transaction is one in which the acquirer finances the transaction using ‘a relatively small portion of equity and a relatively large portion of debt financing’ (p. 1) (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). This strong reliance on debt financing by private equity acquirers is presented by Jensen (1989) as a main cause for the reduction of conflicts of interest between stakeholders and the managers of these firms and, consequently, as a source of bargaining strength in any takeover negotiations. Specifically, the requirement to service the private equity firm’s debt limits the managers’ incentives to retain cash reserves and consequently limits the amount of free cash flows to be spent on wasteful acquisitions. Hence, the private equity firm’s managers are incentivised to be selective in choosing their targets and the levels of premia they are prepared to offer for such targets. Along similar lines, contrary to the case of multi-layer companies described by Coates and Subramanian (2000), Jensen (1989) also argues that private equity firms are more decentralised than publicly held corporations. Such an aspect also allows these firms to have an increased flexibility in the bargaining process. Given these distinctions between the various types of acquirers with respect to their attitude towards the withdrawal from the deal, in the hypotheses presented in this chapter, I examine whether these acquirers differ in the likelihood of including a TTFP in their deals and whether the presence of a TTFP influences the premia they pay.  
6.3. The Panel’s Ban on TTFPs The Panel’s decision to ban TTFPs was part of a series of decisions following the controversial hostile bid initiated by Kraft to acquire Cadbury. This bid was initiated in the end of August 2009 and was completed in January 19th, 2010 after an initial rejection by Cadbury’s board (Moeller, 2012). The notion that a British landmark company was being acquired by a foreign competitor, with the potential job losses associated with Kraft’s future plans regarding Cadbury’s business activities and the role of the recently bailed out Royal Bank of Scotland in financing the deal, caused extensive media coverage stressing Cadbury’s relevance to the British economy (Morris, 2014). This led to many calls to the Panel to ensure that ‘the outcome of a takeover bid is determined primarily by the long term shareholders of the offeree company, who will have a greater commitment to, and a better understanding of, the company, its management and its employees than those shareholders who are driven by short term trading strategies’ (p. 13) (The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 2010). Due to the relatively long 
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period of speculation with respect to Kraft’s intentions, among the most relevant changes to the Code was the tightening of the ‘put up or shut up’ period. Specifically, the Panel required a specified bidder to declare formally her intention to acquire or not acquire the target within 28 days of the target’s declaration of the presence of a potential offer (Morris, 2014). In a further attempt to strengthen the bargaining position of the target companies, the Panel banned the inclusion of TTFPs. Under such an arrangement, when TTFPs are not granted to the initial bidders, the target boards will have a wider range of options in the bargaining process including the possibility of withdrawing from the deals with no substantial costs. To further allow the targets to improve their tactical bargaining position, the Panel permitted the granting of TTFPs, following the Panel’s approval, to White Knight bidders, which are friendly acquirers that emerge when the target company is facing a hostile bid. In the seven-month period following the Panel’s ban, Clifford Chance LLP published a report assessing the UK takeover scene following the ban. Among the 56 acquisitions surveyed, only one dispensation from the prohibition on TTFPs was granted in the merger between Shell and Cove Energy. In addition, no TTFPs were found to be granted to White Knight bidders (Clifford Chance LLP, 2012). The Panel, in turn, published a Consultation Paper in November 2012 aiming to evaluate the impact of its reforms on the takeover scene. Among the interesting aspects of this chapter is the Panel’s concern with respect to the merging parties’ attempt to add provisions aiming to de 
facto play the role of a TTFP to the ‘Co-operation Agreements’ following Rule 21.2(b) of the Code (The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 2012). Under such provisions, the target company commits not to produce the required acquisition documents within a pre-specified period and not to publish these documents without the acquirer’s approval. Further, some provisions imposed restrictions on the target board’s ability to ‘communicate with shareholders and others in relation to the offer’ (p. 12) (The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 2012). Additionally, the commitments made following the ban by the target directors who are also shareholders included: (a) provisions related to the non-solicitation of competing offers, and (b) commitments to notify the acquirer of competing offers and the recommendation of the announced offer to the other shareholders. Nevertheless, the Panel remained confident that the changes introduced in September 2011 increased the protection offered to the target company shareholders (The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 2012). To the best of my knowledge, no scholarly empirical contribution has addressed the empirical merits of this decision. However, the only theoretical scholarly contribution addressing the merits of the Panel’s decision is presented by Calcagno and Falconieri (2014). The theoretical bargaining model presented by the authors, to which the analysis of the role of termination fees is an extension, includes an unsolicited bidder with the outside option to 
121 
 
initiate a tender offer and a target board with the outside option to call for an auction. In this model, moderately low termination fee payments like the ones banned by the Panel are found to have a useful function of compensating the initial bidder for losing the takeover bid without reducing the target’s bargaining power. 
6.4. Hypotheses 
6.4.1. Relationship with alternative commitments Previous literature indicates that TTFPs do not represent the only deal protection device from the target’s side. Coates and Subramanian (2000), for instance, exclude the deals with targets having a controlling shareholder from their sample as ‘it is legal and advisable (and hence common) for an acquirer to obtain a binding agreement from the controlling shareholder to vote for (or tender into) the deal’ (p. 7). As both TTFPs and shareholder commitments represent outcomes of the acquirer’s negotiations with target’s board and shareholders before the formal announcement of the bid, the literature records mixed findings consistent with these forms of commitments being either complements or equivalents. Jeon and Ligon (2011) find that deals including shareholder commitments also include a TTFP. In turn, Boone and Mulherin (2007) find that the fraction of the target’s shares subject to commitments or owned by long-term affiliated bidders negatively influences the likelihood of including a TTFP. However, none of these studies account for the effect of the different conditions at which the shareholders’ commitments cease to be binding on the TTFP’s presence. In this section, a specific hypothesis is presented to examine this relationship. The ‘Irrevocable Undertakings’ made to the bidder by the target shareholders have been a main feature of the takeover scene (Wright et al., 2007). These commitments are either binding or weakly binding agreements with existing shareholders to accept the acquirer’s bid at the price offered.92 The ‘Letters of Intent’, in turn, simply represent non-binding promises from the shareholders’ side to accept the offer (The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 2011). Covering these forms of assurance in the dataset allows us to present the first contribution examining the relationship between the commitments the target shareholders make to accept the offer and the conditions at which these commitments expire on one hand and the presence of TTFPs on another. The trade-off between the percentage of the target shares subject to binding commitments and the presence of TTFPs has been highlighted in the press following the Panel’s decision. For instance, a report by the FoxWilliams Business Law firm indicates that after the ban, due to the inability to include a TTFP, the acquirers may request binding ‘Irrevocable Undertakings’ from a greater number of target shareholders (FoxWilliams, 2012). Along these                                                           92 The weakly binding commitments, unlike the binding ones, expire under specific pre-determined conditions.  
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lines, it is important to note that, while the commitments granted by a particular shareholder do not bind the remaining shareholders, the TTFP binds the entity company as a single decision-making unit.93 Hence, when target shareholders with relatively high ownership stakes grant binding commitments, there is less of a need for the target’s board to grant a TTFP that binds the entire company. Consequently, I hypothesise that there is a negative relationship between the percentage of target shares subject to binding commitments and the presence of a TTFP. Following this discussion, I test the following hypothesis H1a: The lower the percentage of target 
shares subject to binding commitments, the more likely the presence of a TTFP.  Given the reduction in the portion of the target shares subject to binding commitments, a loyal target board should be hesitant to grant a TTFP unless the target shareholders express some sign of approval of the bid. By granting weakly binding commitments that cease to be binding in the presence of a competing bid that exceeds the current one by a specific percentage, or by simply offering non-binding promises to the acquiring firm, the target shareholders indicate that they approve the bid, at least in principle. Under such a condition, a loyal target board that highly values the overall wealth gains due to the acquisition would become more incentivized to grant a TTFP when requested by the acquiring firm. Along these lines, I test H1b: The higher the percentage of target shares subject to weakly binding and non-
binding commitments, the more likely the presence of a TTFP. 
 
6.4.2. The merits of the Panel’s decision In addition to examining the overall difference between the premia in deals including a TTFP and the premia in deals not including such a provision, I present two hypotheses asserting that the granting of TTFPs does not hurt the target shareholders. Mainly, the three types of acquirers -public operating, private operating and private equity firms- might have different capabilities to realise synergies from these deals. For instance, operating companies that are familiar with the target’s business activities can be better equipped to integrate the target and exploit its resources to realise high synergies. Furthermore, public acquirers are relatively large and have access to substantial financing opportunities from the securities market. Such an aspect can make these acquirers more capable of realizing synergies, and possibly offer higher takeover premia, than privately listed acquirers.   If the inclusion of a TTFP allows the initiation and completion of takeover deals rather than reducing the bargaining power of the target shareholders, the premia in deals including                                                           93 As noted by Coates (2009), the granting of a TTFP by the target companies’ boards does not usually require the approval of the shareholders. 
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these provisions should, at least, be as high as the premia in comparable deals announced by the same group of acquirers and not including these provisions. Hence, relative to comparable deals in which the acquirers are not compensated for any costs they incur if the deal is not consummated, deals with a TTFP are not supposed to have lower premia. Based on this discussion, I test H2 as follows: In each of the groups of deals announced by public operating, 
private operating and private equity acquirers, the premia in the deals including a TTFP are, at 
least, as high as the premia in comparable deals which do not include this provision.  H2 addresses the effect of TTFPs on the premia in deals announced by the same group of acquirers without examining whether the popular use of such provisions is associated with a particular type of acquirer approaching the target. For instance, private acquirers (operating and non-operating) that can walk away from the deal at a relatively lower cost than public acquirers can further improve their bargaining position with respect to the target’s board by exploiting the standardised inclusion of a TTFP (Bargeron et al., 2008). Under such an arrangement, the target’s board is not only facing a bidder than can easily walk away from the deal but also has to compensate this bidder if  this board decides not to consummate the deal.94 Therefore, complementing H2, to stress that none of the groups of acquirers systematically exploit the standardised inclusion of a TTFP, I test H3: The likelihood of including a TTFP does not 
significantly differ among the deals announced by public operating, private operating and public 
equity acquirers.  It is imperative to note that the rejection of H3 by itself does not indicate that the target shareholders are disadvantaged by the inclusion of TTFP. Possibly, a particular group of acquirers, due the debt constraint characterising its deals (private equity) or the agency problems characterising its decision-making process (public firms), might systematically demand the inclusion a TTFP as a deal protection measure. However, the rejection of H3 combined with the rejection of H2 for any particular group of acquirers is a likely indicator of the exploitation of a market standard at the expense of the target shareholders. 
6.5. Data 
6.5.1. Initial dataset The sample covers acquisitions announced between January 1st, 2002 and September 1st, 2011. The starting date is chosen mainly because the coverage of the acquisition announcements and the shareholder commitments in the InvestEgate website starts at 2002. The end date is chosen because no deals with a TTFP between this date and the Panel’s ban were announced. The                                                           94Unless she agrees on completing the deal with a relatively low premium. 
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acquisitions covered involve both UK and non-UK listed or privately owned (at the ultimate parent level) acquirers and UK listed targets. A deal to be retained in the sample needs to meet the following sample-selection criteria: (a) the deal value should exceed £1m, (b) the transaction’s payment method should be available from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Thomson One database, (c) the deal needs to be friendly to satisfy the termination fees’ practical requirement of a friendly target board, and (d) the takeover premia should be available and lower than 2, as in Officer (2003). To guarantee that all acquirers involved in the sampled deals share the same objective, the analysis is limited to only deals in which the acquirer aims to control 100% of the target shares. The acquirers are classified either as public operating, private operating or private equity acquirers. The latter group includes both privately listed firms and private equity divisions of public companies.95 Following Fidrmuc et al. (2012), deals flagged by SDC as ‘leveraged buyouts’, ‘acquirer is a financial sponsor’ and ‘acquirer is an investor group’ are classified as private equity deals after screening the deal description. The public operating and private operating acquirers’ deals, in turn, are transactions without the previously mentioned SDC flags and which have the ultimate parent classified as public and private, respectively. As a result, 541 deals end up in the sample. All the variables in the analysis are retrieved from SDC except the age of the target firm, and both target and acquiring firms’ market-to-book value and price-to-earnings ratios, which are retrieved from Datastream. Moreover, the documents that cover the target shareholder commitments are retrieved from the InvetEgate Financial Press website. A main source of deficiency in this dataset is that it does include uncompleted deals, deals with competing acquirers or deals announced by White Knight bidders. Recognising that such an aspect of the dataset prevents the examination of the role of TTFPs in influencing the likelihood of deal completion and the presence of a competing bid, I present my results within the context of the results discussed in Section 6.2.96  
6.5.2. Understatement of the presence of TTFPs A consensus has emerged in recent literature that SDC underreports the presence of TTFPs. For instance, Boone and Mulherin (2007) report that 25% of the deals in their sample recorded by SDC as not including a TTFP do actually include such a provision. In addition, André, Khalil, and Magnan (2007) find in their Canadian acquisitions sample that 70% of the deals recorded by 
                                                          95 The findings remain qualitatively similar if I analyse separately the acquisitions by privately listed private equity firms and the acquisitions by the divisions of public companies specialising in private equity activities. 96 The absence of deals with competing bids due to the restrictions imposed on the dataset does not necessarily reflect the lack of competition in the market for corporate control. Such a result is not surprising. For instance, Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) impose a weaker restriction that the acquirer wants to control more than 50% of the target shares following the transaction. The authors also allow the inclusion of hostile bids. They find that more than 90% of the bids in their US sample are single-bid transactions.  
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SDC as not including such a provision did in fact include one. Along the same lines, Jeon and Ligon (2011) report that more than 10% of the deals in their US sample which were reported by SDC as not including a TTFP did actually include one. After screening the acquisition announcements in the UK sample, similar patterns are detected for not only the target-related but also the acquirer-related termination fee provisions. In the sample of 541 acquisitions covered in this study, while SDC reports that 151 deals (27.91%) include a TTFP, the number of deals which did include such a provision is 287 (53.04%). Hence, 34.87% of the deals recorded as not including a TTFP actually included one. Likewise, while SDC reports that 23 deals (4.25%) include an Acquirer Termination Fee Provision, I find that 34 deals (6.28%) include such an agreement.97 
 
6.5.3. Univariate analysis of the premium I estimate the premium (PREM) offered to target shareholders by dividing the deal value by the target firm’s market value of equity 43 days prior to the announcement of the deal, and subtracting 1 from the result, as in Officer (2003).98 While Officer (2003) excludes from his analysis deals with premia that lie outside the 0 to 2 range, the exclusion of deals with negative premia from the analysis reduces the sample significantly, especially in the period following the recent financial crisis.99 As a result, while the findings remain qualitatively similar with, and without, the exclusion suggested by Officer (2003), the final analysis is conducted by including deals that also experience negative premia. I further introduce an alternative estimate of premium, PREMADJ, which accounts for the variation in the premia across different sectors. In particular, this estimate represents the difference between the premium offered and the average premium level in the target’s sector. Table 6.2 presents the means and medians of the two measures of premium, PREM and PREMADJ, for the entire sample while it further explores the premium within different subsamples based on deal characteristics. These premium measures are represented for the deals in each sample in addition to the groups of deals including, and not including, a TTFP. The mean (median) level of premium, PREM, in my sample is 35% (31.66%) with the premia in all the subsamples being positive and highly significant (at the 1% level). As expected, based on the sector-adjusted measure, PREMADJ, the means (medians) of the premia are considerably lower than the non-industry adjusted ones. In addition, these premia become statistically insignificant on the average level for the entire sample (ALL), and for each of the subsets: domestic                                                           97 This dataset is available from the authors upon request. 98Alexandridis, Fuller, Terhaar, and Travlos (2013) calculate the premium by using the market value of the target 30 days prior to the acquisition’s announcement day. I follow the same method and reach the same qualitative conclusions in alternative estimations. 99 48 out of the 111 deals that are associated with negative premium are announced between August 2007 and December 2009, representing 17.69% of the deals announced during that period. 
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acquisitions (DOMACQ), acquisitions by foreign acquirers (CBACQ), industry-focused (FCSD), industry-diversifying (DVRD) and private equity deals (PRIVEQ). I note the interesting observation that, for the group of deals including a TTFP, PREMADJ is not significantly negative either within the full sample (ALL) or any of the subsamples. However, the deals not including a TTFP include significant negative premia on the full sample (ALL) as well as the subsample of diversifying acquisitions (DVRD) at the 10% level, deals with domestic acquirers (DOMACQ) at the 5% level and the deals announced by private acquirers (PRIVACQ) at the 1% level. The results related to the size, sign and significance of the difference between the premia in deals including a TTFP and the premia in deals not including this provision give strong support to the notion that the inclusion of such provisions does not negatively influence the target shareholders’ wealth. In particular, deals including a TTFP have significantly higher sector-adjusted premia than deals not including this provision at both the mean and median levels, except those acquisitions by public acquirers in which the significant difference is limited to the median. Furthermore, the difference in the sector-adjusted premium (PREMADJ) is insignificant in deals announced by private equity acquirers and cross-border transactions. The differences in premia are close to or exceed 10% which is substantially higher than the 1% cap for TTFP. Such a result provides an early indication that the granting of a TTFP, while possibly having some effect on the increase in the premia, facilitates the completion of deals with acquirers that are already willing to pay high premia. Another interesting observation that is recorded in Table 6.2 is related to the difference in premium (PREM) at the median level between deals with a TTFP and deals without a TTFP announced by private equity acquirers. The negative and highly significant difference (-0.92%) with a level close to the 1%  cap raises concerns that the standardised inclusion of a TTFP comes at the expense of the premium received by the target shareholders in private equity deals. However, despite increasing in magnitude, this difference becomes less significant when the comparison is based on the sector-adjusted premium (PREMADJ). Overall, despite providing strong initial evidence that the inclusion of a TTFP is not detrimental to the target shareholders, the results of the univariate analysis need to be complemented by the results of multivariate and matching analyses comparing deals with close characteristics in order to provide an accurate assessment of the role of TTFPs. 
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Table 6.2: Univariate analysis of the premia   PREM PREMADJ PREM PREMADJ   ALL TARGTERM NOTARGTERM ALL TARGTERM NOTARGTERM TARGTERM vs. NOTARGTERM TARGTERM vs. NOTARGTERM ALL Mean 35.00*** 41.30*** 27.88*** 0.41 5.98*** -5.88* 13.42*** 11.87*** Median 31.66*** 36.18*** 26.15*** -3.84 1.97 -9.54*** 10.02*** 11.52*** 
N 541 287 254      DOMACQ Mean 32.78*** 39.44*** 24.81*** -1.18 4.67* -8.21** 14.63*** 12.88*** Median 30.01*** 33.36*** 24.72*** -6.46* -0.83 -13.07*** 8.64*** 12.24*** 
N 400 218 182      CBACQ Mean 41.29*** 47.19*** 35.64*** 4.95 10.14** -0.01 11.54 10.16 Median 37.05*** 45.87*** 32.15*** 4.39 8.67* -0.82*** 13.71** 9.49 
N 141 69 72      FCSD Mean 36.33*** 43.01*** 29.18*** 1.16 6.81* -4.89 13.82** 11.70* Median 32.38*** 37.53*** 26.06*** -3.90 3.81 -8.09 11.46*** 11.90** 
N 203 105 98      DVRD Mean 34.20*** 40.32*** 27.06*** -0.03 5.51** -6.51* 13.25*** 12.02*** Median 31.48*** 34.88*** 26.68*** -3.12 1.77 -10.85** 8.19*** 12.62*** 
N 338 182 156      PRIVACQ Mean 24.99*** 34.30*** 14.72*** -7.56* 1.21 -17.27*** 19.58*** 18.48*** Median 21.86*** 28.29*** 11.14*** -12.76** -7.35 -20.08*** 17.14*** 12.73*** 
N 202 106 96      PUBACQ Mean 40.97*** 45.41*** 35.88*** 5.16* 8.78*** 1.02 9.53** 7.75 Median 35.97*** 37.80*** 32.49*** 0.29 4.82** -4.68 5.30** 9.50** 
N 339 181 158      PRIVEQ Mean 32.19*** 33.55*** 30.29*** -0.77 0.61 -2.72 3.26 3.33 Median 27.85*** 27.85*** 28.77*** -5.19 -6.78 -1.13 -0.92*** -5.65 
N 139 81 58      Note: This table documents the premium paid to UK public target shareholders in different groups of transactions. Two measures of the premium, PREM and PREMADJ, are reported for the total number of transactions (ALL), transactions	 classified	based	on	the	acquirer’s	 domicile	 (domestic	 acquirers	 (DOMACQ)	 and	 cross-border	acquirers	(CBACQ)),	 industry	relatedness	 based	on	 the	 two-digit	SIC	 code	
(focused	(FCSD)	and	diversifying	(DVRD)),	the	listing	status	of	the	acquirer	at	the	ultimate	parent	level	(a	public	acquirer	(PUBACQ)	or	a	private	one	(PRIVACQ)),	and	acquisitions	classified	as	private	equity	
deals	(PRIVEQ).	For	each	group,	the	mean	and	median	premia	in	addition	to	the	total	number	of	deals,	deals	including	TTFP	and	deals	not	including	such	provisions	are	presented.	The	table	also	presents	
the	difference	between	the	premia	in	deals	including	TTFP	and	the	premia	in	deals	 not	including	a	TTFP.	The	significance	based	on	 the	 t-test	with	 the	null	hypothesis	that	 the	premium	is	equal	to	 0	 is	
reported	next	 to	 the	means.	The	significance	of	 the	Wilcoxon	Rank	Sum	test	with	the	null	hypothesis	 that	 the	median	is	equal	to	0	is	reported	next	to	the	medians.	Next	to	 the	differences	in	means,	the	
significance	of	the	t-test	with	the	null	hypothesis	that	the	difference	in	means	is	equal	to	0	is	reported.	Next	to	the	differences	in	medians,	the	significance	based	on	the	Wilcoxon	Rank	Sum	test	with	the	null	
hypothesis	that	the	two	populations	whose	sample	median	differences	are	presented	have	the	same	continuous	distribution	is	presented.	***,**,	and	*	represent	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively.
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6.5.4. Data on shareholders’ commitments As a result of screening the acquisition announcements collected from the InvestEgate Financial Press website, I have managed to retrieve 164 deals (30.31% of the full sample) that include full details about the commitments made by the target shareholders and the specific conditions at which these commitments cease to be binding. Out of the 164 deals, 107 include a TTFP while 57 deals do not include such provisions. An interesting aspect of this dataset is that it covers all 34 deals which include an Acquirer Termination Fee Provision. Such a finding indicates that these provisions are granted by the acquirer as part of the negotiation in which she aims to receive commitments to accept the offer from the target shareholders.  
6.5.5. Descriptive statistics Table 6.3 contains descriptive statistics for the main continuous variables employed in the analysis. Stressing that toeholds and TTFPs represent equivalent measures for compensating the acquirer in the event of the potential loss of the deal (Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Officer, 2003), the percentage of target shares owned by the acquirer (PERCHELD) is significantly lower in deals with a TTFP compared to deals without a TTFP (1.3% vs. 6.98%). Furthermore, while the targets in deals with TTFP exceed the targets in deals without a TTFP in market value by £104.43m, neither this difference nor the differences in the targets’ market-to-book values (TARGMTBV), age (TARGAGE), and price-equity ratios (TARGPE) between the two groups of deals are statically different. Also, contrary to the conclusions of Officer (2003) and Bates and Lemmon (2003), the deals without TTFP are found to have a higher percentage of their total considerations financed by the acquirer’s securities (STOCK_PERC) than deals with a TTFP (23.61% vs. 15.83%). An interpretation of this result is discussed by Coates and Subramanian (2000) who suggest that the acquirers not using common equity as a financing method are eager to complete the deal and, consequently, are more likely to request the inclusion of a TTFP. Shifting the focus to the commitments granted by the target shareholders, Table 6.3 depicts some interesting patterns. In particular, while there is no significant difference in the overall percentage of target shares subject to commitments (BIND + WEAK_BIND + NON_BIND) between deals with TTFP and deals without such provisions, the former group has a significantly lower percentage of the target shares subject to binding commitments (BIND) than the latter (15.65 vs. 27.81). However, deals with a TTFP include a significantly higher percentage of target shares subject to weakly binding (WEAK_BIND) than deals without such a provision (16.63 vs. 10.47) a level of non-binding (NON_BIND) commitments that is not statistically different than these deals. While such findings give initial support for H1a and the first part of H1b, they need to be validated in a multivariate context. 
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Table 6.3: The continuous covariates and the presence of a TTFP Variable N No. of Deals with a TTFP No. of deals without a TTFP Mean of variable in deals with a TTFP Mean of variable in deals without a TTFP Differentials PERCHELD 541 287 254 1.30 6.98 -5.67*** STOCK_PERC 541 287 254 15.83 23.61 -7.78** TARGMV 541 287 254 474.95 370.52 104.43 TARGAGE 541 284 254 4551 5078 527 TARGMTBV 347 198 149 3.30 2.31 0.98 TARGPE 347 198 149 37.35 54.91 -17.55 BIND 164 107 57 15.65 27.81 -12.16*** WEAK_BIND 164 107 57 16.63 10.47 6.16** NON_BIND 164 107 57 3.48 3.21 0.26 Note: This table represents for each continuous covariate employed in the analysis: the size N of the sample in which it is available, the number of deals with and without a TTFP in this sample, the mean value of this covariate in the group of deals including a TTFP, its mean value in the group of deals not including a TTFP, the difference between these two mean values and its significance based on the null hypothesis that this difference is equal to 0 using the t-test. ***,**,	and	*	represent	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively.  
6.6. Results and Discussion 
6.6.1. Logistic models Table 6.4 presents the determinants of the likelihood of TTFP’s inclusion based on Logistic models with the dependent variable TARGTERM being assigned the value of 1 in the presence of a TTFP and 0 otherwise. Model 1 presents the determinants of this presence on the full sample (541 observations) employed in the analysis while the estimations in Model 2 are based on the sample for which the target’s market-to-book value (TARGMTBV) and price-earnings ratio (TARGPE) are available in Datastream. Consistent with the results of the descriptive statistics, the likelihood of a TTFP inclusion decreases with the increase in the percentage of the consideration financed by stock (STOCK_PERC) and the percentage of target firm’s shares which are already owned by the acquirer (PERCHELD). However, none of the target’s characteristics (the natural logarithm of the target’s market value ln(TARGMV), the market-to-book value (TARGMTBV) or price-earnings ratio (TARGPE)) are found to have a significant impact on influencing the likelihood of the presence of a TTFP.        
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Table 6.4: Predicting the presence of a TTFP and the variation in the target’s shares subject to commitments Dependent  Variable TARGTERM=1 NOTARGTERM=0 TARGTERM=1 NOTARGTERM=0 TARGTERM=1 NOTARGTERM=0 TARGTERM=1 NOTARGTERM=0 TARGTERM=1 NOTARGTERM=0 TARGTERM=1 NOTARGTERM=0 Explanatory Variables\Model (.) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Intercept -0.163 (0.560) 0.554 (0.399) 2.120 (0.162) 0.902 (0.612) -0.433 (0.668) 0.096 (0.556) STOCK_PERC -0.009*** (0.002) -0.010*** (0.003) -0.009 (0.006) -0.007 (0.006) -0.005 (0.005) -0.007 (0.005) ln(TARGMV) 0.073 (0.056) -0.031 (0.075) 0.152 (0.137) 0.069 (0.126) 0.197 (0.133) 0.131 (0.119) PERCHELD -0.060*** (0.014) -0.066*** (0.015) -0.079*** (0.027) -0.076*** (0.024) -0.056*** (0.022) -0.065*** (0.022) PRIVACQ 0.120 (0.256) 0.315 (0.327) 0.437 (0.523) 0.160 (0.500) 0.173 (0.534) 0.101 (0.509) PRIVEQ 0.055 (0.267) -0.030 (0.344) 0.082 (0.576) 0.041 (0.569) -0.052 (0.573) -0.022 (0.566) CBACQ -0.216 (0.216) -0.499* (0.279) 0.505 (0.507) 0.264 (0.475) 0.390 (0.463) 0.411 (0.451) DVRD -0.077 (0.206) -0.160 (0.267) -0.384 (0.394) -0.231 (0.392) -0.173 (0.383) -0.138 (0.386) SCHEME 0.605*** (0.216) 0.621** (0.270) 1.294*** (0.493) 1.035** (0.45) 1.062*** (0.447) 1.077*** (0.452) ACQTERM 1.490*** (0.520) 1.586** (0.641)     TARGMTBV  0.019 (0.023)     TARGPE  -0.0002 (0.0005)     BIND+WEAK_BIND+NON_BIND   -0.011 (0.009)    BIND    -0.021*** (0.007)   WEAK_BIND     0.019* (0.011)  NON_BIND      0.005 (0.024) INDUSTRY and YEAR EFFECTS YES NO YES NO NO NO 
N 541 347 164 164 164 164 McFadden R-squared 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.14 0.10 Prob (LR statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 Note:	This	table	 presents	 the	output	of	6	Logistic	 regressions	highlighting	 the	factors	 influencing	 the	 inclusion	of	a	
TTFP	(TARGTERM)	in	the	deals.	The	McFadden	R-squared	is	 reported	to	highlight	 the	goodness	of	fit	of	the	Logistic	
regressions.	Standard	errors	are	reported	within	parentheses.	The	p-values	from	the	LR	test	with	the	restriction	that	
all	the	Logistic	model	coefficients	are	jointly	equal	to	0	are	reported.	Variables	not	included	in	the	table	were	included	
in	alternative	specifications	and	were	not	found	to	have	significant	effects.	Also,	the	variables	representing	yearly	time	
effects	 are	 found	 to	 have	 insignificant	 effects.	 ***,**,	 and	 *	 represent	 significance	 at	 the	 1%,	 5%	 and	 10%	 levels	respectively.  Moreover, consistent with previous research, the presence of an Acquirer Termination Fee Provision (ACQTERM) is a positive contributor to the presence of a TTFP indicating that both provisions are part of reciprocal agreements. The use of the Scheme of Arrangement (SCHEME), in turn, increases the likelihood of a TTFP presence as this court-administered method to conduct the deal requires the cooperation of the target’s board and might necessitate extended time to be completed, leaving the door open for competing offers. In Chapter Five, the presence of a TTFP was presented as a key predictor of the Scheme’s use. In this chapter, I expand this argument by emphasising the reciprocal aspect of the relationship between these two arrangements. In particular, as both the Scheme and the TTFP are used by acquirers that aim to guarantee the deal’s completion, an acquirer that uses the scheme is also likely to demand the inclusion of a TTFP. Likewise, once an acquirer manages to receive a TTFP, she is likely to proceed with the Scheme further ensure the acquisition’s completion. Appendix 5 gives further support to the complementary aspect of the relationship between these two 
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arrangements. In particular, with the choice of various exclusion restrictions, the positive and significant effect of the Scheme on the choice of the TTFP and the positive effect of the TTFP presence in making the use of the Scheme more likely persists.  Furthermore, despite the asymmetric information which unusually characterises diversifying (DVRD) deals and acquisitions by foreign acquirers (CBACQ) (Kohers and Ang, 2000) which might increase the likelihood of TTFP’s use as a deal protection measure, I find weak evidence in Model 2 that the presence of a foreign acquirer reduces the likelihood of a TTFP being used while the effect of diversifying acquisitions is insignificant in all the specifications reported. With the inclusion of intercepts in the models, the insignificance of the coefficients associated with the dummy variables referring, respectively, to the presence of a private acquirer (PRIVACQ) and the presence of a private equity acquirer (PRIVEQ) lead to the non-rejection of H3. Specifically, the likelihood of a TTFP being included does not systematically differ among private and public acquirers whether operating or private equity firms are involved. While the total percentage of target shares subject to commitments (BIND + WEAK_BIND + NON_BIND) does not influence the likelihood of a TTFP being used in Model 3 (Table 6.4), the results in Model 4 are in line with H1a. In turn, the results in Model 5 indicate that the increase in the portion of the target shares subject to weakly binding commitments is associated with an increase in the likelihood of TTFP presence, which lends support to the first part of H1b. However, Model 6 indicates that non-binding promises do not influence the likelihood of TTFP presence, as evidenced by the insignificant impact of NON_BIND, which is not in line with the second part of H1b. Hence, in absence of binding commitments, the target boards remain hesitant to grant TTFPs unless the holders of a relatively high number of target shares signal that they accept the bid, at least in principle, by making commitments that bind them to some extent. Thus, rather than highlighting overall tradeoff or complementary relationships between the overall portion of the target shares subject to commitments and TTFPs by treating the shareholder commitments as a homogenous group, my results lend support to the notion that the heterogeneity in the types of commitments granted by the target shareholders is a critical factor that influences the target board’s decision to grant a TTFP.   
6.6.2. Initial parametric analysis I examine the influence of the presence of a TTFP on the premium and the shareholders’ announcement period returns in Table 6.5. PREM and PREMADJ are employed as dependent variables in Models 1, 2 and 3. In turn, the three-day (-1, 1) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARTHREE) earned by the target shareholders, estimated as the sum of the differences 
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between the target’s daily stock returns and the FT-ALL Share index returns over the three day window surrounding the announcement, is employed as the dependent variable in Models 4, 5 and 6. The coefficient associated with the presence of a TTFP (TARGTERM) in all the specified models is insignificant. Such results indicate that the use of a TTFP, while not necessarily benefiting the target shareholders, does not reduce the overall gains they realise from takeover deals. In addition, the estimated effect of TARGTERM on CARTHREE in Model 4 (2.25%) is reduced to (1.34%) in Model 5 once I control for the effect of the sector-adjusted premium (PREMADJ) on the market reaction.100 
Table 6.5: Multivariate analysis of the variation in the premia and the market’s reaction Dependent Variable PREM PREMADJ PREMADJ CARTHREE CARTHREE CARTHREE Explanatory Variables\Model (.) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Intercept 0.532*** (0.061) 0.158*** (0.061) 0.230*** (0.081) 0.178*** (0.053) 0.151*** (0.049) 0.209*** (0.054) TARGTERM 0.045 (0.037) 0.032 (0.037) -0.029 (0.040) 0.022 (0.021) 0.013 (0.019) 0.034 (0.024) STOCK_PERC -0.002*** (0.0006) -0.002*** (0.0006) -0.001 (0.0008) -0.001*** (0.0002) -0.001*** (0.0002) -0.001*** (0.0003) ln(TARGMV) -0.033*** (0.009) -0.026*** (0.009) -0.032*** (0.012) -0.018*** (0.006) -0.010* (0.006) -0.016** (0.008) ACQTERM 0.0009 (0.064) -0.003 (0.062) -0.012 (0.074) 0.004 (0.037) 0.004 (0.032) -0.039 (0.042) PERCHELD -0.015*** (0.001) -0.013*** (0.002) -0.015*** (0.002) -0.0003 (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.0003 (0.001) PRIVACQ -0.165*** (0.047) -0.136*** (0.047) -0.084 (0.055) -0.032 (0.028) 0.001 (0.027) -0.029 (0.033) PRIVEQ 0.051 (0.049) 0.049 (0.049) 0.025 (0.053) -0.040 (0.027) -0.051* (0.026) -0.028 (0.031) CBACQ 0.135*** (0.042) 0.105*** (0.041) 0.087* (0.052) 0.038 (0.025) 0.011 (0.023) 0.038 (0.030) DVRD -0.004 (0.040) -0.006 (0.040) -0.003 (0.048) -0.026 (0.023) -0.025 (0.022) -0.0006 (0.026) SCHEME 0.040 (0.038) 0.047 (0.039) 0.026 (0.044) 0.053** (0.024) 0.043** (0.022) 0.044 (0.027) POST_2008 0.085** (0.039) 0.067* (0.038) 0.090** (0.043) 0.063*** (0.024) 0.045** (0.021) 0.092*** (0.029) TARGMTBV   5.78E-05 (0.0017)   -0.0006 (0.001) TARGPE   0.000135** (6.70E-05)   6.00E-05 (5.11E-05) INDUSTRY EFFECTS NO - - NO YES YES 
N 541 541 347 541 541 347 Adjusted R-squared 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.24 0.11 Prob (F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Note:	This	table	presents	the	output	of	3	regressions	highlighting	the	factors	influencing	the	variation	in	the	premium	
received	 by	 the	 target	 shareholders.	 The	 premium	 measures	 employed	 are	 PREM	 and	 PREMADJ.	 The	 table	 also	
presents	 the	 output	 of	 3	 regressions	 examining	 the	 variation	 in	 the	 target	 company’s	 three-day	 (-1,1)	 CAR	
(CARTHREE).	 The	 adjusted	 R-squared	 is	 reported	 to	 highlight	 the	 models’	 goodness	 of	 fit.	 The	 standard	 errors	
reported	 in	 parentheses	 are	 corrected	 for	 heteroskedasticity	 using	 the	White	 (1980)	heteroskedasticity	 consistent	
standard	errors.	The	p-values	from	the	F-test	with	the	restriction	that	all	the	model	coefficients	are	jointly	equal	to	0	
are	 reported.	Variables	 not	 included	 in	the	 table	were	included	in	alternative	 specifications	 and	were	not	found	 to	
have	significant	effects.***,**,	and	*	represent	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively. 
 
 
                                                           100 In Table 6.4, I also control for industry effects and the time effect representing acquisitions announced during or after the year 2008 (POST_2008). Among the various time effects examined in alternative specifications, this time effect is the only significant one.  
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6.6.3. Propensity Score Matching To test H2, I rely on Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to create matched samples of comparable deals within the overall sample as well as the group of deals announced by private equity acquirers (PRIVEQ), the group of deals announced by private (PRIVACQ) operating (NOPRIVEQ) acquirers, and the group of deals announced by public (PUBACQ) operating (NOPRIVEQ) acquirers. The control observations in these samples are deals not including a TTFP but which would be likely to include this provision, as represented by the propensity scores estimated by Logistic models. I estimate on these matched samples the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) (Guo and Fraser, 2010) using the sector-adjusted premium (PREMADJ) as the outcome variable:101 
ܣܶܶ = ∑ {ܴܲܧܯܣܦܬ௜(ܶܣܴܩܶܧܴܯ௜) −ܴܲܧܯܣܦܬ௜(ܱܰܶܣܴܩܶܧܴܯ௜)}௜:்஺ோீ்ாோெୀଵ
ଵܰ
= ∑ ൜൬ܶܣܴܩܶܧܴܯ௜ − (1 − ܶܣܴܩܶܧܴܯ௜)ܭெ(݅)ܯ ൰ ܴܲܧܯܣܦܬ௜ൠே௜ୀଵ
ଵܰ
 with ܰ representing the number of deals in the matched sample, ଵܰ representing the number of deals including a TTFP in this matched sample, ܴܲܧܯܣܦܬ௜(ܶܣܴܩܶܧܴܯ௜)representing the observed sector-adjusted premium for target ݅ when such provisions are included and  
ܴܲܧܯܣܦܬ௜(ܱܰܶܣܴܩܶܧܴܯ௜) representing the outcome in the absence of this provision. Hence, 
ܴܲܧܯܣܦܬ௜(ܱܰܶܣܴܩܶܧܴܯ௜) represents the counterfactual outcome for a treated unit ݅that receives the treatment. This counterfactual outcome is represented by the premium in deals with no TTFP in the matched sample while allowing each one of these deals to be used more than once as a control unit. ܯ represents the number of control units matched to each treated one and is limited to 1 in this study. ܭெ(݅) represents the number of times unit ݅ is used as a match, given that matching is done with replacement. For each group of deals, the models used to estimate the propensity scores are the ones that balance not only these scores on the matched samples but also the main covariates employed in the analysis. Table 6.6 (Panel A) presents the results of the four matching exercises conducted based on the 1:1 Nearest Neighbour (NN) matching algorithm and Caliper Matching (CM). Among the different possible specifications for each of the Logistic models employed in these exercises, I choose the specifications that include the covariates that significantly influence the presence of a TTFP. As for the remaining main covariates, their presence in the Logistic model is dependent on whether they end up being balanced between the treated and control groups on the resulting matched sample. As matching is pursued with replacement, the ATT estimates in which                                                           101 The matching analysis results with PREM as the outcome variable are qualitatively similar but, emphasising the relevance of sector-related characteristics, the results are more sensitive to the effect of a missing covariate. 
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particular control observations, closer to the treated one in terms of propensity scores, are given larger weights than others indicate an insignificant treatment effect.                                    
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Table 6.6: Results of the matching analysis Panel A Sample ALL PRIVEQ NOPRIVEQ AND PRIVACQ NOPRIVEQ AND PUBACQ Matching Algorithm NN CM NN NN Caliper - 0.05 - 0.01 Control Observations per Treated Observation 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 Number of deals with TTFP 287 68 38 109 Number of deals without TTFP 124 31 20 68 PREMADJ of Deals with TTFP (%) 5.98* 1.77 3.306 9.65*** PREMADJ of Deals without TTFP (%) -0.82 -3.04 -19.61** 5.91 KS before Matching (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 KS after Matching (p-value) 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
ܣܶܶ (%) (Abadie and Imbens (2006) Standard Errors)) 3.08 (4.83) 2.75 (8.51) 27.74** (12.55) -0.02 (3.77) HL Estimate (%) at Γ=1 0.00 -3.12 28.17 2.84 Cut-off	Γ	value	(p≈0.05) 1.21 1.73 1.62 1.47 HL Estimate at the Upper Bound (%) (p≈0.05) 4.66 9.88 46.17 9.14 HL Estimate at the Lower Bound (%) (p≈0.05)	 -4.43 -15.91 15.67 -7.15 Cut-off	Γ	value	(p≈0.10) 1.16 1.58 1.82 1.35 HL Estimate at the Upper Bound (%) (p≈0.10) 3.69 7.78 50.87 7.24 HL Estimate at the Lower Bound (%) (p≈0.10) -3.43 -13.01 13.07 -5.42  Panel B  Before Matching After Matching  Treatment  Group Control  Group Abs Std Mean Difference p-value Treatment  Group Control  Group Abs StdMean Difference p-value PROP_SCORE 0.59 0.45 94.63 0.00 0.59 0.59 -0.01 0.99 ln(TARGMV) 4.34 3.78 30.91 0.00 4.34 4.40 3.29 0.68 PERCHELD 1.30 6.97 99.91 0.00 1.30 1.698 6.87 0.17 POST_2008 0.34 0.33 2.88 0.73 0.34 0.34 0.42 0.95 DVRD 0.63 0.61 4.13 0.63 0.63 0.62 1.14 0.88 CBACQ 0.24 0.28 10.00 0.25 0.24 0.22 4.68 0.55 PRIVEQ 0.28 0.22 11.95 0.15 0.28 0.24 8.37 0.22 STOCK_PERC 15.83 23.62 22.95 0.02 15.83 12.36 10.25 0.10 PRIVACQ 0.37 0.37 1.78 0.83 0.37 0.39 4.62 0.54 ACQTERM 0.09 0.02 24.87 0.00 0.09 0.07 8.20 0.00 SCHEME 0.44 0.27 32.75 0.00 0.44 0.48 8.40 0.08  Panel C  Before Matching After Matching  Treatment  Group Control  Group Abs Std Mean Difference p-value Treatment  Group Control  Group Abs Std Mean Difference p-value PROP_SCORE 0.64 0.49 129.2 0.00 0.66 0.66 0.57 0.26 ln(TARGMV) 4.61 3.92 42.15 0.03 4.68 4.64 2.72 0.79 PERCHELD 1.44 7.40 103.32 0.00 0.84 0.39 10.49 0.42 POST_2008 0.25 0.32 15.49 0.38 0.23 0.18 12.04 0.35 CBACQ 0.13 0.17 10.62 0.56 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.99 STOCK_PERC 0.62 7.43 120.11 0.04 0.00 1.12 0.00 0.31 ACQTERM 0.01 0.00 11.11 0.32 0.01 0.00 12.12 0.36 SCHEME 0.51 0.32 37.97 0.02 0.54 0.36 36.63 0.03 Note:	Panel	A	reports	the	results	of	the	PSM	analysis	based	on	Logistic	models	in	which	the	dependent	variable	is	 the	dichotomous	
variable	 TARGTERM	taking	 the	 value	 of	 1	 if	 a	 target	 termination	 fee	 is	 included	 in	 the	deal	 and	 0	 otherwise.	 The	 four	reported	matching	exercises	 are	 applied	respectively	 on	 the	 full	 sample	used	 in	 this	study,	 the	 sample	of	 deals	classified	 as	 private	equity	
transactions,	the	sample	of	deals	classified	as	non-private	equity	transactions	and	announced	by	private	acquirers,	and	the	sample	of	
deals	classified	as	non-private	equity	transactions	and	announced	by	public	acquirers.	The	results	of	the	first	matching	exercise	are	
based	on	a	Logistic	model	 in	which	the	independent	variables	are	PERCHELD,	SCHEME,	DVRD,	STOCK_PERC,	ACQTERM,	PRIVACQ,	
PRIVEQ,	CBA	and	ln(TARGMV).	The	results	of	the	second	matching	exercises	are	based	on	a	Logistic	model	in	which	the	independent	
variables	 are	PERCHELD, POST_2008, STOCK_PERC, and ln(TARGMV). The	 results	 of	 the	 third	matching	 exercise	 are	based	 on	 a	Logistic	model	 in	which	the	 independent	 variables	 are	PERCHELD,	 CBACQ	and	 ln(TARGMV). The results of the fourth matching exercise are based on a Logistic model with the independent covariates PERCHELD, STOCK_PERC, POST_2008, CBACQ and ln(TARGMV). The	Panel	 also	 reports	 the	 number	 of	 control	 observations	matched	 per	 treated	 observation,	 the	 number	 of	 deals	
including	and	not	including	TTFP	in	the	resulting	matched	sample,	the	mean	of	PREMADJ	for	both	the	treated	and	the	control	group	
in	 the	matched	sample	 in	addition	to	the	p-value	 from	the	Kolmogorov-Smirnov	test	with	 the	null	hypothesis	 that	 the	 propensity	
scores	(PORP_SCORE)	estimated	from	the	Logistic	model	have	the	same	distribution	in	 the	treated	 and	control	groups	before	and	
after	the	matching.	The	panel	also	reported	ܣܶܶ 	with	the	standard	error	(in	parentheses)	estimated	following	Abadie	and	Imbens	
(2006),	 the	 HL	 estimate	 at	 ߁ = 1,	 the	 cutoff	 value	 of	 ߁	 at	 which	 the	 initial	 inference	 starts	 to	 change	 qualitatively	 with	 the	
corresponding	p-value	of	 5%	as	well	as	the	value	of	 the	 HL	estimates	 at	 the	upper	and	lower	bounds	established	by	߁,	 the	cutoff	
value	of	߁	at	which	the	initial	inference	starts	to	change	qualitatively	with	the	corresponding	p-value	of	10%	and	the	value	of	the	HL	
estimates	 at	 the	 upper	 and	 lower	 bounds	 established	 by	 ߁.	 Panels	 B	 and	 C,	 based	 on	 the	 first	 and	 second	matching	 exercises	
respectively,	report	 the	means	of	 the	propensity	scores	and	each	main	 covariate	in	the	groups	of	deals	including	and	not	including	
target	termination	fees	before	and	after	the	matching,	the	p-value	 from	the	t-test	associated	with	the	null	hypothesis	of	no	statistical	
difference	between	these	means	before	and	after	matching,	and	the	Absolute	Standardized	Mean	Difference	defined	as	the	absolute	
difference	between	the	means	of	the	covariate	in	each	of	the	 two	 groups	divided by the square root of the mean of the variable’s variances in both groups.***,**,	and	*	represent	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively. 
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For deals announced by private equity acquirers as well as the deals announced by public operating acquirers, the insignificant ATT indicates that those acquirers do not benefit from the inclusion of a TTFP and therefore do not pay relatively low premia when this provision is granted. While the size of the termination fee payment relative to the deal value is capped (and standardized) at 1%, the high and significant ATT (27%) of the TTFP for deals by private operating acquirers is significantly high. Hence, I do not interpret my findings as evidence that the granting of relatively small target termination fee provisions necessarily fully causes an increase in the premium exceeding 27%. Rather, I argue that the targets in deals announced by private operating firms and including a TTFP are approached by acquirers that investigated the different aspects of the acquisitions and are willing to complete the deals by paying relatively high premia given the receipt of a form of deal protection like the TTFP.102 A potential explanation of the limitation of the TTFP’s positive impact on the premia to the case of deals announced by private operating acquirers can be that, while public acquirers already pay significantly high premia in their deals, private acquirers do not often pay high premia due to the limitation of their resources. Furthermore, private operating acquirers might not have the access to the debt financing facilities as the case of private equity acquirers. Hence, private operating acquirers are more likely to proceed with their high-premium deals when they receive a deal protection measure like a TTFP. Table 6.6 (Panels B and C) presents examples of the success of the matching exercises, the first and the second respectively, in balancing the main covariates in the analysis. In particular, the results of the Kolmogorov Smirnov (KS test) indicate that the distributions of propensity scores are not statistically different between the treated and control groups post-matching. The results of the t-tests and the reduction in the Absolute Standardized Mean Bias also confirm the balancing of the main covariates. However, whether the resulting conclusion is valid, given the presence of unobserved covariates influencing the likelihood of TTFP presence is a main concern.  The results reported in Table 6.6 (Panel A) also include outcomes of the Rosenbaum (2002) bounds analysis. For the overall sample (ALL), the results of this sensitivity analysis indicate that the resulting conclusion is sensitive to the effect of a missing covariate. In particular, a missing covariate needs to increase the relative odds of including a TTFP by 16% in order to have either a positive or negative ATT that is significant at the 10% level with corresponding HL estimates of (3.69%) and (-3.43%) at the upper and lower bound respectively. However, the conclusions of the remaining three matching exercises are far less                                                           102 On each matched sample, I run a regression in which the dependent variable is CARTHREE and the dependent variables are TARGTERM and PREMADJ. As expected, the effect of TARGTERM on CARTHREE remains insignificant in the presence of PREMADJ. Alternatively, under the assumption that premium is a determinant of TTFP presence, I estimate propensity score models while including PREMADJ as an independent covariate. Also as expected, the ATTs of the inclusion of a TTFP on CARTHREE in these exercises are insignificant. 
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sensitive to the effect of a missing covariate which highlights the relevance of comparing deals announced by the same acquirer. Specifically, a missing covariate needs to increase the relative odds of target termination fee presence by a factor ranging from 1.47 (for public operating companies) to 1.70 (private operating companies) to alter the qualitative conclusions at the 5% level. Such levels, for instance, are close to the 1.5 level presented by Peel and Makepeace (2012) as evidence of relatively insensitive conclusions in the analysis of the premia charged by accounting auditors.103 They also exceed the level of 1.25 reported by Hujer, Caliendo, and Thomsen (2004) in their analysis of German job market schemes. An economic interpretation of these findings within the context of this investigation is as follows: with Γ=1.60, for instance, a missing covariate needs to have the same effect on the odds of including TTFP as the effect of a decrease in the percentage of the deal value financed by stock by 47%. This effect is also equivalent to that of a decrease in the percentage of target shares already owned by the acquirer by 7% (in Table 6.4, Model 2) in altering the initial qualitative conclusion.104 The fact that these variations are relatively high given the respective averages (standard deviations) of STOCK_PERC and PERCHELD (these are 19.49% (37.44%) and 3.97% (10.53%) respectively) further indicates that my conclusions are relatively insensitive to the effect of a missing covariate.105  Overall, these results show that the usually low-paying private acquirers are willing to pay significantly high premia when a TTFP is present. Hence, the inclusion of the TTFP, while not detrimental to the shareholders of targets acquired by public and private equity companies, actually has a beneficial effect for the shareholders of targets acquired by private firms. Hence, the results of both the parametric and non-parametric analyses suggest that, as reflected by the levels of premia eventually received by the target shareholders, the inclusion of TTFPs in acquisition deals does not reduce the bargaining power of these shareholders, as the Panel suggested. Consequently, I recommend that the Panel end its ban.    
6.7. Conclusion This is the first contribution examining the impact of the varying degrees by which the target shareholders’ commitments to accept an acquisition are binding on the target board’s decision to grant a TTFP in the UK market for corporate control. In particular, I document that this decision is not influenced by the overall percentage of target shares subject to commitments but                                                           103 For the matching exercises presented in the previous footnote, a missing covariate needs to increase the relative odds of TTFP presence in one of two matched deals by a factor exceeding the level of 1.7. 104 Such an analysis follows from the increase of the natural logarithm of the likelihood a TTFP being present by ln(1.6)=0.47. See DiPrete and Gangl (2004) for a description of Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analysis interpretation. 105 I also apply the matching analysis to the sample of deals covering the shareholder’s commitments. The Logistic model used follows the same specification as Model 6 (Table 6.5). The results based on NN matching yield an insignificant ATT of	5.82%.	However,	the	г	level	at	which	the	treatment	effect	becomes	significant	at	the	10%	level	is	1.02. 
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rather by the percentages of shares subject to binding commitments and weakly binding commitments. As a TTFP binds the entire company rather than particular groups of shareholders, my findings are consistent with the notion that the target’s board grants such a provision when the shareholders are committed to accepting the offer but remain reluctant to grant binding promises. Accordingly, further analysis is required to examine the composition of the shareholders’ commitments in the period following the ban to determine whether, as a substitute for TTFPs, the proportion of binding commitments has increased relative to the proportion of weakly binding commitments. Additionally, in examining the empirical merits of the Panel’s decision to ban the inclusion of a TTFP, this contribution provides strong evidence suggesting that the presence of such a provision does not harm the target shareholders. Specifically, after classifying the acquirers in the sample into public operating, private operating and public equity acquirers, my evidence suggests that the effect of the TTFP on the premium is not negative in the groups of comparable deals announced by each of these acquirers. In fact, this effect is positive and significant in the group of acquisitions announced by private operating firms. Furthermore, I combine my premium-related results with the finding that the likelihood of including a TTFP does not significantly differ among these three groups of acquirers to stress that none of these groups exploits the standard inclusion of this provision.  Overall, my empirical findings, combined with the previous literature’s theoretical and empirical conclusions that highlight the harmless aspects of moderate and small termination fee payments, lead to a specific regulatory recommendation that the Panel reconsider its ban. Moreover, on the methodological front, my results highlight the relevance of estimating treatment effects on samples of comparable observations in order to draw accurate regulatory conclusions
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Appendix 4 – Variables’ Definitions 
Variable	(Acronym) Description Source ACQTERM Dummy=1	if	the	deal	includes	an	acquirer	termination	fee	agreement,	0	otherwise SDC		&	InvestEgate CARTHREE The	target’s	announcement	period	three-day	(-1,	1)	Cumulative	Abnormal	Returns Datastream CBACQ Dummy=1	if	the	acquirer	is	a	not	UK	firm,	0	otherwise SDC DOMACQ Dummy=1	if	the	acquirer	is	a	UK	firm,	0	otherwise SDC DVRD Dummy=1	if	the	acquirer	and	the	target	have	different	2-digit	SIC	code,	0	otherwise SDC FCSD Dummy=1	if	the	acquirer	and	the	target	have	the	same	2-digit	SIC	code,	0	otherwise SDC MOE Dummy=1	if	the	deal	is	classified	as	a	merger	of	equal,	0	otherwise SDC PERCHELD The	percentage	of	target	shares	owned	by	the	acquiring	firm	before	the	announcement SDC POST_2008 Dummy=1	if	the	deal	is	announced	in	or	after	the	year	2008,	0	otherwise SDC PREM The	ratio	of	the	deal	value	to	the	acquirer’s	market	valuation	43	days	before	the	announcement	
minus	one SDC PREMADJ The	difference	between	PREM	and	its	average	in	the	target’s	macro-industry	during	the	period	
covered	in	the	sample SDC PRIVACQ Dummy=1	if	the	acquirer	is	a	listed	firm,	0	otherwise SDC PRIVEQ Dummy=1	if	the	deal	is	classified	as	a	private	equity	transaction,	0	otherwise SDC PROP_SCORE The	propensity	score	estimated	by	a	Logistic	model See	the	description	of	Table	6.6 PUBACQ Dummy=1	if	the	acquirer	is	a	privately	listed	firm,	0	otherwise SDC SCHEME Dummy=1	if	the	Scheme	of	Arrangement	is	used	as	a	takeover	method,	0	otherwise SDC STOCK_PERC The	percentage	of	the	deal	value	that	is	financed	with	stock SDC TARGAGE The	number	of	days	separating	the	announcement	days	from	the	date	at	which	the	target	firms	
was	listed	in	Datastream Datastream TARGMTBV The	target	firm’s	market-to-book	value	43	days	before	the	deal’s	announcement Datastream TARGMV The	target	firm’s	market	valuation	43	days	before	the	deal’s	announcement SDC TARGPE The	target	firm’s	price-earnings	value	43	days	before	the	deal’s	announcement Datastream TARGTERM Dummy=1	if	the	deal	includes	a	target	termination	fee	agreement,	0	otherwise	[NOTARGTERM] SDC	&	InvestEgate BIND The	percentage	of	the	target	shares	that	are	subject	to	fully	binding	commitments	to	accept	the	
takeover	bid InvestEgate WEAK_BIND The	percentage	of	the	target	shares	that	are	 subject	to	weakly	binding	commitments	to	accept	
the	takeover	bid	i.e.	commitments	that	expire	under	particular	conditions InvestEgate NON_BIND The	 percentage	 of	 the	 target	 shares	 that	 are	 subject	 to	 non-binding	 promises	 to	 accept	 the	
takeover	bid	 InvestEgate 
Note:	The variables used and their data sources are summarized in this table. SDC is Thomson-Reuters’ SDC database; the adjusted termination fee-related variables are retrieved from the announcements in the InvestEgate financial press website; acquirer- and target-related financial variables are retrieved from Datastream.                                 
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Appendix 5 – The Simultaneous Relationship between the Scheme and the TTFP In Chapter Five, the presence of a TTFP was a treated as an exogenous variable in predicting the use of the Scheme of Arrangement. Yet, in Chapter Six, the presence of a Scheme of Arrangement was treated as an exogenous variable in predicting the use of a TTFP. This appendix puts more emphasis on the endogenous relationship between the Scheme and TTFP. In particular, the results presented in the following table show that both variables are simultaneously determined, and therefore influence each other’s presence through a simultaneous equations system. Following Maddala (1983), two Probit models, rather than Logistic ones, are estimated using pre-determined firm- and deal-related characteristics. Then, various restrictions are examined due to the absence of an apriori justification for a specific exclusion restriction.  Table 6.7: The simultaneous relationship between SCHEME and TARGTERM Dependent  Variable TARGTERM=1 NOTARGTERM=0 SCHEME=1 NOSCHEME=0 TARGTERM=1 NOTARGTERM=0 SCHEME=1 NOSCHEME=0 TARGTERM=1 NOTARGTERM=0 SCHEME=1 NOSCHEME=0 Explanatory Variables\Model (.) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Intercept -0.020 (0.171) -0.1797*** (0.198) -0.154 (0.154) -0.859*** (0.142) 0.140 (0.126) -1.653*** (0.168) STOCK_PERC -0.004*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001)  0.004*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001)  ln(TARGMV) 0.065** (0.030) 0.277*** (0.034) 0.042 (0.032)   0.265*** 0.032) PERCHELD -0.037*** (0.006) -0.006 (0.006) -0.035*** (0.006) -0.007 (0.005) -0.038*** (0.007)  PRIVACQ 0.046 (0.149) -0.060 (0.159)  -0.209 (0.151) 0.067 (0,131) -0.179 (0.147) PRIVEQ 0.081 (0.157) 0.288* (0.165)  0.445*** (0.156)  0.279* (0.160) CBACQ -0.123 (0.134) -0.011 (0.138) -0.127 (0.132) 0.199 (0.130) -0.106 (0.132)  DVRD -0.008 (0.125) 0.220* (0.133) 0.094 (0.117) 0.202* (0.127) -0.034 (0.125)  ACQTERM 0.881*** (0.265) 0.186 (0.248) 0.717*** (0.263)  0.884*** (0.263)  EST_SCHEME   0.314** (0.126)  0.300** (0,149)  EST_TARGTERM    0.445*** (0.156)  0.333*** (0.118) 
N 541 541 541 541 541 541 McFadden R-squared 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.13 Prob (LR-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note:	This	table	presents	the	output	of	the	simultaneous	equations	system	that	relates	SCHEME	and	TARGTERM.	The	first	
two	models	 represent	 the	 reduced-form	equations	 and	 the	 remaining	 four	models	 present	the	 system	with	 arbitrarily	
chosen	 restrictions.	 EST_SCHEME	 and	 EST_TARGTERM	 represent	 the	 fitted	 probabilities	 of	 the	 Scheme	 and	 TTFP	
presence,	respectively,	as	estimated	via	the	reduced-form	equations.	The	McFadden	R-squared	is	reported	to	highlight	the	
goodness	of	fit	of	the	Logistic	regressions.	Standard	errors	are	reported	within	parentheses.	The	p-values	from	the	LR	test	
with	the	restriction	that	all	the	Logistic	model	coefficients	are	jointly	equal	to	0	are	reported.	Variables	not	included	in	the	
table	were	 included	 in	alternative	 specifications	and	were	not	 found	 to	 have	 significant	 effects..	 ***,**,	 and	*	 represent	
significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively.  The results which are presented in Table 6.7 are in line with the qualitative conclusions of the Logistic models reported in Chapters Five and Six. In particular, both the presence of the Scheme and the TTFP are jointly determined and simultaneously linked in a positive relationship. The stability of EST_SCHEME and EST_TARGETERM’s coefficients’ values with the two imposed restrictions, and the high significance of these coefficients, give further support to the reciprocal relationship between these two arrangements. 
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It is worth noting that the key results in Chapters Five and Six are not influenced by this simultaneous relationship. In particular, the main result of an insignificant ATT of the Scheme on the premium received by the target shareholders does not change if TARGTERM is excluded from the matching analysis. Likewise, excluding SCHEME from the models that predict the presence of TTFP does not alter the key result that the TTFP has an insignificant effect on the premium received by the target shareholders.                     
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Concluding Remarks  The primary objective in this thesis was to improve the understanding of the determinants and wealth effects of earnout financing, the Scheme of Arrangement and termination fees in the UK takeover market. In the process, PSM was applied while emphasising its limitations and interpreting its results within the context of an appropriate sensitivity analysis. When appropriate, mainstream parametric analysis was also applied to the matched samples resulting from PSM. Each of the chapters in the thesis included a concluding section that discussed and analysed its empirical results. Therefore, the sole aim of this concluding chapter is to briefly describe these conclusions and their relevance to a future research agenda. With respect to earnout financing, my findings indicate that earnout contracts, by addressing the relevant information asymmetry concerns, help the acquiring firms create additional wealth from private target M&A. However, what Chapter Three shows is that applied economists and merger consultants should be extremely careful when it comes to choosing the appropriate method to estimate the impact of particular contractual arrangements on shareholder wealth. Despite the growing popularity and non-parametric aspect of PSM, when the dataset employed is deficient, this method can yield inaccurate inferences. As this chapter indicates, PSM underestimates the statistical and the economic significance of the earnout’s wealth effect when target-specific factors are omitted from the analysis. Along these lines, employing the relevant sensitivity analysis with PSM in order to quantify the effect that a missing covariate should have on the results reported, and consequently determining if ‘selection on unobservables’ is the main source of estimation bias, are relevant steps that offer critical guidance in evaluating wealth effects.       As an indicator of the earnout’s ability to address the market’s concerns about the acquirer’s overpayment to the target, my findings indicate that increases in the premia are negatively interpreted by the market in non-earnout financed deals via a reduction in the acquirers’ abnormal returns. This negative effect is neutralised in earnout financed deals. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter Four, the target firms can receive relatively high premia following the satisfaction of the earnout’s performance requirements. In particular, I quantify the relationship between the earnout contract’s terms and the offered premium in the earnout financed deal. Along these lines, my results are consistent with the notion that larger relative earnout sizes and longer earnout periods are associated with an increase in the premium that the target’s shareholders require in order to complete the deal. However, contrary to the previous conclusions of Kohers and 
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Ang (2000), despite offering relatively high premia to their targets, the UK acquiring firms are aware of the moral hazard/adverse selection ramifications of making relatively high immediate initial payments. As a result, these firms follow a rule of thumb whereby they make in earnout financed deals initial payments that are lower than, or equal to, the deal payments in comparable non-earnout financed transactions.  Chapter Five provides the first investigation of the frequent reliance on the Scheme of Arrangement in UK public target acquisitions. In addition to examining the influence of various firm- and deal-related factors on the probability of using the Scheme, I also estimate the wealth effects of this takeover method on both the acquiring and the target firms. I document that the tax benefits and guaranteed ownership aspects of the Scheme make its use more likely in complex deals that involve large targets, deals financed by securities, deals that include significant amounts of debt financing and transactions that include termination fee commitments made by the target company. With respect to the premia received by the target shareholders, despite the concerns raised by Payne (2011) about the limited protection offered to target shareholders under the Scheme, my robust parametric and matching-based results indicate that Scheme target shareholders receive premia that are at least as high as those received by the Offer target shareholders.  Regarding the Scheme’s effect on the acquiring firm’s shareholders, I demonstrate how the suboptimal use of the Scheme as a takeover method during the period that preceded its formal codification lead to a significant reduction in the acquirer’s announcement period abnormal returns. Consequently, I put a strong emphasis on the relevance of adopting the appropriate takeover methods when conducting takeovers. I also emphasise the role of regulatory bodies in properly codifying the use of such methods as, otherwise, the regulatory and legal complications that the merging firms will face could significantly reduce the gains from the mergers.  Chapter Six provides the first detailed analysis of determinants and wealth effects of termination fees in the UK market for corporate control. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that termination fees are granted by the target’s board to facilitate the deal’s completion when the target’s shareholders are reluctant to grant binding commitments, and instead make weakly binding commitments to accept the takeover bid. Moreover, my conclusions with respect to the premia are critical of the recent ban that the Panel imposed on termination fees. Particularly, while the Panel’s ban was presented as a protective measure to prevent the exploitation of the target firms’ shareholders, I do not find any evidence suggesting a systematic use of these fees to 
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the detriment of the target shareholders. Consequently, my main recommendation based on the empirical analysis is that the Panel end its ban on termination fees.  Clearly, substantial scope for further research remains. Earnout financing is not the only mechanism applied to address information asymmetry problems in M&A. As Caselli et al. (2006) note, collars and contingent value rights have gained popularity in recent years.106 Hence, the approach that I adopted in studying earnouts, whereby PSM is combined with the RB analysis while also applying parametric analysis to the matched sample, can be useful in studying the characteristics and wealth effects of the remaining risk management techniques. In turn, the analysis of the Scheme of Arrangement in the UK can be applied to samples that cover deals in the various countries in which the use of the Scheme is gaining momentum. Such an analysis can lead to a cross-country comparison of the determinants and wealth effects of the Scheme. This analysis also allows the evaluation of the role of regulatory bodies and merger consultants in influencing the use and codification of this method. Moreover, given that more than three years have passed since the ban on target termination fees, the way this ban influenced the overall M&A activity and the choice of the particular type of ‘Irrevocable Undertakings’ granted by the shareholders could be investigated by comparing these outcomes between the pre- and post-ban periods. In particular, it would be interesting to examine whether the inability to receive target termination fees has made potential bidders reluctant to initiate offers, or if the binding ‘Irrevocable Undertakings’ became more prevalent as substitutes for target termination fees. As this analysis requires the estimation of several outcomes following the Panel’s ban in a time series context, the variant of PSM developed for time series analysis by Angrist and Kuersteiner (2011) is worth considering as a methodology in this investigation.                                                                      106 In stock-for-stock public target deals, a collar gives each party the right to walk away from the deal if the stock price of the other party falls below a pre-specified level. In turn, a contingent value right is a put option issued by the acquiring firm. Via this option, the acquiring firm commits, in case its stock price falls below a pre-specified level, to pay a pre-specified sum to the target firm in cash (Caselli et al., 2006).  
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